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1.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of standard terms in contracts is a roadblock on the road to
reform of American contract law in the era of electronic commerce. In the
1.
The title draws on that of Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. 1. REv. 429 (2002).

t
Visiting Professor of Law, The Catholic University School of Law and Rutgers-Camden
School of Law. J.D. with specialization in International Legal Affairs, Cornell 1977; L1.M.,
Georgetown 1981; Dr. jur., Ludwig Maximilians Universitlit (Munich, Germany) 1986. Formerly, as
Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Dun & Bradstreet, the author was a business
observer/participant in the meetings of the drafting committee of Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, which
became the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. He testified in favor of the act in the two
states that have adopted it. He is a member of the American Law Institute. The views expressed here are
entirely his own. Translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.
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1990s the two sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")-the
American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")-decided to modernize
Article 2 of the U.C.c., which deals with sales of goods, and to create a new
Article 2B, to govern licensing of "computer information," i.e., information in
electronic form, including software. 2 By the end of the decade this ambitious
project lay in shambles. In April 1999, ALI rejected Proposed Article in part
because it did not make major changes in existing law governing standard
terms. In July 1999 NCCUSL rejected the proposed Revised Article 2-Sales
in part because it did seek to change existing law. This continuing controversy
is discussed below in Part II.C.
Standard terms are contract terms that one party formulates for use in its
contracts generally and provides to other parties for use in their mutual
transactions. Typically they are not negotiated but are presented to customers
at the conclusion of bargaining over the contract's principal subject matter.
Standard terms are often referred to pejoratively as "boilerplate." Their legal
importance is that they alter default solutions provided by law. That is, the law
provides one solution that applies "unless the parties agree otherwise." In
standard terms, the parties "agree" otherwise. For example, in a standard term
the buyer may "agree" with the seller to negate a warranty that contract law
would otherwise imply. Standard terms are a feature of the vast majority of
written contracts. Since only one party participates in their formulation, they
offer opportunity for that party to introduce terms that the other might not
willingly agree to in negotiations? In the words of a popular song, "the large
print giveth, and the small print taketh away.,,4
For over forty years American law has authorized courts to decline to
enforce "unconscionable" terms. This unconscionability control is not limited
to standard terms, although it has its principal application there. How
necessary and how successful ·it has been is controversial. While some
observers believe that economic self-interest largely prevents standard terms
drafters from overreaching and that a control limited to the rare
"unconscionable" term is sufficient,5 others complain that the current control
is awkward at best and woefully inadequate at worst. 6

2.
ALI is the source of the noted "Restatements" of the law; it is composed of several
thousand leading jurists. NCUSSL is responsible for most Uniform Acts and consists of several
commissioners per state, usually appointed by the governor of the state, that represent the state. See
Richard E. Speidel, Revising Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 608-09 (2001).
3.
To name a few examples: a term in a contract for new electronic equipment disclaims all
warranties; the terms of a trial subscription to a magazine provide that if not cancelled at the end of the
thirty-day trial, a five-year subscription will be entered; a software license provides that in no
circumstance may the licensee transfer the program to another computer.
4.
TOM WAITS, Step Right Up, on SMALL CHANGE (Elektra Entertairunent 1976), lyrics
available at http://www.yimpan.comlSongsitelLyric/index.asp?sid~2335.SeeWaitsv.Frito-Lay. Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding songwriter's claim for misappropriation of the song).
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 78 to 80.
6.
See, e.g., Bates, infra note 15, at 105 ("[A]dequate consumer protection against unfair
terms in form contracts [is] not being provided by the American legal system"); Mark Klock,
Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REv. 317, 350 (2002) (describing the
American approach as "a complete failure when it comes to deterring unconscionable contracts"). See
also Swanson, infra note 17, at 370.
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The development of infonnation in electronic fonn and of software
(collectively, "computer infonnation") has given standard tenns new and
increased importance. Computer infonnation contracts are hardly imaginable
without standard tenns. Computer infonnation contracts are "licenses." The
standard tenns of these licenses set out what the parties contracting for the
infonnation, i.e., the licensees, may do with it. Typically these licenses limit
the number of users the licensee may permit to use the infonnation, restrict the
uses that the licensee may put the infonnation to, and control the circle of
recipients to whom the licensee may distribute the infonnation. The wish for
legal validation of standard tenns computer infonnation licenses, "shrinkwrap" and "click-wrap" licenses,? was a major goal of the backers of the
Unifonn Computer Infonnation Transactions Act ("UCITA").
Thanks to development of the Internet, standard tenns are a global issue.
Parties from different countries meet on the Internet. They enter into online
license agreements that govern use of Internet sites and transactions in
computer infonnation. They reach contracts for international sales of goods
that utilize standard tenns. As a result, standard tenns designed for use in one
country are subject to laws for which they were not designed. Dozens oftenns
in common use by American Internet service providers such as AOL and
CompuServe have been struck down abroad as unlawful. Even mighty
Microsoft has bowed to consumer associations rewriting its standard license
for Windows 2000. 8
Ever more countries are adopting standard tenns laws. In 1993, on the
eve of the commercialization of the Internet and just as the United States
began revising the D.C.C., the European Union ("E.D.") introduced controls
on standard tenns. It adopted Council Directive 93/13IEEC of April 5, 1993
on unfair tenns in consumer contracts (hereinafter, the "Unfair Tenns
Directive"). The directive requires Member States to have unfair tenns
statutes that meet certain minimum standards. Those standards are more
restrictive than American law. Other countries outside Europe have also
.
adopted standard tenns statutes. 9
The E.D. Unfair Tenns Directive did not appear out of nowhere. Perhaps
its most important source of inspiration was the Gennan Standard Tenns
Statute of 1976 [Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen
7.
"Shrink-wrap" licenses are licenses printed on the packaging of software and other
computer information delivered to licensees in tangible media (e.g., computer diskettes of some kind).
The package is wrapped in a clear-read-through shrink-wrap plastic. The buyer of the computer
information is deemed to have assented to the terms of the license by ripping open the shrink-wrap.
"Click-wrap" licenses are licenses shown in electronic form or made available to users on computer
screens to users. Before the user is permitted to use the online service or the computer program, the user
must agree to the license terms. The user assents to the standard terms by clicking with the mouse. The
term "click-wrap" arose by analogy to "shrink-wrap." Online licenses are typically in "click-wrap"
form, but there is yet another form of online license that is asserted: "browse-wrap." The theory of a
browse-wrap license is that the user is informed that use of the Internet site amounts to the user's assent
to the site's stated terms.
8.
See infra text accompanying note 346. The same trio seems to have lost only one term to
legal action in the United States. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. and America Online,
Inc., 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002).
9.
See, e.g., The Consumer Contract Act [Japan 2001); Adhesion Contract Act [Korea 1986,
amended 1992), both available in English translation at Asia Pacific Consumer Law,
http://www.ciroap.org/apcl/index.htrnl.
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Geschiiflsbedingungen]. 10 That statute itself seems to have had a common
origin with present day American law. In the 1950s, just as both the u.e.e.
and the Common Market were being launched, German and American legal
systems were both working on new approaches to standard terms. The
approaches in the two countries were strikingly similar. This seems to have
been a product of a flow of ideas across the Atlantic. l1 In any case, by the
1960s and 1970s the courts in the two countries were working to give form to
those new rules. In Germany the courts were sufficiently successful that the
legislature could codify the rules in a new statute, the Standard Terms Statute
of 1976.
Already in the 1950s when the U.C.C. was first under consideration,
Rudolf B. Schlesinger called for a "serious study of the advantages and
disadvantages" of the methods undertaken to control oppressive clauses in
Europe and America. 12 Schlesinger had an essentially legislative rationale for
his proposal-such a study would bring critical perspective to drafting
American laws. In 1976, on the eve of adoption of the German Standard
Terms Statute, John P. Dawson published such a study of the then existing
German case law. He found much to admire in German law and counseled
that "German experience can be a guide.,,!3 Two decades later, when ALI and
NCCUSL took up revisions to the u.e.C., Professor Peter Winship reminded
them of Schlesinger's invocation that "[t]he civilians have faced the same
issue and resolved it with a variety of devices," and he renewed the call for a
systematic study.14 The comparativists' call for systematic study has gone
unheeded, even though now there is also a highly practical reason to study
foreign standard terms law. 15
The goal of this article is to begin at long last such systematic
comparative studies of foreign standard terms laws from an American
perspective. Its aims are at the same time both highly practical-facilitation of
compliance with foreign
law-and highly scientific-improved
comprehension of the issues and approaches available to deal with standard
terms.

10. BGBI. IS. 3317 [hereinafter AGB-Gesetz]. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Standard Form
Conditions, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 255, 258 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998);
Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L LJ. 333, 341 (1999).
II. See infra text accompanying notes 37-42, 197.
12. RudolfB. Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative Law,
1 INTER-AM. L. REv. 11,33 (1959). Schlesinger's article first appeared in a government document in
1955. !d. at 11.
13. John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1041, 1125 (1976).
14. Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law," 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1156-58 (1996).
15. There is no study in American legal literature of the E.U.'s Unfair Terms Directive and no
study based on primary sources of German Standard Terms law since Dawson's study made before the
German statute was adopted. The closest article there is to such a study is Larry Bates's recently
published work, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of
Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. I, (2002) (surveying law in Germany, Sweden and the
United Kingdom before the directive, as well as the law of Israel, for models for American law).
Unfortunately, Professor Bates's article does not treat the Unfair Terms Directive, and for its discussion
of German standard terms law, the article relies exclusively on secondary, English-language sources
published more than fifteen years ago.
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This article examines American, European Union, and German law. It
considers not only current law, but significant aspects of the development of
these bodies of law. Awareness of the latter furthers understanding of the
former. Part II sets out general issues involved in standard terms laws and
summarizes American law. It notes the possible origin of American concepts
in Europe and examines standard terms in the struggle over revision of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Part III looks at the law of the European Union
and its origin in the consumer movement. Part IV considers in detail the law
of one Member State as an example, that of Germany.16 Finally, the
conclusion summarizes the results of the examination and notes insights into
American practice that European experiences suggest.
II.

AMERICAN LAW

Part II first examines standard terms in contracts as a general issue. It
then summarizes standard terms in American law 17 and notes the possible
origins of the American law in the German law of the day. Finally, it
examines the treatment of standard terms in the reform of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
A.

Standard Terms Generally as a Legal Problem

Standard terms have been used for well over a century. The issues
involved in their use have long been known. Contract law in Western
countries is based on the principle of freedom of contract. Thus, to varying
extents, but generally as much as is widely acceptable in anyone system,
contract law is default law. That is, it is law that applies unless the parties
agree otherwise.
The nineteenth century brought not only mass production, but also mass
distribution, and with mass distribution, form contracts. In form contracts the
party supplying a product or service (referred to here as "user") spells out the
terms on which the party does business and which it expects the other party to
accept (referred to here often as the "other party"). Standard terms permit
suppliers to rationalize their offerings, to control their agents, and to avoid
wasting time negotiating terms that they are not prepared to vary. Standard
terms can provide answers to questions on which the law is silent. 18 Yet just
16. See infra text accompanying note 197.
17. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this article. For recent fuller examinations
of standard tenns in American law, see E. ALAN FARNSWORTII, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 1999); W.
DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 142
(1996); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151-77 (5th ed. 2000);
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1; Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary:
Article 2
and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REv. 359, 367 (2001). For a listing of still others, see
Bates, supra note 15, at 2 n.2, 14 n.38 (2002).
18. For discussions of the costs and benefits of enforcing standard fonns, see Hein Katz,
Welche gesetzgeberischen Maftnahmen empfehlen sich zum Schutze des Endverbrauchers gegenuber
Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen und Formularvertriigen?, in 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DES FONFZIGSTEN
DEUTSCHEN JuruSTENTAGES, A9, A21-A25 (1974); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 437-41
(2002). Standard tenns make up standard fonn contracts. Standard fonn contracts are themselves
sometimes called contracts of adhesion.

u.c.c.
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as fonn contracts provide benefits, so too, they produce problems. Karl N.
Llewellyn observed that users of standard tenns may "turn[] out a fonn of
contract which resolves all questions in advance in favor of the one party.,,19
What controls, if any, should a legal system place on such tenns?
In contract law, tenns become parts of contracts because parties assent
to them. Typically where standard tenns are used, however, parties are asked
to submit to them unread or, if read, not necessarily understood. 20 Moreover,
when parties do read and understand standard tenns and object to them, the
parties imposing them may refuse any alteration. Where standard tenns are
inalterable, parties asked to "agree" to the tenns in some instances will have
no easy alternatives other than to submit. That is most obviously the case
where the supplier has a monopoly or where all other suppliers use the same
tenns. But practically-at least in smaller matters-it may also be the case
where the inconvenience of seeking out alternatives is disproportionate to the
dangers involved in accepting the tenns. Users of standard tenns act in their
own interests. 21 Ask in house counsels to speak candidly and they will
acknowledge, as one general counsel advised senior management of a Fortune
500 company, that "[t]he purpose of fonn contracts is primarily to protect the
needs of our [internal] clients, not to protect the interests of our customers.,,22
But when users provide tenns in their own self-interest, and parties submitting
to them do not read them or have no choice but to accept them, possibilities
for abuse arise.
Recognition that contract law should provide some measure of
protection against overreaching in contract tenns is near universal in modem
legal systems. 23 Comparative law questions relate to how different legal
systems perceive and define the problem and how they seek to resolve it. 24
Perceptions of the problem mostly lie between two points of view. One view
sees the issue as a contract law question of how the general contract law
requirement of assent applies to standard tenns; the other view sees the
problem as an issue of protection of weaker parties to contracts. Actions taken
to resolve the problem tend to address one or both of two principal questions.
One question is whether and what fonnal or procedural requirements should
detennine whether tenns become parts of contracts (referred to here as
"incorporation control"). The other question is whether and how the content or
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Contract-Institutional Aspects, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 329,335 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1931).
20. For a discussion of the economic, social, and cognitive reasons parties do not read forms,
see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 445-54.
21.
While users are usually suppliers, sometimes they are customers, particularly large ones.
They also may be trade associations or even government bodies. They frequently seek to transfer all
risks to the other parties. See K6tz, supra note 18, at A26-A29 (rejecting the argument that the risk
transfer produces lower prices).
22.
This quotation is from a company internal communication on file with the author. While
this might seem obvious to a lawyer, it is not always obvious to laymen. The author had the in house
lawyer's nightmare come true: an internal client used the company form when the company was,
exceptionally, on the other side of the transaction.
23. See 1 HEIN K6TZ & AxEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 138 (Tony Weir trans.
1997); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 333 (Tony Weir trans.,
3d ed. 1998)
24. This article is concerned only with overreaching through use of standard terms and not
with other issues of overreaching, such as duress.
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substance of tenns should be subject to control (referred to here as "content
control"). All of these concepts are found in American law.
B. . American Approaches to Standard Terms, Especially in the U. C. C.

American treatments of standard tenns have been dominated for over
forty years by concepts identified with Llewellyn: "unconscionability" and
"blanket assent." Llewellyn's influence is pervasive to this day.25 As the
leading commercial law scholar of the mid-twentieth century, principal
architect of the U.C.C., and Reporter for Article 2, Llewellyn drafted section
2-302 of the U.C.C. It pennits, but does not require, a court to decline to
enforce a tenn that it finds "unconscionable.,,26 While a precursor of section
2-302 drafted in the early 1940s applied only to standard tenns,27 section 2302 is not limited to controlling standard tenns. It applies to transactions
between merchants as well as to transactions with consumers. Section 2-302
first became law in 1954 when Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt
the u.C.C.; in the 1960s it became law throughout the land,zs Llewellyn
considered the section to be "perhaps the most valuable section in the entire
Code.,,29 Subject to much discussion3o and criticism from the beginning,
section 2-302 has never been amended. It almost certainly will remain
essentially unchanged for the foreseeable future. 3 !
25. See, e.g.. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 4.26, at 301-02 (highlighting Llewellyn's name
in the margin); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I (in which Llewellyn's name appears 34 times). Cf
Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) provides:
26.
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
Official Comment 1 elaborates:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the
contracts or clauses which they fmd to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has
been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of
offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to
the dominant purpose of the contract. The section is intended to allow the court to pass
directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a
conclusion oflaw as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear that it is
proper for the court to hear evidence upon these questions. The principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power. /d. (internal citations omitted).
See also Kiitz, supra note 18, at A49 (discussing the virtues of an open control of content in German
law).
27.
Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51
SMU L. REv. 275, 299-302, 306-14, 334-36 (1998) (quoting the provision); see also Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 509-10 (1967)
(quoting the provision).
28. The history of the drafting of section 2-302 is set out in Leff, supra note 27, at 489-501,
509-16.
29. FARNSWORTI!, supra note 17, § 4.28, at 307, citing New York Law Revision Commission,
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code at 121 (1954).
30. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 365 (4th ed. 1998).
31. If the ALI Membership adopts the NCCUSL-ALI post-1999 compromise, already
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Section 2-302 was not Llewellyn's last word on the subject. In the 1960s
he introduced the concept of "blanket assent" to explain what happens in
standard fonn contracts. He denied that there is assent to all the tenns of a
standard fonn contract. Assent, he argued, applies only to the few "dickered"
tenns, the broad type of the transaction, and "a blanket assent (not a specific
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent tenns the seller may have on his
fonn, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
tenns.,,32 The idea is said to dominate American treatment of standard fonns. 33
From this base the United States has dealt with standard tenns. Court
decisions and scholarship-there has been no legislation as such34-have built
on this base, seeking to make sense of it, and working to make it effective.
Competing or perhaps better described as complementary approaches, i.e., the
doctrines of "reasonable expectations" and a somewhat similar scheme used in
the Restatement of Contracts, have sought favor. The efforts have not been
universally regarded as successful. 35
Llewellyn considered the authority bestowed on courts by section 2-302
to be novel in American law. 36 Comparative law scholars believe that
Llewellyn drew his inspiration for section 2-302 from the practice of
controlling standard tenns in Gennany under the general clauses of the
Gennan Civil Code. 37 Although in the latter part of his life Llewellyn
approved by both NCCUSL and by the ALI Council, see Report of ALI Council Consideration of
U.C.C. Projects, available at http://www.ali.org/forum4/ALIReport_LiebmanI002.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2002), the only change will be to substitute the word "term" for the word "clause." See
American Law Institute, Uniform Commercial Code-Proposed Amendments to Article 2. Sales &
Proposed Amendments to Article 2A. Leases-Council Draft No.2 (October 8, 2002) § 2-302 (2002). If
that draft is defeated, which seems unlikely, there will be no change at all.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LA W TRADITION-DECIDING ApPEALS 370 (1960).
32.
33.
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461. See also MARTIN MUNZ, ALLGEMEINE
GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN IN DEN USA UND DEUTSCHLAND 1M HANDELSVERKEHR 70 (1992).
34.
At least there has been no general legislation. There have been consumer protection laws
that affect standard terms in certain types of contracts and sectors.
35. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 15, at 2 n.2, 14 n.40 (concluding that there is an "absence of
any sort of consensus among legal commentators" and "[t]he case law is full of inconsistencies,
contradictions, and lacks any sort of unifying theme"); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 434
(noting that "[t]he doctrine governing contract enforcement has long been criticized as vague, illdefined, and easily muddled").
36.
This is clear from the official comment, quoted in supra note 26. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra
note 17, § 4.28, at 307 (calling it "one of the [U.C.C.'s] most innovative sections").
37.
RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 20-21
(6th ed. 1998); JUTTA KLAPISCH, DER EINFLUB DER DEUTSCHEN UND OSTERREICHISCHEN EMIGRANTEN
AUF CONTRACTS OF ADHESION UND BARGAINING IN GoOD FAITH 1M US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT 66
(1991) (citing views of Eike von Hippel). The inspirational sections would be Section 138 (prohibiting
sittenwidrige transactions, i.e., those against good morals), and Section 242 (requiring Treu und
Glauben, i.e., "good faith" in carrying out contracts). But not everyone sees its origin in German law.
See, e.g., Kamp, supra note 27, at 299-302, 306-14, 334-36 (1998) (discussing origin of Section 2-302
with no mention of a German connection). Those who see the origin elsewhere find it in the practice of
the courts of equity. The concept of unconscionability is said to have "deep roots in law and equity." See
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.38, at 366. But see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942) (suggesting skepticism in referring to an "asserted doctrine of
unconscionability"). What mix of influences may have directed Llewellyn's drafting of § 2-302 may
never be known, but that the German Civil Code was a direct influence on him is generally believed. See
E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant
International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 47, 52 (1995) (noting that the
obligation of good faith in U.C.C. Section 1-304, former Section 1-203, comes directly from Section 242
of the German Civil Code).
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preferred to downplay, if not conceal, the importance of foreign ideas on his
thinking/ 8 his familiarity with the German legal system is now well known. 39
While from New York City, Llewellyn graduated from high school in
Germany and he spoke German fluently. In the 1920s and early 1930s, he
spent two years in Leipzig as a visiting professor and published one of his
most important jurisprudential works there. 4o His knowledge of the pre-War
practice of standard terms control is obvious from his review of the first
comparative book on the topic in which he stated some of his thoughts on the
subject. 41 Just as he may have drawn on German law in drafting section 2-302,
Llewellyn may also have drawn inspiration for his idea of blanket assent from
German practice in the 1950s.42
Section 2-302 on unconscionability is the principal American.treatment
of standard terms. Even where it is not directly applicable-because a
transaction does not involve a sale of goods-its approach is often followed,
either explicitly or sub silentio. 43 Section 2-302 is not limited to standard
38. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 37, at 21. Riesenfeld reports the counsel that
Llewellyn gave him immediately upon his arrival in the United States:
Another piece of advice impressed me even more. He mentioned the failure of courses in
comparative law and told me never to reveal when I relied on an idea coming from continental
Europe, because that would be the 'kiss of death,' again reiterating that admonition three times
over so that it would sink in as it did.
Stefen A. Riesenfeld, Reminiscences of Karl Llewellyn, in RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE
GESELLSCHAIT UND HANDELSRACHT: KARL N. LLEWELLYN UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE 11, 14
(Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 1994).
39. See Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 705 (1992); Paul D.
Carrington, Der Einflu/3 kontinentalen Rechts auf Juristen und Rechtskultur der USA 1776-1933 JZ
[JURISTENZEITUNG] 529, 537; Ulrich Drobnig, Llewellyn and Germany, in RECHTSREALISMUS, supra
note 38, at 17; Shael Hennan, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1125, 1128 (1982); Riesenfeld, supra
note 38, at 15 ("Llewellyn was intimately acquainted with Gennan doctrinal developments."); James
Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987). A close connection remained to the end of his life.
When he died in 1962 Llewellyn was working on a set of lectures to deliver in Gennany that were to
give a "comprehensive picture of his thought" such as he had never before given. WILLIAM TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT viii (1973).
40.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA (1933),
translated as THE CASE LA W SYSTEM IN AMERICA (M. Ansaldi trans., 1989).
41.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939) (reviewing OTTO
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW
(1937». Dawson observed that the "main object" of the book was to describe Gennan practice on
standardized fonn contracts. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117-23.
Dawson hints at such an inspiration. Compare Dawson, supra note 13, at 1108 (noting
42.
Gennan Supreme Court Judgment of March 8, 1955) with id. at 1118 ("[E]ven a brief summary [of
Llewellyn's 1960 argument] should suggest how closely it parallels the basic elements in the thinking of
Gennan courts and scholars." Nor did the influence of Gennan law on American treatment of fonn
agreements stop with Llewellyn. Emigre Gennan scholars, particularly Friedrich Kessler and Albert
Ehrenzweig, had a substantial influence. See GOTTFRIED RAISER, DIE GERICHTLICHE KONTROLLE VON
FORMULARBEDINGUNGEN 1M AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 12 n.65 (1966); KLAPISCH,
supra note 37, at 55-110; Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections
on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 887, 889 (1956); RudolfB. Schlesinger,
supra note 12, at 32 n.54.
43. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.39, at 370; FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, §
4.28, at 308; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-2, at 153. See also Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (applying § 2-302 unconscionability analysis to nonArticle 2 transaction); Gonzalez v. A-I Self-Storage, Inc. 795 A.2d 885, 888 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000)
(applying § 2-302 unconscionability analysis to non-U.C.C. transaction and commenting on role of 2302 generally). Cf SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 142 (noting that when courts adopted unconscionability,
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terms, but applies to all contract terms, including separately negotiated terms.
In practice, however, most cases in recent times involve standard terms. 44
Review of standard terms is not limited to anyone class of contracting parties,
e.g., consumers, but applies generally to all parties. Cases applying section 2302 in practice often involve businesses,4s although businesses are said to
have little success except in cases of procedural unconscionability.46
Section 2-302 is a general clause, essentially authorizing courts to
review contract terms. It provides little direction and is not backed up by any
list of unconscionable terms. The question is a legal one for the court, but
requires taking evidence on the term's "commercial setting, purpose and
effect.,,47 Unconscionability determinations are "fact-sensitive" and are made
on a "case-by-case basis.,,48 Although section 2-302 does not distinguish
between incorporating standard terms into contracts and controlling the
contents of those terms, the Official Comment seems to suggest, when it
references 0p.pression and unfair surprise, that the section is concerned with
both issues. Notwithstanding the absence of a clear statutory mandate,
commentary and case decisions under 2-302 distinguish between "procedural
unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability."so That pair of terms
corresponds to incorporation control and content control, respectively.
Procedural unconscionability is concerned with how the parties reached
agreement and which terms are part of it, i.e., the contract documents, their
legibility and comprehensibility, etc. Substantive unconscionability relates to
the promises actually made in the terms themselves, e.g., liability disclaimers.
Since section 2-302 has no explicit control on incorporation of terms,
courts have derived a control from the general prohibition of
unconscionability. Perhaps as a result, they are disinclined to invalidate terms
"they were not changing the common law to be like Article 2-they were making the common law and
the law of the article simultaneously"}.
44.
SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 24 n.l
(1977) (reporting one non-standard term case out of 160); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 142 (reporting
"not one" case out of "thousands" involving a non-standard term). In the earliest days of the Section,
many cases are said to have involved excessive prices, which obviously are not standard terms. Those
cases, however, are said to have dwindled to a "trickle." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-6, at
163.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, at 371; SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143 (1996)
45.
(reporting "[a]t least 40 percent of the parties seeking the protections of unconscionability in the
reported cases have been business consumers since 1990").
46.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-9, at 176. But see SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143
(noting that it is applied to both "without distinction").
47.
U.C.C. § 2-302(2}.
48.
Forsyth v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., 135 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1997). Accord,
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 156 ("It is not possible to define unconscionability. It is not
a concept, but a determination to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula.").
Dawson also emphasized the general character of the Section 2-302 test. See Dawson, supra note 13, at
1042 (noting that "[a]1I will agree that by any test Section 2-302 is a general clause").
49.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.37, at 366, § 9.40, at 373. The Comment is
quoted supra note 26.
50.
Formative for the American discussion is Leff, supra note 27. See also Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 456-58 (discussing unconscionability and the importance of Leffs
argument). Views ofLeffs article are disparate. According to one view, it is one of the twenty-two most
influential law review pieces published between 1965 and 1985. Robert C. Berring & Sally Gunderson,
Preface to 3 GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS 1, 1-3 (Robert C. Berring & Sally Gunderson eds.,1990).
Dawson thought it, of the many articles on U.C.C. unconscionability, "the silliest of them all." Dawson,
supra note 13, at 1041 n.l.
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on this ground alone, except in cases of essential goods or services and
monopoly-like situations. 5l They commonly require that both procedural and
substantive unconscionability be present, employing what has been called a
"sliding scale" that allows taking into account both elements. 52 They are
reluctant to invalidate a term based on substantive unconscionability alone. 53
A most peculiar result follows from this: a clever user need only make sure
that the other party knows of the term's existence. A party who knows what
he or she is agreeing to cannot later complain that it is unconscionable. 54
American law imposes on that party a duty to read which is said to enshrine
the writing as "sacrosanct" and make it "impregnable.,,55
The unconscionability standard of section 2-302 conjures up a picture of
Simon Legree demanding the debtor's first-born child to guarantee
performance. 56 It seems to have been meant to impose a hurdle higher than
unfairness. 57 The Official Comment says that Section 2-302 is not designed to
adjust for imbalances in bargaining power in order to protect weaker parties.
Thus it would seem to be more concerned with the bargain that is struck than
with the respective strengths and weaknesses of the parties. 58 Although some
51. See V.C.C. [New) Revised art. 2. Sales § 2-302, Comment I, at 34-35 (Council Draft No.
I) (Oct. 5, 2000) (noting that courts "should seldom invalidate a contract, or a term of a contract, that is
not substantively unconscionable solely on the basis of one party's conduct," but "generally" should
require both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability); Swanson, supra note 22, at 365, 393-95.
52.
E.g., Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Engineering, Inc., 107 Cal.
Rptr. 645, 656 (2001). See SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 57; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 457;
Swanson, supra note 22, at 367, 393-95.
53.
Swanson, supra note 17, at 368. See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at
169.
54. See, e.g., Eller v. Nationsbank of Texas, 975 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App. 1998)
(upholding a term absolving bank of all liability for loss to safe deposit box content, noting "[h]aving
signed it, she is bound by its terms"). But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at 169 (noting
that courts have yet to give an answer to this question). Murray notes that in American contract law,
"[t]he overriding reluctance to excuse a party from the terms of a record he has signed continues as a
brooding omnipresence." John E. Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 DUQ. L.
REv. 533, 565 (1997). It is especially strong in a business context, even where the signer cannot read the
language of the document. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Cermanica Nuova
d'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1386 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We find it nothing short of astounding
that an individual, purportedly experienced in commercial matters, would sign a contract in a foreign
language and expect not to be bound simply because he could not comprehend its terms."). But under
German law, the contract partner ordinarily will be deemed to have accepted foreign language standard
terms only if they are in the language in which contract negotiations took place. Schmidt in
VLMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG DES RECHTS DER
ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 277 (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN,
AGB-GESETZ]. Speidel, long before he became Reporter for Revised Article 2, argued against ''writ[ing]
off the individual consumer who should have reasonably understood that a risk was allocated to him."
Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 359, 364
(1970). He called for eliminating any requirement of assent for consumers and testing consumer general
terms only against "oppression." !d. at 374-75. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at 169
("Courts probably delude themselves when they assume that the prominence of a printed clause brings it
to the buyer's attention and thus gives buyer a more 'meaningful choice. "').
55.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45, at 390.
56.
Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 156 (giving as an example, "I have the
right to cut off one of your child's fingers for each day you are in default").
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Professional Claims, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (M.D. AI. 1998)
(noting that "the doctrine of unconscionability is reserved for egregious cases"). Cf WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 17, § 4-2, at 154 ("gross advantage-taking").
58.
But see MUNZ, supra note 33, at 225-26 (arguing that the goal of American law is to
create a fictitious equality of the parties).
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courts have attempted to give a more concrete
definition to unconscionability,
~
no generally accepted tests have emerged. The cases are said to be too fact
specific to lead to a useful body of case precedent. 60
Two alternative tests have been proposed: that of Restatement section
61
211 and that of "reasonable expectations." Under Restatement section
211 (3), "Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement." The Restatement test has not been
frequently applied. A few years ago one review found only forty-three
reported decisions applying this, test, of which twenty-five came from
62
Arizona. As this provision has been applied, courts have focused on the
expectation of the party manifesting assent rather than the drafter of the terms,
notwithstanding that the language suggests a contrary focus. 63 This has
resulted in the Restatement test becoming more like the "reasonable
expectations" test. 64
The reasonable expectations test invalidates a term that lies outside what
a party might reasonably expect. The reasonable expectations test has been
applied mostly to insurance contracts, particularly where the fine print negated
the insured's purpose in acquiring the insurance. 65 Both the Restatement and
reasonable expectations tests look to the expectations and intentions of the
particular parties to the transaction. 66
In important respects all three approaches are similar as applied. They
provide general clauses with somewhat different tests, They do not provide
separate regimens for incorporating terms into contracts, They do not give
specific types of objectionable terms. Their focus is on the individual parties
and is case-specific. They do not develop abstract and generalizing rules.
They are all said to follow Llewellyn'S concept of "blanket assent" which is
said to be "best understood to mean that, although consumers do not read
59.
Swanson, supra note 17, at 366.
SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 57.
60.
RilsTATEMENT § 211 reads in full:
61.
§ 211 Standardized Agreements
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the
writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a partiCUlar term, the term is not
part of the agreement.
62.
James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2,75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 324-25
(1997).
63.

Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 459.

64.
65.

Id.
Id.

66.
But the Restatement test "seems to be suggesting a new kind of objective approach to
standardized agreements. Rather than seeking out true assent on a case by case basis, it places the duty
on the courts to consider the essential fairness of the printed terms, both from the viewpoint of surprise
and inherent one-sidedness." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45, at 391. Had American
contract law gone in that direction, it would be similar to the contract model of German law. See infra
Part IV.B.
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standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance are
reasonable, consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be
bound to them. ,,67
Section 2-302 provides only one mechanism for dealing with
unconscionable terms: a court may choose not to enforce them. That
mechanism, of course, assumes that the user seeks to enforce the
unconscionable term. Section 2-302 makes no provision for damages,
injunctive, or declaratory relief. It provides no authorization for proactive
action by an administrative or other public law body. It is the same for both
the Restatement and the reasonable expectations tests. As a result of the
method of enforcement, use of unconscionable terms is practically a no-risk
proposition. If one party uses the term and the other party does nothing, one
wins. If the other party has the wherewithal to challenge the term, if the
challenge is unsuccessful, the party using the term wins. If, on the other hand,
the party challenging the term wins, the user is no worse off than if he or she
had never used the term at all. He or she can now redraft the term in slightly
68
different language and use it again.
Unconscionability, in any case, has proven to be a hard standard to meet:
only a small handful of cases-according to one count, just fourteen in one
ten-year period-did. 69 Judge Posner noted some years ago that Indiana was
"so unfriendly to the defense of unconscionability" that in more than twenty
years there was only one reported case where it was accepted: a clause,
untitled, in fine print, whereby a high school drop-out guaranteed a
multinational oil company against the consequences of its own negligence. 7o
So how is the American approach of unconscionability judged? A
current consumers' guide published by the American Bar Association
concludes in typical telegraphic text that th~ rule's application is "uncommon,
uneven, and unpredictable.,,71 Most scholarly commentators would probably
agree. Standard works on contracts72 and studies of unconscionability suggest
as much. 73 Section 2-302 is extremely difficult to defend as a working rule
and hardly anyone does.
67. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461.
68. SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143. Of course, the careful user in the occasional challenge
case will settle that case so as not to risk an adverse decision on the term that might hinder its future use.
See Swanson, supra note 17, at 387. For a discussion of the infirmities of enforcement through litigation,
see Bates, supra note 15, at 6-7,18-28.
69. U.C.C. Revised art. 2, § 2-105 (Discussion Draft 1997). The actual number of cases is
debated, but the fact that the number is in the tens or hundreds rather than in thousands or higher seems
clear.
70. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1985).
71. ABA
Guide
to
Consumer
Law,
Chapter
3,
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practicallbooks/consumer/home.html(last visited Dec. 15,2002).
72. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45 (finding inconsistency in which theory
should be applied, and a lack of uniformity in the results reached in similar cases); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 17, § 4.28 ("[That] the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and
weakness."); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 155 (noting that the test of unconscionability
is "nearly useless").
73.
See, e.g., Bates, supra note IS, at 14 n.40 ("The case law is full of inconsistencies,
contradictions, and lacks any sort of unifying theme."); Swanson, supra note 17, at 386 ("Athough the
commentary is mixed, most is negative, and the volume of discontent alone signals a desire for
change-for improvement. The most common criticisms stem from the amorphous nature of the
doctrine .... "). See also John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIIT. L. REv.
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Instead of admiring how well it works, supporters of section 2-302
emphasize that alternatives are likely to be worse. When section 2-302
originated, it was subject to much controversy. There was much fear that it
would disrupt the commercial world. Llewellyn surely did not have disruption
in mind when he proposed section 2-302, but, just as surely, he did hope that
section 2-302 would lead to judicial development of a "machinery for striking
down,,74 improper terms that would permit courts to "police explicitly against
the contracts or terms which they find to be unconscionable.,,75 The feared
disruption has not occurred. 76 But the cost has been that the provision is rarely
77
enforced and has little effect on actual business practice.
Advocates of the "alternatives-would-be-worse" approach fall into two
basic camps that might be characterized as optimists and pessimists. Optimists
like the present law. Some believe that there is no problem78 or that the market
79
sufficiently discourages opportunism in standard terms. Others feel that
8o
section 2-302, with all its warts, works pretty well. Pessimists, on the other
hand, concede that section 2-302 does not work well. But they doubt that there
is any way to improve on it. They are resigned to a less than satisfactory law.
Typically they are inclined to continue with judicial development of
. b'l'
unconsclOna
Ilty. 81
The defenses of section 2-302 are less than satisfying. If oppressive
terms are not a problem, then why not simply dispense with the section
1, 2 (1969) ("The existing case law is not helpful with rare exception-the writers have done little
beyond deplore the Delphic nature ofthe concept or the codification thereof.").
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 369-70. Cf Murray, supra note 37, at 38.
74.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (Official Comment 1) (2002).
75.
76.
This was already noted in 1970. See Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or
Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 337, 345 (1970) ("Conservatism in the application of section 2-302, together
with refusal to give it punitive or penal effect, have kept it from having any noticeably disruptive effect
on the commercial world.").
77. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143; see also Eben Colby, Note, What Did the
Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the Walker Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REv. 625
(2002) (reviewing a famous unconscionability case and its impact on the party to it).
78. See, e.g., Letter from Professor Randy E. Barnett, Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston
University School of Law, to Lawrence 1. Bugge, Chairman, Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 9,
1999) at 1, 2, quoted in Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transactions in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. REv. 371, 403 (2000) ("There is no great reservoir of
problematic cases in which consumers have been victimized in ways that are not currently redressed by
2-302. I searched hard for such cases to include in my casebook ... but to no avail. The seas were
relatively tranquil. .. .It is an attempt to fix something that is not broken, with the effect of harming both
consumers and sellers in the process.").
79. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1. See also Robert A. Hillman, Debunking
Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C. C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L.
REv. 1,25 (1981).
80. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461 ("The current bundle of judicial
approaches to policing paper-form contracts reflects Llewellyn's vision and provides a workable
solution to the issues raised by paper standard forms."); Swanson, supra note 17, at 399 ("As for
substantive content, the current Section 2-302 adequately serves its underlying purposes .... Despite all
the fuss, the more things change, the more they remain the same-and that is not a bad result here.");
White, supra note 62.
81.
See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J.L. & COM. 1,40
(1999) ("There is no escape from such a necessarily fluid and vague standard."); Murray, supra note 73,
at 38 ("any statute is at best dubious, uncertain, awkward, deficient or spotty") (paraphrasing
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 144, 174 ; William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Neoformalism in a Real World ofForms, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 971, 1004 (2001).
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altogether? Nearly everyone recognizes that application of section 2-302 does
not work well. But if standard terms are a problem, then why not do
something meaningful about them? There is no apparent reason why one
should believe that a law that is rarely applied and that has little sanction when
it is applied much affects business behavior. Advocates of the status quo insist
upon "hard statistical data" to justify revision. 82 Perhaps they should present
data supporting the status quo. One need not look far to see that section 2-302
has invalidated only a tiny number of standard terms. An examination of cases
illustrates that even the variety of terms subject to the section is limited.
Nevertheless, empirical research into what terms businesses actually use
would be welcome.
Mixed judgments of section 2-302 are not limited to the scholarly
community. A split in public perception became apparent in the course of the
reform of the V.C.C. Then consumer groups largely opposed section 2-302
83
unconscionability while business interests generally supported it.
C.

The U. C. C. Reform Debacle

84

By the late 1980s the V.C.C. seemed middle-aged. Article 2 appeared to
need change. Since it had been drafted in the 1940s, it had no provision for
software or other forms of computer information. An official study
commission created in 1988 recommended that a drafting committee be
appointed to propose revisions to Article 2. A committee was appointed and
began meeting in 1992. 85
As originally conceived, Revised Article 2 was to include both the
existing law of sales of goods and new law for licensing computer
information. It was to accomplish this through an approach known as "huband-spoke." Matters common to both types of transactions were to be covered
by the "hub," while matters peculiar to one type of transaction were to be
covered in their respective "spokes." This approach to drafting is well-known
to those familiar with European codes that are divided into "General" and
"Special" parts. The approach contributes to consistency and uniformity in the
law. 86 In 1995 the leadership of NCCVSL decided to abandon the hub-andspoke approach in favor of a separate article for software and information,
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses. It appointed a separate drafting committee to
create a new article. 87
82. Swanson, supra note 17, at 387.
83. Michael M. Greenfield & Linda I. Rusch, Limits on Standard-Form Contracting in
Revised Article 2, 32 U.C.C. L.J. 115,144 (1999).
84.
"Debacle" is a tenn used by the original Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor
Richard Speidel. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 612.
85. See generally Linda I. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never
Ending Saga ofa Search for Balance, 52 SMU 1. REv. 1683 (1999).
86. On the hub-and-spoke approach generally in the proposed revisions to Article 2, see
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 123; Rusch, supra note 85, at 1686; Speidel, supra note 2, at 61213. Professor Rusch was Associate Reporter for Revised Article 2.
87. According to the Reporter for the Article 2 Drafting Committee, Professor Richard E.
Speidel, the NCCUSL dropped the hub-and-spoke approach because certain strong software producers
and others in industry opposed it. These producers viewed the draft then on the table as too oriented
toward consumers. They wanted their own law. Speidel, supra note 2, at 619.
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The two drafting committees went about their work separately, although
they tried to coordinate their work as best they could. Both committees held
open meetings in which they welcomed anyone who wished to attend, and
many observers did. Nevertheless, consumer interests soon identified the
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee with the software
industry, while business interests saw the Revised Article 2 Drafting
Committee as anti-business. It thus should not have been a total surprise
when, in 1999, ALI, which itself was less identified with business interests,
rejected Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, and NCCUSL, which was more
identified with business interests, rejected Revised Article 2. 88
Neither NCCUSL nor ALI was ready to discard nearly a decade's worth
of work. Both acted swiftly to rescue something out of the ashes. NCCUSL
was able to act first because it could act alone. It is the source of uniform
laws; only for the Uniform Commercial Code does it share sponsorship with
ALI. By the simple expedient of detaching the proposed law from the U.C.C.,
NCCUSL could and did promulgate Proposed Article 2B-Licenses without
ALI's cooperation. It dubbed the new law the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, or "UCITA." Transforming Article 2B-Licenses into
UCITA did require sacrificing the aura of association with America's leading
uniform law, the U.C.C. Losing that aura may have diminished UCITA's
chances for enactment. The criticism that had led to ALI's defeat of Proposed
Article 2B-Licenses did not abate. More than three years after UCITA's
promulgation, only two states-Maryland and Virginia-have enacted it. In
summer 2002 NCCUSL amended UCITA to improve chances for adoption by
other states.
ALI, on other hand, could not unilaterally save Revised Article 2Sales. ALI had to have the cooperation ofNCCUSL in order to amend Article
2, which is part of the U.C.C. While ALI was able to save the idea of revision,
it could not keep the 1999 proposal intact in the manner NCCUSL was able to
maintain Proposed Article 2B-Licenses. After Revised Article 2-Sales was
rejected in summer 1999, ALI conferred with NCCUSL and together they
appointed a new drafting committee to write a new Revised Article 2-Sales.
While that new draft retained features of the defeated proposal, it eliminated
much that had been controversial, and generally simplified and scaled back
the changes originally proposed. That new draft, somewhat modified, is likely
to receive final approval in 2003. 89
The original Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor Richard
Speidel, has explained the different courses that the two proposed laws have
taken by pointing to the economic interests concerned with them. In the case
of UCITA, former Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, there were substantial
economic interests behind the legislation. In the case of Revised Article 2Sales, on the other hand, there was no comparable group pushing for adoption.
88. In both instances, the leadership of the respective organizations declined to present the
proposals to their memberships for a vote. See id. at 611, 619.
89. The proposal was approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in summer 2002 and by the
ALI Council in October 2002. It has only to receive the approval of the ALI Membership at the ALI
Annual Meeting in May 2003 to be adopted. See Report of ALI Council Consideration of U.C.C.
Projects, supra note 31.
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Indeed, Speidel believes quite the contrary was the case. According to
Professor Speidel, "strong sellers" are very pleased by current Article 2Sales: "Limited only by the porous doctrines of unconscionability and good
faith, strong sellers are able to shape the contract to fit their interests,
particularly where small business and consumers are involved.,,90 He charges
that they opposed proposed revisions without themselves offering solutions
that they would accept. He suggests that consumer interests were
underrepresented in both committees' deliberations. 91
The U.C.c. reform caused latent discontent with section 2-302 and its
treatment of unconscionable standard terms to surface. The two drafting
committees that set to work in 1995 had very different views of how they
should treat standard terms and unconscionability. The Revised Article 2Sales Drafting Committee sought to develop a new, stronger rule, while the
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee chose to maintain the
status quo. Consumer representatives involved in the process lauded the
former and condemned the latter while business representatives tended to do
. the reverse. 92
Just
The Associate Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor Linda
Rusch, has detailed the Revised Article 2-Sales Drafting Committee's efforts
to reform the U.C.C. 's treatment of standard terms contracts. 93 Early drafts of
Revised Article 2-Sales distinguished between standard terms and negotiated
contracts. 94 Use of standard terms invoked rules that, to prevent unfair
surprise, encouraged users to disclose the terms and to obtain informed
consent. Not long into the drafting process, however, NCCUSL leadership
decided to drop rules that turned on whether a contract used standard terms. 95
None of the drafts of Revised Article 2-Sales would have created a
separate incorporation control; all of them would have controlled
incorporation and content together in the same provisions. But the Revised
Article 2-Sales Drafting Committee sought to strengthen those provisions'
control over content using a new general clause. The Committee's drafts left
the unconscionability provision essentially intact and added a new section 2206 of varying texts. That latter provision would have provided additional
safeguards applicable to standard terms in consumer contracts. 96 For a time
the Committee focused on a reasonable expectations test and attempted to
concretize that standard to meet criticism that it created too much
uncertainty.97 In the end, however, the Committee dropped the reasonable
expectations test and settled on one based on commercial fair dealing.
90.
Speidel, supra note 2, at 617-18.
91. Id. at 618.
92. The author, then a representative of business, was somewhat unusual in his views. While
not promoting radical change, he did urge that the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee
adopt some broadening of Section 2-302 in order to make the proposed legislation more enactable.
93.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83.
94.
Speidel, supra note 2, at 615.
95. !d. at 614-16. Industry objected to special rules for consumers and to rules based on
standard terms. See, e.g., Letter from William M. Elliott, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and
Secretary, Gateway to Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 9,
1999) (on file with author).
96.
For the earlier part of the § 2-206 story, see Murray, supra note 54, at 563-71.
97.
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 125-26.
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The final version of Proposed section 2-206 reads, in part:
(a) In a consumer contract, a court may refuse to enforce a standard term in a record the
inclusion of which was materially inconsistent with reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in contracts of that type, or, subject to section 2-202, conflicts with one or
more nonstandard terms to which the parties have agreed. 98

The Committee's final proposal, however, protected warranty disclaimers and
warranty modifications that met Code requirements from being invalidated. It
thus would have preserved for business one of the most valuable uses of
standard terms.
1.

Proposed Article 2BIUCITA

As already noted, standard terms are especially important in the
computer information industry. Copyright law does not protect all information
and does not always provide the protection that computer information
providers need. Because of limited legal protections provided by intellectual
property laws, computer information providers need contractual protections.
For the industry, the license is the product. 99 Securing the validity of those
licenses was one of its major goals in seeking adoption of Proposed Article
2B-Licenses.
The opening position of Proposed Article 2B-Licenses on standard
terms was not dissimilar from that of Revised Article 2-Sales. Given their
common origin, that is not surprising. Both started off distinguishing standard
terms and negotiated terms, required full opportunity to review, and adopted a
general clause review along the reasonable expectations line.lOo Their ending
points, however, were rather different.
Whereas Revised Article 2-Sales dropped a distinction between
standard terms and negotiated terms, UCITA maintained one in its definition
of standard form. 101 This enables it to extend its protections not only to
98.
U.C.C. Revised art. 2-Sales (proposed Final Draft) (May I, 1999).
99.
See UClTA, Prefatory Note (2000) ("What rights are acquired or withheld depends on
what the contract says. This point only is implicit in Article 2 for goods such as books; UClTA makes it
explicit for the information economy where, unlike in the case of a book, the contract (license) is the
product."); see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891, 895-99 (1998). In
Germany, in discussing standard terms, the point is made of insurance: "insurance as product of law"
("Versicherung als Rechtsprodukt"). Joachim Schmidt-Salzer, EG-Richtlinie iiber mij1briiuchliche

Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen. Inhaltskontrolle von AVB und Deregulierung der
Versicherungsaufsicht, VersR [VersicherungsRecht] 1995, 1261, text and accompanying note. See also
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875,900-03 (1999); cf.
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (1970); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans.
Computers. and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000).
100. See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 125 (noting that the October 1, 1995 draft of §
2-206 included the reasonable expectations test; see also U.C.C. Revised art. 2B (Licenses with
§ 2B-308(b)(I» (Feb.
2,
1996),
available
at
Prefatory
Note
and
Comments
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ulcjrame.htrn ("[T]he term creates an obligation or imposes a
limitation that is not consistent with customary industry practices and that a reasonable licensor should
know would cause most licensees in transactions of similar type to refuse the contract if the term were
brought to the attention of the licensee.... ").
101. UClTA § 102(a)(60). See also Speidel, supra note 2, at 619.

2003]

Standard-Terms Contracting

127

consumers, but to all participants in "mass market transactions.,,102 Advocates
ofUCITA cite this as a significant advance and a "dramatic legal shift.,,103 Yet
critics say that the distinction makes relatively little difference in the law that
was adopted. 104
Unlike Article 2 and Revised Article 2-Sales, UCITA has a provision
directed toward incorporation of standard terms. Originally, section 209(b)
provided that standard terms could become effective in a mass market license
even though "a copy of the license is not available in a manner permitting an
opportunity to review by the license before the licensee becomes obligated to
pay.,,105 To make this result more palatable, the section gave the licensee a
generous right to return at the expense of the licensor. This shift was
somewhat less dramatic than it might otherwise have been, however, because
before UCITA was drafted, the Seventh Circuit seemed to allow the same
result under Article 2. 106 The provision met significant resistance. At its 2002
Annual Meeting NCCUSL revised section 209 to provide that a term does not
become part of the license if "the licensee does not have an opportunity to
review the term before agreeing to it.,,107
The early drafts of Pro~osed Article 2B-Licenses followed the test of
Restatement section 211(3).1 8 In 1997 the Drafting Committee dropped the
Restatement test in favor of the unconscionability standard of section 2-302.
At the suggestion of the NCCUSL 1998 annual meeting in July, the test was
broadened to prohibit terms contrary to "public policy.,,109 The public policy
provision is to make clear that UCITA does not uphold licenses that are
invalid under federal copyright law. The public policy exception was regarded
· eXIstmg
.. Iaw. 110
as not changmg
As enacted, UCIT A provides that terms in mass market licenses are not
enforceable if they are unconscionable, preempted by federal law, or contrary

102. See UCITA § 209.
See, e.g., Towle, supra note 78, at 379-80 (2000) ("Under UCITA, the customer in a
'mass-market transaction' is afforded what amount to consumer protections, even if the customer is a
business. As noted, this represents a dramatic legal shift.").
104. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 619.
105. UCITA § 209{b).
106. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808
(1997) (enforcing an arbitration clause that the consumer did not receive or review until after receiving
the product). But it appears that the court believed that the consumer did have an opportunity to review,
which the consumer did not exercise. Id. at 1150. The Article 2 Drafting Committee also struggled with
this issue and in the end ignored it. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 616. Gateway's General Counsel
advised the Article 2 Committee Chairman of facts indicating that there was an opportunity to review.
Letter from William M. Elliott, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Gateway, to
Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Feb. 3 1999) (on file with author).
Similarly, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (l991), does not uphold enforcing standard
terms where there is no opportunity to review. The Shute Court specifically noted that the question of
opportunity to review had been conceded. Id. at 590.
The
summer
2002
final
amendments
are
available
at
107.
http://www.law.upenn.edulblllu\c/ucital2002act.htm.
108. U.C.C. art. 2B-Licenses (Discussion Draft Mar. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ucc2/397art2.htm.
109. U.C.C. art. 2B-Licenses (Discussion Draft Aug. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulblllulc/ucc2b/2b898.pdf.
110. U.C.C. art. 2B Software Contracts and Licenses of Information (Council Draft No.4, Dec.
1,1998) § 2B-105 Reporter's Notes at 38-39 (1998), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu.
103.
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to public policy.111 Its unconscionability provision in section 111 is a virtual
clone of U.C.c. section 2-302. Critics find little to cheer about in UCITA's
control of standard terms. According to one, "UCITA's approach to form
contracts in commercial transactions can be captured in one word
(enforced)." 112 Another characterizes it as "anything goes."ll3
When the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee backed
off the reasonable expectations test of the Restatement, it considered
proposals for stricter review of license terms than the unconscionability
standard of 2-302, including one dubbed "unconscionability lite.,,114 But those
against a more stringent test had one argument at their ready disposal: Article
2B-Licenses was supposed to codify existing law and not create new law. I1S
They had only to point to that law. The Reporter, Professor Ray Nimmer,
himself observed: "With very few exceptions, standard form contract terms
are enforceable.,,116
The argument that the proposed law tracks existing law was more
persuasive with the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee and
with the NCCUSL Annual Meeting than it has been with consumer advocates
and others in the public sector. 117 Outside the rarified air of drafting
committees and annual meetings, critics continue to attack UCITA as too
friendly to software suppliers and too unfriendly to consumer interests. They
include library associations who fear that suppliers will use standard terms to
111. UCIT A §§ 105 (preemption by federal law; contracts contrary to public policy); 111
(unconscionability); 209 (same).
112. Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk. Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REv. 1,33 (2000).
113. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 99, at 906. They propose that UCITA include a standard
of "public interest unconscionability" which would read: "All mass-market contracts, non-negotiable
access contracts, and contracts imposing non-negotiable restrictions on uses of computerized
information goods must be made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard for the
public interest in education, science, research, technological innovation, freedom of speech, and the
preservation of competition." Id. at 930 (emphasis omitted).
114. See Report of the Nov.
13-15, 1998 Drafting Committee meeting,
http://www.2bguide.com/nov98rpt.htrnl. At the meeting,
[a] committee member argued in favor of placing some kind of "reasonableness" restriction
around mass market license terms, referring to the Hazard memo. Other committee members
disagreed, noting that the refund right in this section was the tradeoff for allowing terms to be
made available after acquisition. The Reporter agreed, and noting that 2B built in the right to say
no to the terms, stated that the committee should not allow courts to throw out terms that were
neither unconscionable nor in violation of a fundamental public policy.... A committee member
responded by asking whether people were satisfied with the unconscionability doctrine or not.
Some seemed to want to reject a "refusal term" in a license with the beneficial part of the bargain
still being held to be enforceable. If there were problems in the real world, the unconscionability
doctrine would have been expanded in the last 50 years. The lack of controversy around the
unconscionability standard did not support the argument that a refusal term standard is necessary.
Another committee member disagreed, stating that unconscionability issues were mostly raised
in small claims court, so there was no data to say that people were satisfied with the standard....
The comment was then made that earlier there seemed to be an intent to have a new standard on
unconscionability (unconscionability lite) but it no longer seemed to be included.
115. The Drafting Committee Chair, Carlyle Ring, in several conversations with the author at
different drafting sessions emphasized that in his experience, a proposed uniform law is most likely to
be accepted if it can be presented as merely a codification of existing law and practice.
116. Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827,847 (1998).
117. Speidel argues that NCCUSL is more concerned with getting a law enacted, while ALI is
more interested in getting it right. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 608.
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limit use of materials in ways not presently limited by copyright law. 118 Only
some critics recognize that VCITA, in upholding standard terms, is not
departing from existin law. 119 Prospects for nationwide enactment of VCITA
are uncertain at best. 12ff
2.

Absence a/Comparative Law Inquiries

Both the Revised Article 2-Sales and the Proposed Article 2BLicense Drafting Committees spent a great deal of time considering
alternatives to section 2-302. The Revised Article 2-Sales Drafting
Committee in particular discussed possible new solutions to the problem
seemingly endlessly. One can hardly help but wonder whether those
discussions might have been quicker and ultimately more productive if only
the committees had had knowledge of foreign approaches. They would have
been able to observe standard terms control systems more extensive than
section 2-302 in actual operation; they would not have had to guess whether
such a system was even possible. The Committees would have had models for
ways to implement such systems; they would not have been limited to
considering only general clause approaches. Comparative law inquiries could
have helped overcome our limited abilities either to conceive of or to
experiment with alternatives.
At no time during the decade long u.C.C. reform project did either of
the Drafting Committees (or anyone else at ALI or NCCVSL) study foreign
experiences with standard terms laws. Indeed, the Drafting Committees were
118. See,
e.g., Free Software Foundation, Why We Must Fight UCITA,
http://www.gnu.orgiphilosophy/ucita.html(..UCITA will allow the publishers to impose the most
outrageous restrictions on you."); Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, What's Wrong
With UCITA?, http://www.4cite.orglwhat...problems.html; Letter from American Library Association
and four other library associations, to Gene N. Lebrun, President of the National Conference of
Commissioners
on
Uniform
State
Laws
3
(July
12,
1999),
http://www.arl.orgiinfo/letters/lebrun7.12.html(.. [UClTA]legitimiz[es] shrink wrap or click on licenses
which may include terms that inappropriately restrict use by the purchaser or user."). For the concerns of
libraries, see James R. Maxeiner, The New Commercial Law And Public Information Policy: The
Libraries and UCITA, 219, 233 in UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING: UCITA, E-SIGNATURE,
FEDERAL, STATE AND FOREIGN REGULATION (Practising Law Institute, 2001). For opposition generally,
see the website on UCITA for Laura N. Gasaway's cyberspace law course at
http://www.unc.edulcourses/law357c/cyberprojects/springOllucita.htm.
119. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 112, at 4: "[T]he National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ... has promulgated a comprehensive commercial statute that fails to remedy or
even modify the law of form contracts in purely commercial transactions." See also Cern Kaner, Why
You Should Oppose UCITA, 17 COMPUTER LAWYER, 20, at 21-22 (May 2000):
You might try arguing that the term is unconscionable under UClTA Section Ill, but courts are
rarely receptive to a business' plea for relief from a contract term on grounds of
unconscionability. You might try arguing that this term should not be enforced because
something about it violates a fundamental public policy, but I'm not sure which one you would
cite.
But see Law Library Association of Maryland, Testimony In Opposition To Maryland House Bill 19,
Senate Bill 142, Feb. 3, 2000, http://www.lI.georgetown.edulaallwashltm020300b.html. ("UClTA's
explicit endorsement of shrink-wrap licenses will make many unfair terms enforceable in court,
whereas today many such terms are thrown out.").
120. See Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 550 (1999). For further information on UCITA and standard terms, see
Clarke, supra note 112. Even if UClTA is not adopted nation-wide, it may still have helped industry
obtain validation of use of standard terms in shrink-wrap and clickwrap licenses.
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hardly aware of them. Foreign readers who are accustomed to comparative
law studies being made when new legislation is under consideration are sure
to be surprised. Their surprise is all the more justified when one considers that
(1) at least one American comparativist called the Committees' attention to
those solutions,121 (2) existing American law may have had a foreign
inspiration, and (3) just as the Committees began their work, the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) adopted Principles
of International Commercial Contracts that include some special rules for
standard terms. 122 The Reporter for the post-1999 version of Revised Article
2-Sales, Professor Henry Gabriel, explained that the lack of interest in
foreign approaches is to be attributed to the law revision process itself, which
is focused on the existing law: "This focus tends to be inward-Iookingalways focused on the existing Code itself, and therefore, the comparisons
with other codes, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CIS G) and the UNIDROIT principles, tend to be
incidental as opposed to deliberate.,,123
Only recently and outside of the U.C.c. reform process has the United
States seen approaches to standard terms that do more than provide variations
on a familiar melody. In 1998 the New Jersey Law Revision Commission
proposed a new statute to govern standard terms. 124 The proposed statute is
unlike anything else ever seen in the United States. Its goal is to protect
freedom of contract from pernicious standard terms; it is not a consumer
protection statute. It is not limited to a general clause,125 but identifies specific
types of contract issues, which it then approves, prohibits or marks for
evaluation. 126 The similarities to European laws are unmistakable. 127 Other
121. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
122. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994), deals with
what is known in the United States as the "battle of the fonns" and is not relevant here. Of the other
three, article 2.19 defines standard tenns. Articles 2.20 and 2.21 provide limited incorporation controls.
The fonner provides that "(1) No tenn contained in standard tenns which is of such a character that the
other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective unless it has been expressly acceptcd by
that party." Id. at 58. The latter merely provides that in case of conflict, a tenn that is not a standard tenn
prevails over a standard tenn.
123. Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1995, 2001 (1998). See also Richard E. Speidel, The Impact of
Internationalization of Transnational Commercial Law: The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 J. INT'L L. & Bus.
165 (1995).
124. NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL REpORT RELATING TO STANDARD FORM
CONTRACTS § I (g), at 2 (1998), available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us. The Commission's Report
concluded that existing law does not provide "unifonn and flexible standards" and has neither "protected
consumers against the opportunism of certain sellers nor has it provided sellers with legal rules based on
the logic of the mass market."
125. Id. § 8(a). "[AJ tenn is enforceable unless, at the time of sale, the tenn would have caused
a reasonable buyer to reject the sale."
126. /d. § 9-12.
127. For example, the New Jersey Commission's associate counsel, John J.A. Burke, wrote the
author:
In reply to your question, the Commission reviewed the European Directive on Unfair
Tenns in Consumer Contracts as well as the French and German Codes. The Commission
followed the European approach in so far as identifying specific issues for legislative
governance. However, unlike the European approach, the Commission's Standard Form
Contract Act (SFC) is not consumer protection legislation. Rather, it is an attempt to set
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than introducing the proposed Act as a bill, the New Jersey legislature has not
acted on it. The Commission itself did not produce a study of European laws
and presumably did not have the resources to do so. The balance of this article
seeks to make a start in that direction.
III.

EUROPEAN UNION LAW

Part III addresses control of standard terms in the law of the European
Union. Part IV goes on to consider the law in one Member State, Germany.
Part IV is necessary because the E.U. law of unfair terms is not directly
applicable. There, as in most areas of law, the European Union has chosen to
harmonize national laws rather than to adopt a single E.U. law. The device to
accomplish harmonization is the directive. Directives are instructions to
Member States to adopt laws with particular content. But directives are
binding only as to result, and not as to form and method of implementation. 12s
The focus of this Part is on the European Union's Council Directive
93/13IEEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Adopted in
1993, the Unfair Terms Directive is the basis ofE.U.-wide control of standard
terms. It requires Member States to conform their laws to the directive's
model. 129
A.

Origin in Consumer Protection

The Unfair Terms Directive is consumer protection legislation. The first
Europe-wide efforts to address standard terms accompanied the growth of the
consumer movement in the 1970s. Even before the European Union looked at
unfair terms, a broader and looser group of European States, the Council of
Europe, began looking at the issue in 1973. On November 16, 1976, it adopted
Resolution (76) 47 on "Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and an
Appropriate Method of Control" and issued an explanatory memorandum. 130
the limits of "freedom of contract" in an area where one party to the contract is the single
author seeking to pass virtually all risk to the other party. The SFC Act makes no
distinction between merchants and consumers nor does its application depend on the
nature of the product that is the subject of the contract, thus unifying the law of contracts
for goods, services and intellectual property.
E-mail from John J.A. Burke, Associate Counsel to the New Jersey Law Review Commission, to author
(July 8, 2002) (on file with author). See also John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction
Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285 (2000).
In 2002 Professor Larry Bates made an even more radical proposal: standard terms should be
presumed invalid; the relationship between user and the other party should be regarded as a "status
relationship" subject to regulation; and that an administrative body should approve use of standard
terms. Significantly, he drew inspiration from foreign experiences. Bates, supra note 15, at 90-105.
128. !d. at 326-31, 792-94. Directives contrast with "regulations," which are applicable
generally, are binding in all respects and are directly applicable. [d. at 324. See generally Peter-Christian
MUller-Graff, EC Directives as a Means of Private Law Unification, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CNIL
CODE (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d rev. ed. 1998).
129. Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13IEEC of 5
April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, COM (2000) 248 final (noting that Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and the Nordic countries had only to amend their laws) [hereinafter E.U.
Commission Report).

130.

Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and an Appropriate Method of Control, Resolution

(76) 47 of the Comm. ofMinisters, Council of Europe, 262d Meet. (1977).
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The Resolution noted that consumers were increasingly offered goods and
services on terms that prejudice their interests but which they had no power to
amend. The resolution's first recommendation was to encourage Council
members to adopt legislation to protect consumers "against unfair terms in
contracts based on standard texts and in other contracts where the consumer
has little, if any, possibility of negotiating or influencing their content." The
scope of the resolution was limited to consumers, but with respect to
consumers it applied to consumer contracts generally and not just to standard
terms. The resolution addressed both incorporation and content.
The accompanying explanatory memorandum found the source of the
problem in the essence of standard terms. Suppliers generally have the
advantage in drafting standard contract forms. Individual consumers rarely
negotiate those terms and, if they do, they seldom have bargaining power
sufficient to protect their interests. The principle of freedom of contract
permits suppliers through use of standard terms to impose on consumers terms
that "satisfy the suppliers' interests but disregard the interests of the
consumers. ,,131 The explanatory memorandum gives a non-exhaustive list of
twenty-eight terms considered to be unfair in the majority of member States. It
classes those terms into six broad general classes: terms regarding formation,
termination, and performance; terms limiting the liability of the supplier;
terms limiting the consumer's rights or remedies; terms relating to security;
terms relating to disputes; and other terms. The specific terms are familiar. A
few examples from the list are given in the margin. 132
The European Union itself first raised the issue of one-sided standard
terms in 1975 when the Commission, the E.U.'s principal governing body,
issued its first consumer protection proposals. In the 1970s a number ofE.V.
131. Id.atll.
132. Examples include:
4. Terms whereby a contract will continue in being for an unreasonably long period
unless terminated by the consumer by a specified date....
6. Terms whercby the supplier reserves the right to decide unilaterally whether the goods
are in conformity with the contract or not. ...
8. Terms whereby the goods need not correspond with those elements of their description
which are essential to the consumer or with the sample or need not be fit for the purpose
communicated by the consumer and accepted by the supplier or in default of such
communication with their normal use ....
9. Terms whereby the supplier can without reasonable grounds withhold the fulfillment
of his obligations ....
12. Terms whereby the liability of the supplier is either excluded or limited to an
unjustified extent. ...
14. Terms whereby the right of the consumer to repudiate a contract under which the
supplier is bound to repair the goods and does not do so within a reasonable time is
excluded....
18. Terms whereby the withholding by the consumer of all or part of the payment due, if
the supplier does not fulfil his obligations, is prohibited ....
21. Terms whereby a consumer is prohibited from claiming a right of set-off against the
supplier....
25. Terms which impose a burden of proof on the consumer which normally would lie on
the supplier....
26. Terms which impose on the consumer an unreasonably short period of time to make
complaints to the supplier....
27. Terms whereby, without good reason, the consumer is required to have goods
repaired by the supplier exclusively or to obtain replacement parts only from him.
Id. at 14-16.
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Member States adopted national standard terms legislation. 133 Only weeks
after the Council of Europe issued its recommendations, the German
legislature adopted the Standard Terms Statute. 134 In 1976 the Commission
issued a preliminary draft directive of standard clauses in consumer contracts.
That proposal died. 135
Throughout the legislative processes in Europe comparative law played
a part. In 1978 the Council of Europe made standard terms the subject of its
Eighth Annual Legal Colloquy on European Law. The colloquy included
reports on standard terms law in the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel,
Sweden, Cyprus, and Ireland. 136 In 1984 the Commission of the European
Union returned to the issue of unfair terms and issued a working paper on
abusive clauses in consumer contracts. 137 Before issuing a draft directive, it
commissioned a comparative study of the law in the Member States of the
European Union and elsewhere. 138
In 1990 the Commission again proposed a draft directive on unfair
terms. The Union adopted the final version of the Unfair Terms Directive on
April 5, 1993. 139 It required Member States to implement it by December 31,
1994. Adoption of the Unfair Terms Directive was part of a larger initiative in
the consumer protection area. In 1992 a new article was added to the E.U.
Treaty that specifically directs the Union to address the interests of
consumers. 140 Several other directives also provide consumers protection. 141
B.

The Unfair Terms Directive

The Unfair Terms Directive is a "minimum" directive, that is, it sets out
minimum standards. Article 8 explicitly permits Member States to maintain or
133. See Ewoud H. Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPo
L. 525, 525-26 (1978).

134. AGB-Gesetz, supra note 10. See Otto Sandrock, The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West
Germany, 26 AM. J. COMPo L. 551 (1978).
135. Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 82, margin no. 66.
136. Standard Terms in Contracts: Proceedings of the Eighth Colloquy on European Law,
Council of Europe, (1979).
137. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 5; Hermann-Josef Bunte, Zehn Jahre
AGB-Gesetz-Riickblick und Ausblick, NJW [Neue Juristische Wochenschrift] 1987, 921, 921.
138. Note, Commission of the European Communities Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 15 J. CONSUMER POL'y 97 (1992), (citing EWOUD
HONDIUS, UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS (1987». See also HONDIUS,
STANDAARDVOORWAARDEN: RECHTSVERGELIJENKE BESCHOUWINGEN OVER STANDAARDISERING VAN
KONTRAKTSBEDINGEN EN OVERHEIDSTOEZICHT DAAROP (1978) (with summaries in French at 835-44, in
English at 845-54, and in German at 855-65).
139. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L. 95) 29 [hereinafter Unfair Terms Directive].
For a briefrecounting of the chronology, see E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 5.
140. Now Article 153 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (incorporating the
changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the· Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts). Its paragraph 1 provides:
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer
protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic
interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and
to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.
141. See PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM 1108 (Lawrence W. Gormley ed., 3d ed.
1998).
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to adopt "more stringent provisions" in order to ensure "a maximum degree of
protection for the consumer.,,142
The Unfair Terms Directive is limited to contracts with consumers, i.e.,
natural persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business, or
143
profession.
It does not require that Member States control standard terms
that are used between non-consumers, although the laws of some Member
States dO. I44 As originally proposed, it would have applied to all terms in all
contracts with consumers. As a result of Member State criticism, the scope of
the directive was narrowed. As adopted it does not apply to terms that have
been "individually negotiated.,,145 "[P]re-formulated standard contracts" are
not individually negotiated. 146 It excludes from content review the "main
subject matter of the contract" and the "adequacy of the price and
remuneration." 147
The Unfair Terms Directive has no specific provision that governs
incorporation into contracts. It is debated whether the "transparency"
provision of Article 5-which requires that when in writing "terms must
always be drafted in plain, intelligible lanf.uage"-should be regarded as an
incorporation control or a content control." 48 The principal problem with that
interpretation is practical: as presently structured, for a term to be invalidated,
149
it must be unfair under the content control of Article 3.
Control of the content of terms is the heart of the Unfair Terms
Directive. 15o The control consists of a general clause, essentially in Article 3,
and a list of exemplary unfair terms in an Annex. Article 6(1) provides that
"unfair terms" as defined in Article 3 shall not be binding on consumers in
contracts with sellers or suppliers. Article 3(1) requires that a contract term
shall be regarded as unfair "if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it
causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.,,151 Although the
language of Article 3(1) suggests that two separate criteria must be met, i.e.,
142. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 8.
143. Id. art. 2(b). The European Court of Justice rejected the idea that "consumers" includes
non-natural persons. Joined Cases C-541 & 542/99, Cape Snc v. Idealservice Sri, 2001 E.C.R. I-09049.
144. Gennany, for example. See infra text accompanying notes 243-44.
145. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(1). See infra text accompanying notes 32533.
146. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(2).
147. Id. art. 4(2). Terms dealing with those issues must still be "in plain intelligible language."
148. Workshop 4: Obligation of Clarity and Favourable Interpretation to the Consumer (Art.
5), in The Integration of Directive 93/13 into the National Legal Systems 158 (1999), available at
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/dgs/health_consumer/events/event29_ 04.pdf [hereinafter Integration of
Directive 93/13]. The same article further provides that when in doubt, terms are to be given the
interpretation most favorable to the consumer. In favor of regarding Article 5 as an incorporation control
is the twentieth recital of the Preamble of the Unfair Terms Directive, which states: ''whereas contracts
should be drafted in plain intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to
examine all the terms .... " Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 5.
149. Id. Item (i) in the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive, which provides that a term may be
found unfair if it precludes an opportunity to review prior to the contract becoming binding, raises the
same issue. See also infra note 336 (discussing German Code placement of transparency under the
content control).
ISO. See Workshop 3: The Definition of "Unfairness": The Application of Art. 3(1), 4(1)-and
of the Annexes of the Directive, in Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148, at 132 [hereinafter
Workshop 3].
lSI. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(1)
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significant imbalance and action contrary to good faith, the official position is
that any clause that causes a significant imbalance is by definition contrary to
the principle of good faith. 152 Perhaps because the Unfair Terms Directive is
not directly applicable law, this point has not been as significant an issue as it
might otherwise have been. It is in effect resolved by the implementing
language that a particular Member State uses. Article 4(1) provides that the
unfairness of a term is to take into account "all the circumstances attending
the conclusion of the contract." But, as already noted, national law is not to
judge whether the contract itself is unfair. 153
A separate Annex lists seventeen different specific types of terms that
may be considered unfair. 154 The list is "indicative" only, that is, a contractual
term on the list is not automatically deemed unfair but only subject to
evaluation. 155 The terms identified in the list, rather than the language of the
general clause itself, are to serve as "the first and the essential reference point
in answering the questions: what is unfairness? when are there grounds for
considering a clause as unfair?,,156 Since the Unfair Terms Directive is a
minimal directive, Member States may completely prohibit terms in the
Annex. Some Member States have done so. There have been proposals that
the Unfair Terms Directive itself should be amended to consist of both a list of
ls7
terms subject to evaluation and a prohibited list. A few of the items on the
list may be discussed briefly here.
Item (b) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive has been the most
158
frequently litigated class of term.
It permits finding a term unfair and thus
unenforceable if the term has the object or the effect of inappropriately
excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-a-vis the seller or
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual
obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or
supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him. Item
(b) recently lost significance when the European Union took a still more
aggressive approach to the issue of guarantees. In Directive 1999/44IEC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of25 May 1999 on certain aspects of
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (the "Guarantees
Directive"), it made certain guarantees mandatory. No review of terms for
unfairness is necessary where the law makes the terms mandatory.159
Item (i) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive is particularly
significant in connection with shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses. It provides
that a term may be found unfair if it has the object or effect of "irrevocably
binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of
152. See id. at 141.
153. See infra text accompanying note 147.
154. The European Court of Justice has held that it is not necessary that the list itselfbe enacted
into positive law. See infra text accompanying note 170.
155. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16.
156. Workshop 3, supra note 150, at 137.
157. Id. at 138.
158. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16.
159. For a discussion of the effect of the Guarantees Directive on German law, see infra text
accompanying notes 357 to 359.
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becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract." This
incorporation control is at odds with the original version of UCITA section
209 that authorized this very type of term. 160
Item (q) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive calls for evaluating,
among other terms, a term "excluding or hindering the consumer's right to
take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring
the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions." The European Court of Justice held that this provision renders
invalid forum selection clauses with consumers. 161 The court found that a
clause that selected the seller's principal place of business which was far from
the consumer's domicile (but in the consumer's home country) "must be
regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive in so far as
it causes, contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant imbalance in
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment
of the consumer.,,162
As noted Article 6 provides that unfair terms shall not be enforced. But
the Unfair Terms Directive is concerned with more than invalidating
objectionable terms. It seeks affirmatively to stamp them out. Article 7(1)
requires Member States to ensure that "adequate and effective means exist to
prevent the continued use of unfair terms." The Unfair Terms Directive does
not limit the means chosen. It does not require a particular form of judicial or
administrative proceeding. Leaving aside measures not available throughout
the European Union, two procedures that are available in all countries to help
stamp out unfair terms might strike American lawyers as unusual. The
European Court of Justice held recently that effective protection of consumers
requires that national courts of their own motion determine whether a term is
unfair.163 The second measure is the consumer association action required by
Article 7. Its Paragraph 2 requires that consumer grouRs be authorized to bring
actions "to prevent the continued use of such terms." 64 It requires further that
these actions may be directed against sellers collectively and not just against a
165
These measures are designed to overcome the infirmities of
single seller.
private litigation where ordinarily the judgment affects only the party before

160. See supra text accompanying note 105.
161. Case C-240/98, Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, 2000 E.C.R. 1-

4941.
162. [d. at 1-4973.
163. [d. at 1-4976. The Court reasoned that "the system of protection introduced by the

Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-a-vis the seller or supplier, as
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge." It noted that "[i]n disputes where the
amounts involved are often limited, the lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake, which
may deter the consumer from contesting the application of an unfair term." [d. at 1-4973.
164. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 7(2):
The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions, whereby persons or
organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers,
may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before
competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up
for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to
prevent the continued use of such terms."
165. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 7(3).
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the court, and not the world at large (i.e., inter partes, but not ergo omnes),
and only for that one specific term. 166
Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive requires that Member States
take steps to ensure that the directive's protections are not circumvented by
choice of non-European Union law. This requirement, however, applies only
if the consumer has a close connection "with the territory of the Member
States."
C.

Implementation in the Member States of the Unfair Terms Directive

Member States must conform their laws to the requirements of
directives. Conformity does not mean uniformity; the actual implementation
of directives varies significantly from Member State to Member State.
Although directives are often quite detailed, a review of their provisions can
give only a partial picture of the applicable law. This is the case with the
Unfair Terms Directive, which is less specific than some other directives. Part
IV of this article discusses the application of the Unfair Terms Directive in
Germany and gives a picture of how the directive actually works in practice in
one country. This section provides an overview of the steps that have been
taken to implement the directive throughout the Euror,ean Union, but does not
address the actual law in each of the Member States. 1 7
The Unfair Terms Directive instructed the Commission to report on the
directive's implementation after five years. The Commission delivered its
report in April 2000 ("Commission Report"). The Commission Report
includes a list of the implementing statutes in the Member States. 168 Detailed
reports on implementation in the individual Member States were included in
the papers ofa conference held prefatory to the issuance of the Commission's
Report. 169
The Commission reported that it had brought proceedings before the
European Court of Justice against all the Member States for infractions in
implementing the directive, but that most of these proceedings had been
concluded without the Court having to issue a judgment. Subsequent to the
Commission Report, the Court has issued several judgments on
implementation. The only judgment of the Court that went against the
Commission was the case against Sweden, where the Court held that Sweden
did not need to include the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive verbatim in
its positive law, since the Annex was merely exemplary and since Sweden
both included the Annex in the legislative history and actually dealt directly
with most ofthe terms contained in the Annex in its law.l70
166. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 22-23.
167. For a short survey of the law in all E.U. Member States plus Switzerland, see Ulmer in
ULMERlBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 99-120. See also Integration of Directive
93/13, supra note 148 (with reports in English and French on many Member States).
168. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 38
169. See Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148.
170. Case C-478/99, Commission v. Kingdom of Swed., 2002 E.C.R. 1-04147. The Court held
for the Commission in C-144/99, Commission v. Kingdom of the Neth., 2001 E.C.R. 1-03541 (finding
that the Netherlands failed to fulfill its obligations under the Unfair Terms Directive by not transposing
Articles 4(2) and 5, concerning transparency, into Dutch law) and in Case C-372/99, Commission v.
Italy, 2002 E.C.R. 1-00819 (finding that Italy failed to fulfill its obligations under the Unfair Terms
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The Commission also reported on its own efforts to implement the
directive. These included subsidizing dialogues between consumers and
industry at both the national and European levels, subsidizing legal actions for
injunctions brought by consumer groups to eliminate unfair terms, conducting
information campaigns, sponsoring a conference on implementation of the
directive in Member States, and working to develop empirical data on unfair
terms. 171 The last mentioned is among the more interesting from an American
perspective.
While in the United States a wel1-represented view holds that the
incidence of "unconscionable" terms in contracts is low, there is no
comparable position in Europe. Nevertheless, on both sides of the Atlantic
participants in discussions of standard terms have lamented the absence of
empirical data that might confirm the existence of a problem and disclose its
extent. 172 The Commission undertook as part of its mission of implementing
the directive a program to fil1 that gap. There were two basic components to
that effort: market studies and a case-law database. Its report summarizes the
results of seven different market studies that examined use of unfair terms in
contracts in a variety of industries and countries. 173
In order to monitor implementation of the directive, the Commission set
up for an initial five-year period a data base, accessible to the public, to
include al1 known legal decisions regarding unfair terms (the "CLAB"
Database). The CLAB database includes files based on specific contractual
terms chal1enged in legal action as unfair. Although the col1ection focuses on
consumer contracts, CLAB also includes decisions regarding terms strictly
between non-consumers. In its initial five years of operation the database
174
accumulated 7649 cases. About 3000 of these cases predated the directive.
About one third of the Commission Report is devoted to an annex giving
statistics from the CLAB database. 175 The Commission has now asked for bids
to carry on the CLAB database for five more years. 176
In its report the Commission left no doubt that it believes that unfair
terms in consumer contracts are a real problem. It concluded that "balanced
contractual relations are anything but the rule, that unfair terms are widely

Directive by only prohibiting the actual use of unfair terms, and not the recommendation of the use of
unfair terms, as required by Article 7(3». Looking to the Netherlan~s case, the German legislature
adopted into statutory law a rule that had been applied through judicial interpretation. See infra note 337.
171. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9-12. The conference took place in Brussels
July 1-3, 1999. The Papers are collected in Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148. The
proceedings are an exercise in practical comparative law, including both reports on the laws governing
unfair terms in most of the Member States as well as special sector reports and comparative overview
reports.
172. See, e.g., KOtz, supra note 18, at AII-Al2; Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 700 n.3, 703-04.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
173. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9,39-41.
174. Consumer Policy: Commission Aims To Update Unfair Terms Data Base, EUR. REp.,
section 2583, Apr. 7, 2001.
175. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 43-62.
176. See Consumer Policy, supra note 174; Allgemeine Ausschreibung Nr. DG SANCO
20011B3/002 beziiglich der Sammlung und Analyse von "Fallrecht" in den Staaten des EWR belreffend
mi13brauchliche
K1auseln
in
Verbrauchervertragen
flir
die
Jahre
2001-2005,
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/dgs/health_consumer/library/tenders!ca1l24_de. pdf.
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used, and that new types of unfair terms arise by the day.,,177 The market
studies demonstrated, it contended, not only "the ubiquity of unfair terms in
standard-form contracts but also the enormous difficulty of getting hold of the
contractual terms before concluding a contract.,,178
D.

The Future of the Unfair Terms Directive

The Commission Report is not limited to stating the law at the turn of
the century. The Commission in its report also raised questions designed "to
trigger the widest and most fruitful possible debate on the subject.,,179 The
Commission referred its report, including its questions for comments, to the
Economic and Social Committee, a formal body of the European Union
established under the Treaty of Amsterdam to give non-binding advisory
opinions. While the Commission Report on a whole was rather upbeat, the
Committee's response was less so. Its first conclusion was: "Rather than
merely 'approximating' legislation, the main objective of any future revision
of Directive 93/13/EC-which is hopefully not far away-must be to truly
harmonise and standardise legislation in the Member States in this area.,,180
The Commission revisited the limitations on the directive's scope. It
noted that the implementation laws in some Member States did not include all
three exclusions contained in the directive, i.e., of non-consumers, of
181
individually negotiated terms, and of the main subject matter of a contract.
It asked whether one or more of these limitations should be eliminated. The
Economic and Social Committee answered yes: get rid of all three. 182
The Commission raised relatively few questions about the future of the
content control. It noted that in practice, it had not made much difference
whether a member state had chosen to adopt the general clause of Article 3(1)
almost verbatim or had rephrased it to a greater or lesser extent. More
important in the Commission's view was the way in which Member States had
transposed the Annex list of suspect terms into national law. The Commission
stated its view that the practical effect of the content control would be greater
if all Member States would adopt the list and do so in a way that minimized its
vagueness and led to published "black lists" of prohibited terms. It asked
whether the contents of the indicative list should be given in greater detail or
number and whether its nature should be altered. 183 The Economic and Social
Committee answered that the list should not be lengthened, but tightened up
177. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 13.
178. Id. at 9.
179. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 2.
180. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Report from the Commission on
the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13IEEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 2001 O.J. (C 116) 116, 124 at 10.1 [hereinafter Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee].
181. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 14-15, 31.
182. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124,10.2 and, 10.3.
See infra text accompanying notes 252-260.
183. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16-17. Subsequent to this plea, the
Commission lost its case seeking to require Sweden to adopt the Annex. The argument the Commission
summarized against adopting the Annex was that then the list might limit enforcement of the general
provision. One problem in reaching uniformity throughout Europe is that unfairness is measured based
on the law otherwise applicable, which varies from Member State to Member State.
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and simplified. A "black list" should be created to stand beside the "gray"
list. 184
The Commission noted deficiencies in the transparency requirement. It
asked whether changes were needed and whether consumers should be given
the right to review terms before concluding a contract. 185 The Economic and
Social Policy Committee replied that "[a]ll necessary steps" should be
taken. 186
Many of the Commission's questions, and its most provocative
suggestions, relate to what the Commission termed "positive" enforcement.
The problem, the Commission asserted, is that the existing system of
"negative" enforcement is not enough. While a particular term in a particular
contract is deemed unfair, the system of negative enforcement does not
prevent others from using the same term found to be unfair or the user of the
unfair term from adopting a similar term. Colorfully the Commission
commented: "Unfair terms are like the Hydra: cut off one head and others
..
I
,,187
grow In Its pace.
The Commission posed a whole series of questions related to improving
the existing system of negative enforcement and to adopting a new system of
positive enforcement. Among the more provocative: Should penalties be
introduced to discourage use of unfair terms?188 Should a procedure be
established to declare court decisions to have an effect against everyone?189
Should an administrative body be established to analyze and prohibit terms?190
Should actions be taken at a Europe-wide level to eliminate unfair terms?191
The Economic and Social Committee was less receptive to changes in
enforcement. It found unjustified the Commission's suggestion that civil
penalties be applied. 192 It did encourage the Commission to explore the
possibility of establishinfiprocedures to make a finding that a term is unfair
binding on everyone. 9 It endorsed creating a Community level
194
administrative arrangement and greater use of administrative mechanisms.
It stated, however, that a prior approval system was generally inappropriate
because it would be "extremely bureaucratic" and still would not guarantee an
absence of unfair terms. 195
The Economic and Social Committee observed a need to clarify the
principle of good faith so that it would not lead to different national
provisions. Of its own motion the Committee recommended a comparative
law inquiry. It asked the Commission and the member states "to jointly

184. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 121

~5

~10.6.

185. E.D. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 18.
186. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124 ~10.4.
187. E.D. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 24.
188. !d. at 20, 23
189. !d. at 23.
190. Id. at 23-25.
191. !d. at 25-27.
192. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 122 ~6.4.
193. Id. at 123
194. Id. at 123
195. Id. at 124~8.2.1.

and 124-25
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explore the possibility of adopting a new approach to this whole area, drawing
on U.S. experience with the drafting of framework or standard laws.,,196
The future of these proposals is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that
the European Union has taken a strong position that it will protect consumers
against unfair terms. Just how that position is implemented in one country is
the subject of the next part of this article.
IV.

GERMAN LAW

The Unfair Terms Directive, just as any other directive of the European
Union, has force only insofar as the fifteen-soon to be twenty-five-member
states implement it. In proceedings before the European Court of Justice, the
Commission of the European Union acts vigorously to assure that member
states implement directives fully and completely. To see how the Unfair
Terms Directive actually applies, one must examine national law.
Because directives leave to each member state the form and methods of
its implementation, each implementing law is unique to the country adopting
it. Ideally, this article would examine the law in each of the member states of
the European Union. But no one author could know all the languages and
legal systems involved necessary for an: examination of fifteen, let alone
twenty-five, member states. A consortium would be necessary. For the
purpose ofthis article, it is sufficient to focus on the law of one Member State.
Hopefully, similar studies of the laws of other member states will follow
publication of this article.
While the law of any Member State could illustrate the implementation
of the Unfair Terms Directive, this article examines the law of Germany.
There are several reasons for the choice. An obvious economic reason is that
Germany, with over eighty million inhabitants, has the largest population of
any country in the European Union. Its law presumably governs the most
transactions of any Member State's law. But there are more important
intellectual reasons to look at the law of Germany first. The German legal
system was among the first European legal systems to identify the issue of
standard terms and was the first to address the issue systematically. Its
Standard Terms Statute was very influential in the drafting of the European
directive. As has been noted, its law also may have had a significant influence
on American law in its formative stages. 197
Part IV examines German law and its development in detail. Section A
considers the judge-made law that controlled standard terms through 1976.
Section B sets out the contract model for controlling standard terms that was
developed by the courts and that became the basis of the Standard Terms
196. Id. at 121 ~4.4. Not everyone in Europe is enthusiastic about comparative law inquiries, at
least comparative studies with the United States. By a vote of 46 for to 73 against, with 6 abstentions,
the Committee voted down a proposal that would have deleted the recommendation quoted in the text
for the reason that "U.S. experience with the drafting of framework or standard laws cannot be
transposed directly to the European Union. In contrast to the European Union, the United States share
uniform legal concepts." Id. at 127.
197. Besides such objective factors, there are also important SUbjective factors: the author
knows German and the German legal system.
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Statute of 1976. Section C summarizes the principal provisions of the 1976
Standard Terms Statute as it became part of the German Civil Code in
198
2002.
Section D examines how the initial proposals for the E.D. Unfair
Terms Directive challenged the contract model in Germany and how German
commentators influenced the final form of the Unfair Terms Directive.
Finally, Section E discusses how German law applies to American Internet
licenses.
A.

German Judge-Made Law

The German legal system has long provided some control over the use
of standard terms. American jurists are used to thinking of the United States as
a country of judge-made law, while they see Germany as a country of
legislation, yet for three quarters of the last century, German law controlling
standard terms was judge-made. 199 In Germany, as in the United States, form
agreements achieved widespread use by the end of the nineteenth century.
Already in 1871 a statute that imposed liability on railroads also prohibited
agreements excluding that liability.200 Given German insistence that judges
have a basis in statute to act, German judges were not quick to challenge
standard terms. In 1883 the German Supreme Court (then known as the
Reichsgericht) held that freedom of contract-in the absence of any
legislation-precluded courts from intervening to control standard terms no
201
matter how offensive the terms might be.
When the German Civil Code came into force in 1900, the courts
acquired a statutory basis for intervention. That basis was in the general
clauses of the Code, especially in sections 138 and 242. The first paragraph of
section 138 provides: "A transaction that offends good morals (gute Sitten) is
void.,,202 One might translate "offend good morals" as "unconscionable.,,203
Section 242 provides: "Obligations shall be performed in the manner required
by good faith [Treu und Glauben], with regard to commercial usage.,,204
Using these two general clauses, German courts limited enforcement of
standard terms.
198. Gesetz zur Modemisierung des Schuldrechts, Statute for Modernizing the Law of
Obligations, v. 26.11.2001 (BGBI. I s. 3138).
199. ZWEIGERT & Ki.'>TZ, supra note 23, at 336 (noting that the German law on standard terms
is "judge-made law of the purest kind, and in creating it the German courts have done a remarkable and
praiseworthy job without parallel elsewhere"). Accord Baudenbacher, supra note 10, at 341-42 (noting
that the law was codified in the AGB and contributed to the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive: "Essentially,
all of Europe (with the exception of Switzerland) lives-or will in the near future live-under a law that
originated from freely developed judge-made law of the German Supreme Court").
200. See Keitz, supra note 18, at A38 (discussing Section 5 of the Imperial Liability Statute
[Reichshaftpflichtgesetz] of 1871).
201. Judgment of June 16, 1883, RGZ II, 100 110 (enforcing English language-English law
based exclusions ofliability). See Kotz, supra note 18, at A30; Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN,
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 531.
202. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1046 (providing a comparison of U.C.C. Section 2-302
unconscionability with the general clauses mentioned here).
203. For a discussion of the difficulty of translating Section 138, particularly in connection
with standard terms, see OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 106-07 (1937) (noting the various translations, ranging from "good
morals," "boni mores," "public policy" and "unsocial").
204. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1044.
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Through the 1930s German courts relied princ~ally on the good morals
provision of section 138 to police standard terms. 20 Their focus then tended
to be on monopoly situations where the party presented with the terms had no
choice but to accept them. 206 In 1935 Ludwig Raiser moved the discussion a
major step forward by the publication of his post-doctoral dissertation
(Habilitationsschrift), Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen,
which provided a thorough analysis of the problems involved under the thenapplicable law. 207 Raiser's book was reprinted in 1961 and to this day is cited
as a principal source of inspiration in the field. 208 Raiser asked whether there
was a misuse of the freedom of contract not only where the user of standard
terms has a monopoly position, but also where the user depends upon the
indifference or legal inexperience of the other party. 209
Soon after the reestablishment of a democratic government following the
Nazi dictatorship, the reconstituted German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) addressed the issue of control of standard terms. While building on the
work of the old Court, the new Supreme Court put its own stamp on standardterms contro1. 210 From a technical viewpoint, it shifted from relying on the
good morals provision of section 138 to the good-faith provision of section
242.211 But in addition to this seemingly technical change, the Court's
decisions of the 1950s and 1960s set in motion broader changes in thinking
that culminated in the Standard Terms Statute. These changes are discussed
below in Section B.
Notwithstanding the active role German courts had taken in controlling
form contracts,z12 by the early 1970s there was consensus that it was time for
legislation. The consumer movement had gathered stren~th and parties on
both sides of the legislative aisle sought its approva1. 21 The Ministry of
205. See LUDWIG RAISER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 280-83
(1961) (discussing reliance on both provisions and suggestion made to use Section 242).
206. See Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 531.
207. Although Raiser's book appeared in the third year of the Nazi dictatorship, it is based on
the law in force before 1933. Cf PRAUSNITZ, supra note 203, at 106 (noting the "great change" in
German law since 1933, that the law discussed pre-dated that change, and that as of 1937 no definite
alternative line of decisions in standard terms had developed). Raiser's crucial point of departure that
was followed in the 1950s, but since abandoned, was the similarity of standard terms to legal norms.
Raiser, supra note 205, at 5; see also Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 37-38
(calling it the "path-breaking investigation"); Hans Erich Brandner, Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem
Gebiet der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1973, 613 (noting that in his "unsurpassed work"
Raiser had recognized all the fundamentals of the issues and often the details); ZWEIGERT & K6TZ,
supra note 23, at 336 ("pathbreaking").
209. RAISER, supra note 205, at 284. See also Kotz, supra note 18, at A31; Ludwig Raiser,
Vertragsfreiheit heute, JZ 1958, 1,7.
210. See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 23, at 336.
211. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1956, BGHZ 22, 91. See Helmut Heinrichs, Umsetzung der EGRichtlinie iiber mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen durch Auslegung Erweiterung des
Anwendungsbereichs der Inhaltskontrolle, NJW 1995, 153, 156; Manfred Wolf & Thomas Pfeiffer, Der
richtige Standort des AGB-Rechts innerhalb der BGB, ZRP [Zeitschrift fiIr Rechtspolitik] 2001, 303,
304.
212. See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1103.
213. See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 358 (Tony Weir,
trans., 2d ed. 1992). For the history of adoption of the law, see MARIANNE SCHATZ-BERGFELD,
VERBRAUCHERINTERESSEN 1M POLITISCHEN PROZESS: DAS AGB GESETZ 62-119 (1984); Brandner, supra
note 208; Wolfgang Eith, Zum Schutzbediirfnis Gegeniiber Allgemeinene Geschiiftsbedingungen, NJW
1974, 16; Kotz, supra note 18, at A9-Al1.
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Justice established a working group that proposed legislation, while the
opposition Christian Democrats prepared a competing proposal. Both drafts
were available when, in September 1974, the German Jurists' Association
(Deutscher Juristentag) considered the issue of standard terms contracts at its
biennial meeting. 214 Professor Rein Katz, one of Germany's leading
comparative-law scholars, was commissioned to write a 100-page review of
standard terms for the meeting, which he titled "Which Legislative Measures
Recommend Themselves for the Protection of the Consumer Against General
Terms and Form Contracts?,,215 The title of Professor Katz's report-provided
to him by the Association-is significant. It is "which le~islative measures"
and not, "whether legislative measures" are called for.2 6 There was little
opposition to having some form of strengthened control. Indeed, the political
parties all agreed on the final bill and it passed both houses of the German
. Iature unammous
.
Iy. 217
I egIS
Dissatisfaction with judge-made law was grounded not in its content but
in its efficacy. The problem was one of judge-made law generally and not just
of judge-made law of standard terms. Above all, judge-made law is limited in
its scope. Courts can act only in cases that are brought to them, so their
decisions have a limited effect. Court control of terms often did not take place
because of the risks of litigation (in Germany, the losing party pays the costs).
Courts could control only the most flagrant abuses; they were not seen as well
suited to deal with more subtle abuses. Even parties subject to adverse
decisions could readily reformulate their standard terms. Judge-made law was
criticized for an absence of concrete provisions and for uneven application by
lower COurtS. 218
Judge-made law also posed a risk that the German legal system takes
particularly seriously: that judges might make political decisions. In German
214. Rolf StUmer, Die Verhandlungen der Abteilung Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ
1974,720.
215. Kiitz, supra note 18, at AI.
216. Manfred Wolf, Gesetz und Richterrecht bei Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1974,
465 (making the same point).
217. Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 43, margin no. 19.
Bunte notes that between 1974 and 1977, the conviction that there was a need for legislative action was
"firmly anchored" in the public, the political parties, and the scholarly community. Bunte, supra note
137, at 921-22. Even a foreign observer noted the consensus months before the statute was passed. See
Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117 ("It seems that all now agree on the need for comprehensive
legislation."). See also Amtliche BegrUndung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Gesetztes,
Drucksache 7/3919, Teil AS, at 11, reprinted in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ,
KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG DES RECHTS DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN
22-24 (1st ed. 1977) (discussing the political climate and steps taken toward a law). For a contrary view
of the law's adoption, see MANFRED THAMM & GERHARD PILGER, TASCHENKOMMENTAR ZUM AGBGESETZ 41 (1998) (describing the hearing given business interests as a "pure alibi event").
218. For discussions of the problems of using judge-made law, see THOMAS BECKER, DIE
AUSLEGUNG DES § 9 ABS. 2 AGB-GESETZ 19-20 (1986); Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN,
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 567, margin no. 63; Bunte, supra note 137, at 922; Dawson, supra
note 13, at 1117; Max Dietiein, Neues Kontrollverfahrenfor Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen?, NJW
1974, 1065, at 1065 (calling such an action "a lottery with a very high price"); Kl:itz, supra note 18, at
A47-A56 (noting that protection by the courts would be really effective only if the party could bring an
action against the use of the terms and that action would be effective against all who use such terms);
Manfred Wolf, Vorschliige for eine gesetzliche Regelung der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ
1974, 41, at 41. See also Amtliche Begrilndung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Geseztes, supra
note 217, at 20-21. For a comparable discussion of American law, see Bates, supra note IS.
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understanding, political decisions are for the legislature and for politically
responsible executors and administrators. The application of law should be
objective. Categorizing certain types of standard tenns as unlawful might
constitute political decision-making if the illegality of the tenns were not
already sufficiently set out, explicitly or implicitly, in a statute. 219
Legislation offered a remedy for these deficiencies and a way to avoid
this risk. Legislation is proactive. It can be systematic and have universal
effect. 220 It can bring about a reconsideration of standard tenns generally in a
way that single court decisions cannot. Legislation can thus bring a breadth of
application and reduce the incidence of objectionable standard tenns.
Legislation can provide increased legal certainty. 221 Legislation is the
appropriate place for political decisions that approve or disapprove use of
particular provisions. In a democratic state, the affected social groups have an
222
opportunity to participate in these political decisions.
Typically in Gennan and other continental legal systems, comparative
223
That was the case with the
law inquiries precede substantial legislation.
Standard Tenns Statute, where such inquiries had an important role in the
224
movement from judge-made law to legislation. In 1967 the Association for
Comparative Law (Gesellschaft for Rechtsvergleichung) sponsored a
symposium at its biennial convention in which experts presented papers
setting out the treatment of standard tenns in Gennany, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Israel. Ludwig Raiser himself presented
the final overall report. 225 He began his report lamenting that he could not
219. See James R. Maxeiner, u.s. "Methods Awareness" (Methodenbewufltsein) for German
Jurists, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER 114, (Bernhard GroBfeld et al. eds., 1998); JAMES
R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (1986).
220. Wolf, supra note 216, at 465. Cf Dietlein, supra note 218; Katz, supra note 18, at A47.
221. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922 (noting ten years later a breadth of effect not possible with
judge-made law); Stiirner, supra note 214.
222. Stiirner, supra note 214. Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 677, 689 (2001) (explaining the death of Revised Article 2: "I think it's naive to believe that a nongovernmental, non-elected, elitist body of insiders can ever get those kind of rules right, whatever we
mean by 'right.' Consumer issues raise important value choices and difficult normative questions that
are best resolved through the ordinary legislative and judicial process."). See also MAXEINER, supra note
219.
223. See Schlesinger, supra note 37, at 14-15.
224. See Hans Erich Brandner, Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem Gebiet der Allgemeinen
Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1973, 613, 613, 618 (noting the comparative law inquiries as one of the
distinguishing characteristics of this as the second "generation" of standard terms law and describing
them as "important").
225. Ludwig Raiser, Die richterliche Kontrolle von Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, in
RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 123 (Ernst Caemmerer ed.,
1968). There were many other comparative studies. Raiser's nephew did one devoted to the United
States. RAISER, supra note 42. For other studies from the 1960s that include the United States, see
EUGEN AUER, DIE RICHTERLICHE KORREKTUR VON STANDARDVERTRAGEN (1964) (comparing judicial
review of standard form contracts in Germany, Switzerland and the United States); EIKE VON HIPPEL,
DIE KONTROLLE DER VERTRAGSFREIHEIT NACH ANGLO-AMERlKANISCHEM RECHT (1963); Eike von
Hippel, The Control of Exemption Clauses-A Comparative Study, 16 lNT'L & COMPo L.Q. 591 (1967).
For book-length studies of English law from that time, see THEO KADE, RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON
FORMULARMASSIGEN HAFTUNGSFRElZEICHNUNGEN 1M ENGLISCHEN RECHT (1970) and STANISLAUS
PRINZ zu SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN-BERLEBURG, ALLGEMEINE GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 1M ENGLISCHEN
RECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG (1969). The Swiss study concluded that the supposedly
flexible common law system was much less flexible than the supposedly formalistic civil law system.
AUER, supra. The Standard Terms Statute did not put a stop to such comparative studies. For two book-
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provide empirical studies of the incidence of standard terms and their abuses.
Their ubiquity, however, could not be doubted. And so too, Raiser said, was
the need for judicial control of their abuses. 226
Raiser discussed in particular how the presence or absence of content
controls impacted controls on incorporation and interpretation. He observed of
the courts of different countries that the less emphasis they placed on
incorporation and interpretation, the more they were inclined to control
content of standard terms directly; and, the more timid they were in
controlling content directly, the more likely they were to scrutinize strictlyperhaps too strictly-incorporation and interpretation. 227 While most countries
tended to focus on incorporation and interpretation, Raiser reported that
German and American courts, the latter with perhaps some reluctance, were
increasingly resorting to direct content control. Responding to criticisms that
control under section 242 of the German Civil Code was too indefinite, he
pointed to the newly adopted section 2-302 of the U.C.C. as another example
228
of a very broad cause.
I
The legislative history of the Standard Terms Statute demonstrates the
importance of comparative inquiry in the legislation. The official government
report on the proposed bill devoted a subsection to foreign experiences. It
drew attention to the then relatively few statutes that expressly regulated
standard terms, in particular the Israeli Standard Contracts Law. It noted that
in Sweden and the United States general prohibitions of inequitable terms
applied. It took particular note ofU.C.C. section 2-302, which it observed was
used principally and increasingly against form contracts. It observed that
contrary to fears that section 2-302 would endanger legal certainty, groups of
cases and approaches were giving the general clause firm contours. 229
B.

The Contract Model

Consensus that action was needed contributed to the adoption of the
Standard Terms Statute. Equally helpful was a large measure of consensus as
to how the statute should limit unfair standard terms without excessively
restricting freedom of contract.
Control of standard terms challenges freedom of contract: how can
courts control terms in parties' contracts without throwing freedom of contract
overboard?230 Default provisions in contract law permit parties to agree to
length studies since that have included the United States, see MUNZ, supra note 33; WILFRID
SCHLOCHTERMEYER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN IN KANADA MIT
BEZUGEN ZUM DEUTSCHEN, ENGLISCHEN, FRANZOSISCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (1985)
(discussing Canadian law with references to American, English, French, and Gennan law).
226. Raiser, supra note 225, at 141 (noting that control was "essential").
227. !d. at 138-39. Accord Brandner, supra note 224, at 614 (noting with a comparison to Italy,
that when there are high demands for knowledge of tenns, once knowledge is shown, there is an
inclination to treat standard fonn contracts as negotiated contracts); ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 23,
at 335-36. For a recent, similar comment about drafting in America, see Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA
on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 167, 192 (2001).
228. RAISER, supra note 42, at 127-28.
229. Amtliche Begriindung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Geseztes, supra note 217, at
21-22.
230. See RAISER, supra note 42, at 25-35 (discussing the transition from Section 138 to Section
242 and the problems arising from using Section 242 to set limits on private autonomy).
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results different from those prescribed by law. If parties assent to those
differing results, they are bound by them. If parties use standard terms, when
should they be bound by them? The German answer, which the Supreme
Court had already begun to develop in the 1950s, is referred to here as the
"contract model.,,231
German standard terms law recognizes that when standard terms are
used there is little freedom of contract for the party subject to them.232 While
the user typically consults legal counsel to draft them and takes care that the
terms work to his or her benefit, the other party rarely does. Thus, though the
terms are typically the focus of the user's daily life, the other party is engaged
in many transactions, each different from the other. The cost to the other party
of exercising the right of freedom of contract is excessive.
Standard terms problems arise because some users exploit their control
over drafting to resolve all issues in their favor in order to override results
provided by law. Yet,the parties have never agreed on these points. Instead,
parties subject to standard terms take those terms as givens. Parties accepting
standard terms negotiate principal issues of price and performance and then
allow users to provide 'appropriate terms. In effect, they delegate to users the
responsibility to draft terms. Users take upon themselves the obligation to
provide suitable terms in good faith. 233 Good faith requires that those terms be
even-handed. As the German Supreme Court explained in an early decision:
[IJt depends upon how to evaluate the statements as the expression of the intention of
judicious and honest parties, who want to give their business dealings a general
contractual framework. The circumstance has to be taken into account, that the principal
[AuftraggeberJ need not know in detail the content of the standard terms. Since, on the
other hand, it needs his assent to be bound, his agreement can relate only to such terms as
he can reasonably and fairly expect to be asserted. 234

231. Cj Hermann-Josef Bunte, Gedanken zur Harmonisierung in der EG auf dem Gebiet der
mif3briiuchlichen Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HORST LOCHER ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG, 325, 331 (Peter Uiffelmann & Hermann Korbion, eds., 1990) (referring generally to the
Vertragsmodell of German private law).
232. KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, ERSTER BAND, ALLGEMElNER TElL, 68
(10th ed. 1970).
233. Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 616 (citing
BGHZ 54, 106, (109)).
234. Judgment of Mar. 8, 1955, BGHZ 17, 1 (3) (citations omitted). Dawson hinted that
Llewellyn might have drawn on the Court's decisions from the 1950s for his idea of "blanket assent."
See supra text accompanying note 32. The parallels to this very case are remarkable. Consider that only
five years later Llewellyn wrote on "blanket assent":
There has been accompanying that basic deal another which, ifnot on any fiduciary basis,
at least involves a plain expression of confidence, asked and accepted, with a
corresponding limit on the powers granted: the boiler-plate is assented to en bloc, "sight,
unseen," on the implicit assumption and to the full extent that (I) it does not alter or
impair the fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone, and (2) that its terms are
neither in the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and unfair.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370-71. Further, "Any contract with boiler-plate results in two separate
contracts: the dickered deal, and the collateral one of supplementary boilerplate." [d. at 371. Todd
Rakoff, who reviewed only Llewellyn's comments, concluded that "[hJe apparently means that the
adherent assents in the sense of reposing confidence, within limits, in the drafting party to fill in the
terms of the deal." Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1174, 1200 (1983). Rakoff found that assumption "very weak" and recommended abandoning it.
[d. It is, however, the basis of the German law. Cj John Dawson, The General Clauses, Viewed from a
Distance, in RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES UND AUSLANDISCHES PRIVATRECHT 41, 441,
452-53 (1977) ("[I]t came to be seen that most of the text on printed forms was not read and, if so, was
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Good faith requires that the user of standard tenns not subject the other party
to an unreasonable disadvantage. 235
German standard tenns law sets limits on the freedom of users to exploit
their position as drafters to their sole benefit. It prohibits them from taking
inappropriate advantage of other parties. Thus, the issue is not controlling the
freedom-of-contract (Vertragsfreiheit) of parties, but of preventing abuse by
one party, the user, of that party's freedom of contract-drafting (Vertrags'.(;·h·
) 236
gesta ItungsJrel
elt.
In Gennan theory, the contract model does not limit freedom of contract.
The parties may agree to the tenns they like. What the contract model does is
prevent one party from using the drafting device of standard tenns to
introduce tenns that unreasonably disadvantage the other party. The contract
model does not ask whether the deal or a particular tenn between the parties is
fair; it asks whether the standard tenns provided by the user are a good faith
basis for the parties' contractual relationship.
.
The contract model compares a challenged standard tenn to two
principal measures of validity: the essential basic principles ofthe statute from
which the standard tenn deviates and the essential rights or duties necessary to
achieve the purposes of the contract. 237 Unlike the potentially far-reaching
inquiry mandated by American law,m the scope of the contract model is
largely limited to the standard tenn challenged, the relevant statutory default
rules, and the contract concerned. It requires only review of transactions of the
type and classes of participants concerned, but not of the circumstances of the
individual parties to the particular transaction.239 The relevant statute serves a
"classifying and guiding function" (Ordnungs-und Leitbildfunktion). 240 This
approach of the contract model is tenned "abstract-universal" (abstraktseldom understood by the signers, that this made nonsense of the usual tests of mutual assent, that the
draftsmen of such documents were in substance and effect law-makers. So the conclusion took firm hold
that there should be cast on them the responsibility oflaw-makers to distribute even-handed justice.").
235. § 307(1) BDRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [Civil Code] [hereinafter BGB].
236. See Gesetzesentwurf-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts [Draft
Legislation for the Modernization of Contract Law], May 14, 2001, Drucksache 14/6040 at 149 (2001);
Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 529, margin no. 1;
Hermann Josef Bunte, Die EG-Richtlinie iJber miJ3briiuchliche Klauseln Verbrauchervertriigen und ihre
Umsetzung durch das Gesetz zur A"nderung des AGB-Gesetzes, DB [DER BETRIEB] 1996, 1389, and text
accompanying note 22; Bunte, Zehn Jahre, supra note 137, at 923; Reinhard Damm, Europiiisches
Verbrauchervertragsrecht und AGB-Recht, JZ 1994, 161, 166-67; Heinrichs in PALANDT, GESETZ ZUR
MODERNISIERUNG DES SCHULDRECHTS, ERGANZUNGSBAND ZU PALANDT, BDRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
101, margin nos. 8-9 (61st ed. 2002) [hereinafter PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB]; Horst Locher, Das
AGB-Gesetz und VOB Teil B, in VOB-Teile A und B-Kommentar, 506 margin no. 3 (Heinz Ingenstau &
Hermann Korbion, eds., 14th ed. 2001); see also AVER, supra note 225, at 99-100, 102 (making the
same point before the statute was adopted).
237. § 307(2) BGB, supra note 235; see Gesetzesentwurf-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, supra note 236, at 149; Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN,
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 617 (noting that deviation from default law is not the basis for the
control, but the measure); Eike Schmidt, Inhaltskontrolle von Schuldvertriigen, DRiZ [Deutsche
Richterzeitung] 1991, 81, 83.
238. See supra text accompanying note 48.
239. See Judgment of Oct. 29,1956, BGHZ 22, 91 (98); Judgment of Mar. 8,1955, supra note
234 at (3); Kiitz, supra note 18, at A51; Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 99, at 1262 (commenting that to a
foreign observer not familiar with the "dogmatic-conceptual" phase of German standard terms law, this
appears as "a simply incomprehensible approach to the problem").
240. JOACHIM SCHMIDT-SALZER, ALLGEMEINE GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 186-89 (2d ed. 1977).
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generellen) rather than "particular-personalized" (konkret-individuellen).241 It
has pennitted German law, through a combination of statutory rules and
judicial decisions, to develop a ~udicature of specific prohibited terms in each
of their multiple manifestations. 42
The contract model is oriented on general contract law. As a result,
although the catalyst for passage of the Standard Terms Statute was the
consumer movement, it was not limited, as the Unfair Terms Directive is, to
consumer contracts. The German law exists to prevent abuse of the freedom
of contract drafting by those controlling the drafting of terms. The German
law accordingly protects all parties against misuse of standard terms. 243 The
law requires no finding of weakness in the party subjected to the terms or
oppression by the user. German standard terms law thus is not a special law
protecting consumers against overbearing suppliers. It is a general law that
governs a particular contract practice, i.e. standard terms. 244 The legislation is
an explicit approval of the use of standard terms and an acknowledgment of
the rationalization benefits they bring. It defends the freedom of contract. 245
C.

German Standard Terms Legislation

The Standard Terms Statute, Das Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der
Allgemeinen Geschiiflsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz), entered into force on April
246
1, 1977. The law quickly assumed a central role in German contract law.
From 1977 to 1999 the German Supreme Court alone, not to speak of the
lower courts, decided more than 1500 cases dealing with the Standard Terms
Statute. 247 The Standard Terms Statute remained a separate statute until
241. See Judgment of July 4, 1997, V ZR 405/96, CR 1998, 286 (287); Damm, supra note 236,
at 172-174; Helmut Heinrichs, Die EG-Richtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Klauseln in
Verbrauchervertriigen, NJW 1993, 1817, 1820; Joachim Schmidt-Salzer, Transformation der EGRichtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen in deutsches Recht und AGB-Gesetz,
BB [BE1RlEBS-BERATOR] 1995, 734-36.
242. Even before the Standard Terms Statute, Kiitzjudged the effort a success. See Kiitz, supra
note 18, at A51 (noting that the courts did not rely on unchecked control using indefinite general
clauses, but developed case groups, clause varieties, and contract types).
243. This legislative decision is consistent with practice prior to the adoption of the law, which
policed standard terms without regard to whether a consumer was involved. Most leading cases before
the statute was adopted, in fact, involved contracts between merchants. See Eith, supra note 213, at 17;
accord Bunte, supra note 137, at 925. Eith's article is a contemporary argument against limitation to
consumer protection. While in principle it protects all parties equally, as will be discussed, it does allow
for treatment of businesspersons that is different from that of consumers. See infra text accompanying
notes 294-96. The provisions of the Civil Code on standard terms, i.e., Sections 305 to 310, are written
in terms of general applicability and refer to the user of the terms and the other party to the contract.
Section 310 then provides that certain provisions do not apply to contracts with a businessperson
(Unternehmer). Businessperson is defined in Section 14 I to be "a natural or legal person or a legally
capable association of persons, at the conclusion of a legal transaction, acting in exercise of a
commercial or independent professional activity."
244. Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 734-36.
245. Markus Stoffels, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle, JZ 2001,843,844 (discussing AGB § 8,
the provision that became § 307(3) BGB without change, and noting the limitations of § 307(3) that
keep price and performance terms firmly in the hands of the contracting parties).
246. Oliver Remien, AGB-Gesetz und Richtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Verbrauchervertragsklauseln in ihrem europiiischen Urnfeld, ZEuP 1994, 34 ("Since the Standard Terms Statute was passed,
contract law in Germany is above all the law of the control of standard terms.").
247. The cases are listed at ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, at 173588 ..
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January 1, 2002, when its substantive provisions became part of the Civil
Code and its procedural provisions became part of a new procedural statute. 248
No major changes were made in the substantive law as it stood at the end of
2001. 2 9 During its 25-year life, while certain details were adjusted, the law
experienced no major amendments. The most noteworthy event in its life was
25o
its harmonization with the E.U. Directive. The law is widely regarded as a
success.251 In some sectors of the economy, use of standard terms increased
upon adoption of the law.252
This article refers to the standard terms legislation by the new Civil
Code section numbers rather than by the section numbers of the Standard
Terms Statute. Set out below is a transposition table that identifies those
provisions by their section numbers in the Standard Terms Statute. Attached
as an Appendix to this article is an English translation of the Civil Code
provisions.

248. The Standard Tenns Statute was made part of the Law of Obligations, i.e., Book 2 of the
Civil Code. Some commentators argued that it should remain a free-standing law or should be made part
of the General Part, i.e., Book 1 of the Civil Code, since its effect is not limited to contracts falling under
Book 2, Law of Obligations. See, e.g., Peter Ulmer, Das AGB-Gesetz-ein eigenstiindiges
Kodifikationswerk, JZ 2001, 491. Wolf & Pfeiffer, supra note 209, at 303, 304. Complete transposition
tables are given at Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, and in the supplement to
ULMERlBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 3-74. The most important is:
Civil Code
§ 305
§ 305a
§ 305b
§ 305c
§ 306
§ 306a
§ 307
§ 308
§ 309
§ 310

OldAGBG
§§ 1 and 2
§ 23 (part)
§4
§§ 3 and 5
§6
§7
§§ 8 and 9
§ 10
§11
§ 23 (part)

249. Heinrichs in Palandt, BOB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 at 100, margin no. 2. For a
comprehensive review of the changes, see Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, AGB-Recht ins BGB-Eine
erste Bestandsaufnahme, NJW 2002, 12.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 332-39.
251. Twice in the last decade there was cause to evaluate the success of the law: first, when it
was amended to implement the E.U. Unfair Tenns Directive, and second, when it was incorporated into
the Civil Code in the obligations law refonn. With respect to the fonner, see, for example, Martin W.
Huff, Kleingedrucktes for Europa, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZElTUNG, May 17, 1993, at 15. Huffs
editorial, appearing in the business section of a leading conservative newspaper, argued that the call for
narrowing the Gennan law as part of the hannonization with E.U. law was not a good idea, since the
Gennan law had proven to be a success. See also Gesetzeentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines
Gesetzes zur Anderung des AGB-Gesetzes [Draft Legislation to Change the Standard Tenns Law], Feb.
10, 1995, Drucksache 13/2713 at III; Hans W. Miklitz, AGB-Gesetz und die EG-Richtlinie iiber
mifibriiuchliche Vertragsklauseln in Werbrauchervertriigen, ZEP [Zeitschrift filr Europliisches
Privatrecht] 1993, 522, 524 (stating so "sounds the canon in unison"). With respect to the latter, see, for
example, Horst Locher, Das AGB-Gesetz und VOB Teil B, in VOB-Teile A und B-Kommentar, 505
margin n.3 (Heinz Ingenstau & Hennann Korbion eds., 14th ed. 2001); see also Ulmer, in
ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, supra note 54, at 491 (noting general recognition that it was one of the
more successful laws of the last several decades). For one dissonant voice-and that quite so-see
THAMM & PILGER, supra note 217, at 47 ("overwhelmingly, materially negative"); id. at 49 ("a
defectively designed statute").
252. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922.
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The standard terms law consists of two principal parts: an incorporation
control in sections 305 to 305c, and a content control in sections 307 to 309.253
The definition of "standard terms" in section 305(1) largely determines the
scope of the law. Standard terms are terms prepared beforehand for a multiple
number of contracts and are presented (stellt) by the user to the other party at
the contract's conclusion. 254 The form in which the terms appear does not
matter and they mayor may not be separate from the rest of the contract.
section 305 provides that terms separately negotiated between the parties are
not standard terms and are not subject to control under the standard terms
. IattOn.
· 255
I egIs
1.

Incorporation Controls

Besides defining standard terms, section 305 provides the general rule
for when standard terms become part of a contract as a body. Sections 30Sa
through 30Sc modify the general rule of section 305. Section 30Sa provides
special rules for the transportation and telecommunication industries; Section
30Sb provides that individually negotiated terms take priority over standard
terms, and section 30Sc provides incorporation and interpretation rules for
individual terms.
Section 305(2) requires that users of standard terms give other parties
notice and an opportunity to review the terms. Standard terms do not become
part of the contract unless they comply with these formalities and the other
party assents to their use. The notice may be oral or in writing. If, for certain
types of contracts, an express notice creates disproportionate difficulties, a
suitable sign at the place of contracting may suffice. The notice must be
apparent to an average customer. Thus, for example, if a reference in a
contract to the terms is to be sufficient notice, that reference must be so
conspicuous that it could not be overlooked even in a fleeting review of the
contract. 256 The reference must be made at the same time as the contract and is
not effective if made only once the contract is concluded. Thus, for example, a
reference on a ticket of admission to a theatre is insufficient, since the ticket is
provided only after the contract is reached.257 The user of standard terms must
provide the other party with an opportunity to review the standard terms, but
is not required to provide the terms unsolicited. 258 The critical moment is
253. In the Standard Terms Statute the statutory subdivisions made the separation explicit. The
four sections dealing with content control (§§ 8-11) were collected together in a separate second
subdivision, "Invalid Terms"; the first section in the subdivision, Section 8, had the caption "Limits of
the Content Control." Sections relating to definition, incorporation, interpretation, and legal effect of
invalidity were collected together in a first subdivision, "General Provisions."
254. This is the general rule, but to comply with the Unfair Terms Directive, the law has been
revised to ease these requirements in consumer transactions. See infra text accompanying note 266.
255. Although they are still subject to the general clauses of the Civil Code. See MUNZ, supra
note 33, at 240-41.
.
256. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 305, at 106, margin no. 29
(with case citation); Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 207,
margin no. 27.
257. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 305, at 106, margin no. 30
(with case citations).
258. The legislature did not adopt a proposal to require furnishing a copy of the terms without
awaiting a request. See Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, supra note 54, § 2, at 220, margin no. 46.
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when the customer makes the contractual commitment; sending the terms after
the commitment is made will ordinarily not suffice. 259
Section 31 O( 1) provides that neither the notice nor the opportunity to
review requirements apply directly to contracts between businesspersons. 26o
They are subject to the general rules of the Civil Code for contracts generally.
Often in contracts between businesspersons both parties use standard terms,
which leads to the problem known in the United States as the "battle of the
forms" and governed by section 2-207 of the u.C.c. 26 \
Section 305c(1)(1) provides that surprising terms do not become part of
the contract. A term is surprising if, under the circumstances, in particular in
view of the external appearance of the contract, it is so unusual that the other
party would not expect it. Decisive is not a term's unfairness, but its
unusualness. 262 A classic example of a clause prohibited as surprising is one
that requires a bu:?t;er of a product to obtain necessary service for the product
from the seller. 63 Businesspersons receive the full protection of this
provision. 264 Section 305c(2) provides that any doubts in construction of a
standard term are to be resolved against the user. Section 305b provides that
individually negotiated terms take priority over standard terms. Thus, for
example, if the parties agree on a delive~ date, that agreement is not
superseded by a standard term allowing delay. 65

2.

Content Control

The heart of German standard terms legislation is its control of the
content of standard terms. 266 The content control consists of three parts: a
general clause (section 307); a list of terms that may be prohibited (section
308, sometimes called the "gray list"); and a list of terms that are prohibited
(section 309, sometimes called the "black list").
A court reviewing challenged terms is first to confirm that the
challenged terms have become part of the contract under sections 305 through
305c. It is then to test them against the content controls, looking first to the
prohibited list, then to the suspect list, and only finally to the general clause. 267

259. See id. § 2 at 222-23, margin no. 48.
260. § 310(1) BGB, supra note 235.
261. See KARL LARENZ, ALLGEMEINER TElL DES DEUTSCHEN BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 489 (4th
ed. 1977); Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 245-63
(discussing when standard terms become part of agreements between businesspersons).
262. Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 3, at 302, margin
no. 1 308, margin no. 12; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 305c at 112,
margin no. 3 (with case citation). The test for unusualness is with respect to contracts of that type. Ulmer
in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 3, at 310, margin no. 14; Schmidt in
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 12, at 1453, margin no. 11.
263. Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GEsETz, supra note 54, § 3, at 319, margin
no. 26.
264. Id., § 3, at 345, margin no. 54.
265. Id., § 4, at 363, margin no. 22 (with case citations).
266. Brandner in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54 at 490 ("das
Kernstuc!c"); Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 119, margin no. 2.
267. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 539, margin
no. 15.
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Section 307(3) explicitly limits the content control to standard terms that
provide for changes and additions to default law. It thereby excludes from the
content control the fundamental terms of the bargain, namely performances
and price?68 The limitation of the content control to standard terms is
designed to insure that the control does not itself interfere with the free market
269
.
an d pnvate autonomy.
The question of validity is a question of law. Fact questions and the
burden of proof playa subordinate role. The facts necessary to decide whether
a term improperly creates a material disadvantage are usually undisputed. The
determination that the disadvantage is unreasonable is purely a matter of law
and allows for no taking of proof. 270 To a substantial extent, the evaluation
can be abstract and objective.
Sections 308 and 309 list prohibited and suspect terms. The two sections
are considered to be applications of the general clause of section 307.271
Section 309 lists eight types of prohibited terms.272 It voids without evaluation
terms on the list. Thus, for example, section 309(7) voids a term that excludes
or limits liability for personal injury ("life, body, health") or for gross
negligence. 273 Section 308 lists thirteen types of suspect terms. It does not
presume that terms of the types listed are invalid but requires an evaluation of
the particular term. 274 For example, section 308(1) requires determination of
whether a period of time reserved to accept or reject an offer or to perform is
"inappropriately long or not sufficiently definite."
Sections 308 and 309 are intended to increase legal certainty. While few
would doubt they have made a positive contribution, the extent to which they
have done so may be debatable. Their catalogues provide fixed points of
departure. If a term falls under section 309, no further examination is
necessary. If a term that falls under section 308, it is tested under specified
measures.
Section 31 O( 1) removes standard terms used with businesspersons from
the direct controls of sections 308 and 309. However, it leaves those terms
subject to testing under the general clause of section 307. Its practical effect is
to let courts decide whether section 308 and 309 controls make sense in
business contexts. 275 In practice, courts tend to apply them anyway to
268. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 8, at 495, margin
no. 1; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307 at 125, margin no. 54.
However, this does not exclude from the content control terms that relate to price. [d. at 125, margin no.
60; cf E.U. Unfair Terms Directive art. 4(2).
269. Stoffels, supra note 245, at 844.
270. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 635, margin
no. 162; LARENZ, supra note 261, at 501. See Decision of Oct. 24, 2001, VIII ARZ 1101, BGHZ 8,
1(01), available at http://www.bgh-free.de.
271. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 119, margin no. 2.
272. The introduction to the list alerts readers that the list assumes that the term in question is
not already prohibited by some other provision oflaw.
273. The entire list is in the Appendix.
274. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 538, margin
no. 12.
275. The extent to which the courts, in applying the general clause to agreements between
businesspersons, should look to Sections 308 and 309 is controversial. See Brandner in
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 538, margin no. 13. For a book
devoted solely to the question, see REINHARD LUTZ, AGB-KoNTROLLE 1M HANDELSVERKEHR UNTER .
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standard terms with business~ersons, by analogy.276 In some areas, that
application is nearly automatic. 77
The general clause, section 307, tests standard terms not caught by
sections 308 and 309. The first sentence of subsection (1) of section 307
makes invalid (unwirksam) certain standard terms "if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at an
unreasonable (unangemessene) disadvantage."
Application of section 307(1) to a particular standard term looks to what
278
the legal positions of the parties would be if there were no such term.
Courts determine whether the user of the term has one-sidedly exploited
control over drafting. Courts focus on the default solution and on the change
in legal result. They are not supposed to be concerned with the situation of
individual parties. 279 Courts find users have not complied with the good faith
requirement when terms are entirely one-sided and take no account of the
other parties. They require that obligations imposed by standard terms be
reasonable in relation both to the user's own interests and the burden imposed
on the other party. In making these determinations, courts rely on other
fundamental principles of German law such as necessity (Erforderlichkeit)
and proportionality (Verhiiltnismiifiigkeit).28o They do not void terms simply
because the terms impose burdens. For example, they do not find that a party
subject to a standard term is unreasonably disadvantaged if the term is not
very burdensome281 or if it im~oses an obligation that would be expected of
the party in good faith anyway. 82
Section 307 does not consist solely of the general clause prohibition in
its first sentence. The balance of the section guides application of the general
clause. The second sentence of the first paragraph provides that an
unreasonable disadvantage may be found in contract language that is not clear
BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DER KLAUSELVERBOTE (1991).
276. Gerald Spindler, Haftungsklauseln in Provider-Vertriigen: Probleme der Inhaltskontrolle,
CR 1999, 626, 627.
277. Christian Schubel, Schuldrechtsreform: Perspektivenwechsel im Bargerlichen Recht und
AGB-Kontrolle for den Handelskauf, JZ 2001, 1113, 1115. See also Hans Erich Brandner & Peter
Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie aber mifibriiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverttiigen: Kritische Bemerkungen
zum Vorschlag der EG-Kommission, BB 1991,703 (finding extensive uniformity).
278. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, § 9, at 571 margin
no. 70 (with case citations); Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 120
margin no. 8 (with case citations). Presumably this process is regarded simply as construction of the
statute and not as law-making itself. While German courts routinely rely on judge-made law, it is not for
the judges to make policy decisions. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 219, at 39-44.
279. Judgment of July 4, 1997, supra note 241 at 287 (requiring instead an "iiberindividuellgeneralisierende, typisierende, von den konkreten Umstanden des Einzelfalls absehende Betrachtungsweise"). See Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 571 margin
no. 70.
280. Bunte, Die EG-Richtlinie, supra note 236, at text accompanying note 13. Regarding
necessity and proportionality and their general importance, see James R. Maxeiner, Constitutionalizing
Forfeiture Law-The German Example, 27 AM. J. COMPo L. 635, 649 (1979). For proportionality, see
generally HANS KUTSCHER ET AL., DER GRUNDSATZ DER VERHALTNISMASSIGKEIT IN EUROpAISCHEN
RECHTSORDNUNGEN (1985).
281. Schubel, supra note 277, at 1114-15 (discussing the tendency to avoid any departure from
dispositive law).
282. For this paragraph generally, see Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ,
supra note 54, § 9, at 571-74, margin nos. 70-74.
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and comprehensible. The second paragraph provides for two situations when
an unreasonable disadvantage is to be presumed. Section 307(2)(1) presumes
an unreasonable disadvantage when a standard term makes a material
departure from a fundamental principle of otherwise applicable law. Section
307(2)(2) presumes an unreasonable disadvantage if the term takes away or
283
limits a material benefit that the contract is designed to provide. Sections
307(2)(1) and 307(2)(2) complement each other. In practice a clear distinction
is not always made between them. 284 Section 307(2)(1), which focuses on the
law, is considered clearer and more predictable than section 307(2)(2), which
focuses on the contract itself. 285 Section 307(2)(1)does not presume an
unreasonable disadvantage merely because the standard term changes the
outcome provided by law. 286 It requires that the change be fundamental; that
the standard term displace a material interest of the other party or of the
society at large protected by the law.287 Section 307(2)(2) typically is used to
test liability limitations and warranty exclusions that are not otherwise
prohibited by sections 308 and 309-for example, a liability limitation for
·
ord mary
neg l'Igence. 288
In the United States there is a certain resignation that a trade-off between
"certainty of contract and fairness of terms" is necessary in the control of
standard terms. 289 In Germany, there is no such resignation. There the control
of standard terms has come a long way from its beginnings in a couple of
general clauses. Under German law there now exists what might be termed a
matrix of content control. It provides numerous orientation points for those
283. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 619, margin
no. 142. Larenz notes that nos. 1 and 2 substantially cover each other. LARENZ, supra note 261, at 501.
284. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 609-10,
margin nos. 131-32.
285. Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Der Software-Entwicklungsvertrag-VertragstypRisikobegrenzung, CR 2000, 73, 76.
286. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 123, margin no. 28.
287. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GEsETz, supra note 54, § 9, at 611, margin
no. 133; LARENZ, supra note 261, at 500 (discussing when legal provisions incorporate material values
and when they only have an ordering role). Where statutory guidance is absent, there are increased
difficulties in applying the control. Locher, supra note 251, 505, margin no. 2 (Heinz Ingenstau &
Hermann Korbion eds., 14th ed. 2001).
288. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 625 margin
no. 150. How does such a review work in practice? The decision of the German Supreme Court of Oct.
24,2001, VIII ARZ 1101, JZ 2002, 1001, available at http://www.bverfg.de. can serve as an example.
At issue was the validity of a term that disclaimed the landlord's liability to a tenant for ordinary
negligence. A leaky roof damaged the tenant's furniture. The court considered whether such a
contractual limitation of liability would eviscerate one of the main duties (a so-called cardinal duty) of
the lease agreement, the fulfillment of which the tenant could justly rely on. The court turned to the
lessor's obligations under the Civil Code, which provides that lessors are responsible for maintaining the
premises in a suitable condition. Excluding liability that the lessor is responsible for, the court
continued, limits the obligation of the lessor to maintain the premises and works to the material
disadvantage of the tenant. The court held that the purpose of a lease of living quarters is to provide a
place for the tenant to live and that a tenant cannot be expected to guard against defects in house
construction. The court further found that no insurance was available to tenants to guard against the risk
of defective construction, while such insurance was available to the lessor as the owner of the building.
The court therefore held that the standard term was invalid. It impermissibly disadvantaged tenants
contrary to the requirement of good faith. The court did not concern itself with whether the party subject
to the term had read it, knew what it meant, or had sought to obtain insurance against the risk of a leaky
roof.
289. See, e.g., Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 144, 148.
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who would judge the validity of standard terms. Sections 308 and 309 provide
relatively fixed points. Section 307 guides its own application, which has
passed from general abstract statements to the dominance of "case law" in
concrete, specific situations. 29o Precedents and commentary can now fill in the
spaces.
The number of precedents and publications in the area is enormous. The
German Supreme Court alone has decided more than 1500 cases. 291 Not.a
month goes by without an article on standard terms. Books devoted to
standard terms appear frequently. These books have different approaches to
coverage. Some are detailed commentaries on the law. Some are practical;
others are theoretical. Dissertations examine particular legal aspects or effects
in particular sectors of the economy. Practical guides profile particular
industries: a 395-page tome for the construction trade is now in its ninth
edition.292 And the construction trade is just one of many industries to have its
own volume. There are even guides for the general public. One, a widelydistributed, 4S0-page popular paperback, now in its fifth edition, promises to
help the general public in "drafting and controlling of the 'fine print. ",293
These guides could not be produced if the law did not provide predictability.
Professional commentaries adopt a matrix approach to their discussions
of content control. First, they give explanations of each of the three principal
statutory controls, now sections 307-309. That is the usual approach of a
German statutory commentary. But then, deviating from the usual, they
catalogue specific terms across all three controls categorizing the terms either
by their legal nature (e.g., choice-of-Iaw clauses, mandatory writing clauses)
or by the business sector in which they are used (e.g., construction contracts,
hospital contracts).294 This matrix permits precision in identifying when terms
are likely to be valid and when they are not.
3.

Enforcement

As does its American counterpart, German standard terms law provides
that impermissible terms are unenforceable. 295 That remedy recently received
290. Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Die Entwicklung des AGB-Rechts im Jahr 2001, NJW
2002, 1688, 1695-96. German judges and scholars already had experience in developing such case
groups under the "good faith" provisions of Section 242 of the Civil Code. The process even has a
name: "concretisation." Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faith in European Contract
Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 7, 23 (Reinhard
Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000).
291. See supra note 247.
ECKHARD FRIKELL, UNWIRKSAME
292. LUDWIG GLATZEL, OLAF HOFMANN &
BAUVERTRAGSKLAUSELN NACH DEM AGB-GESETZ: RECHTSPRECHUNG - SCHNELLUBERSICHT,
MUSTERBAUVERTRAG, GESETZESTEXT (9th ed. 2000).
293. JORGEN NIEBLING, GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN (AGB) VON A - Z: NEUES SCHULDRECHT NEUE AGB (5th ed. 2002)
294. One commentary gives nearly five hundred pages to this review and treats it in a separate
section designated appendix to §§ 9-11. ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, at
957-1446. A "pocket" commentary to the law devotes nearly half of its 478 pages to its § 9 appendix.
THAMM & PILGER, supra note 217, at 90-319. The leading "short" commentary to the entire civil code
devotes more than a dozen pages and one hundred margin numbers to this aspect of the catalogue under
the discussion of Section 307. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at
127-41, margin nos. 68-169.
295. §§ 305, 306 BGB. Section 306(1) provides that in those cases the contract remains
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new teeth when the European Court of Justice held that national courts of the
European Union must of their own motion examine whether material contract
l'.....
296
terms are unlau m actions agamst consumers.
Unlike American law, however, German standard terms law, ever since
the legislature first took up the issue in the 1970s, has been concerned with
what the European Commission later called "positive enforcement," i.e.,
measures designed to prevent the use of unfair terms. When the legislature
first took up a standard terms law, it considered several alternative approaches
to enforcement. One widely discussed proposal called for a "preventive
administrative control." Parties who wished to use standard terms would file
terms for review and approval with a new administrative agency.297 In the end,
however, the legislature rejected every form of administrative oversight. 298
Instead of adopting an administrative oversight, at the last moment, the
legislature introduced a novel procedural solution: the institutional action, i.e.,
the Verbandsklage. 299 Consumer groups and trade associations have the right
to brinBi suit against those who use or recommend use of unlawful standard
terms. 3 0 These institutional suits exist not to protect individual customers or
users of impermissible standard terms, but the contracting public generally
from application of impermissible terms. 3D! Originally a part of the Standard
Terms Statute, since January 1,2002 that right of action is now governed by
the new Law of Actions for Injunctions for Violations of Consumer and Other
Law (Gesetz fiber Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts-und anderen
otherwise effective. It protects the other party to the contract by reversing the usual presumption that the
entire contact is void. Schmidt, in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-Gesetz supra note 54, § 6 at 427,
margin no. 1. Unlike American law, German law theoretically allows for damages for intentional or
negligent use of invalid terms. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, §
9, at 565, margin no. 57.
296. Case C-240/98, supra note 161. In the German legal system, the holding affects more than
just private litigation. It also requires that notarieS-Who have an important role in many contractsexamine contract term unfairr.ess. It may also impose similar obligations on the land registry office.
Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 563-64, margin nos. 5455.
297. Brandner, supra note 224, at 617. The most extreme of these would have made
administrative approval a necessary prerequisite to use of any standard terms. Somewhat less extreme
proposals included suggestions for registering terms and creation of a special administrative body
similar to the Federal Cartel Office to enforce the new law. The Israeli Standard Contracts Law, 1964,
13. L.S.1. 152, (1964-65), served as a model for an administrative approach, but also as a warning, since
it did not seem to work too well. See Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note
54, at 1457, margin no. 4; Uri Yadin, Legislative Control of Standard Contracts, in RICHTERLICHE
KONTROLLE VON ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 143, 154 (1968) (noting only one opinion
under the law-a decision denying Dun & Bradstreet's request for approval of a liability exclusion). The
original Israeli statute, which can be considered the world's first standard terms statute, is printed in
RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON ALLEGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 175. See also Ewoud H.
Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPo L. 525, 529-32 (1978).
298. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 1457-58, margin
nos. 5-7.
299. Id. at 1457-58, margin no. 9.
300. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922. The Verbandsklage was understood as a substitute for a
farther-reaching administrative control. Eike Schmidt, Verbraucherschutzende Verbandsklagen, NJW
2002, 25, 28. The original German provisions for a collection action apparently served as inspiration for
Article 7 of the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ,
supra note 54, § 13, at 1482, margin no. 23.
301. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG at 413; Hensen in
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 13, at 1482, margin no. 23 (citing half a
dozen Supreme Court decisions).
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Verstoj3en [UklaGJ), hereafter referred to as the "Injunctions Act." The
institutional action is Germany's closest analogue to an American class
302
action.
Section 1 of the Injunctions Act provides that whoever uses or
recommends the use in commerce of standard terms that are invalid under
Civil Code sections 307 to 309 is subject to an injunctive action to cease and
desist. Sections 2 and 3 of the Injunctions Act provide that qualifying
consumer groups, trade associations and chambers of commerce officially
recognized by the European Union or by the German federal government are
authorized to bring suit. Trial courts, however, spend no time in determining
whether a particular association is qualified. Section 4 provides that
administrative authorities are to maintain lists of qualified organizations and
update them regularly.
Most institutional legal complaints do not require judicial involvement.
They follow the "warning" (Abmahnung) procedure of German competition
law. Under this procedure a potential plaintiff sends a formal letter demanding
that the user of the terms cease-and-desist. The demand letter must include the
terms claimed to be invalid and the basis for the claim of invalidity. If the user
accepts the demand, the user makes a legally binding declaration that it is
ceasing and desisting from use of the tenns (Unterlassungserkliirung).
Typically in such a declaration the user commits to treat such terms in its
contracts with third parties as invalid and agrees to pay a penalty for each later
use of a prohibited or comparable term (in cases known to the author, about €
1,000 per term, with a maximum of about € 2,500 to € 9,000 per contract). If
the recipient of the demand letter rejects the demand, the plaintiff may then
sue and, if the plaintiff wins, recover the costs of the suit. 30 The cost shifting
provisions of section 5 of the Injunction Act have the effect of making use of
the warning procedure practically if not legally required.
Section 6 of the Injunctions Act provides that plaintiffs ordinarily must
sue in the defendant's home jurisdiction. Of importance for American
companies, however, section 6 provides further that if the defendant is not
located in Germany, the plaintiff may sue in any district where the defendant
uses the invalid tenns. Section 7 provides as an additional sanction that an
304
eventual judgment is to be published.
Sections 9 and 11 of the Injunctions Act give the institutional action its
real teeth. Section 9 requires that a judgment against the defendant must recite
the invalid term, identify the type of transaction in which its use by the
defendant is prohibited, and prohibit the use of terms having the same content.
In ordinary civil litigation, a judgment has effect only for the parties to the
suit. But section 11 of the Injunctions Act changes the normal rule and gives
302. See generally Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under E. U. and German Law, II
DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 355 (2001).
303. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 5, at 421, margin no.
7; Hensen in ULMERlBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ., supra note 54, § 13 at 1496-1502, margin nos.
49-66. For a description in English of the Abmahnung procedure general\y, see Georg Jennes & Peter
Schotthlifer, Germany, in ADVERTISING LAW IN EUROPE AND NORTII AMERICA 203, at § 26, 228-30
(James R. Maxeiner & Peter SchotthOfer eds., 2d ed. 1999).
304. This is a meaningful sanction in Germany where legal proceedings are not as public as in
the United States.
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the judgment a broader effect. Terms found invalid in such an action are
invalid with respect to all of the users' customers. 305 Those customers may
rely on the judgment. Defendants who continue to use terms held invalid are
subject under section 890 of the Code of Civil Procedure to fines of up to €
250,000 and imprisonment for up to two years. 306
Consumer associations initiate many actions against standard terms. In
Berlin and Stuttgart, two consumer or~anizations are reported each to give
several hundred warnings each year. 30 Not counting cases resolved at the
warning stage, in a little more than twenty-four years, consumer associations
brought 3523 suits. 308 Consumer associations account for more than half of all
reported cases applying the Standard Terms Statute. 309 Their suits can have a
broad impact. In one recent case, a consumer association successfully
challenged thirteen terms in a standard form recommended by the automobile
. dustry to new car deaIers. 310
m
Consumer associations might bring even more injunction actions were it
not for the costs of such actions and their litigation risks. 311 To help
associations bring more actions, the European Union provides the associations
with funds. 312 The normal rule of German civil procedure-that the loser
pays-helps defray costs when associations win, but exposes them to risks
when they lose. To reduce the discouraging effect of the rule, it has been
modified for association actions. The law limits the maximum nominal
amount in dispute in such cases to € 250,000. In practice, the usual amount is
much lower: it ranges from € 1500 to € 2500 per clause in dispute. 313
Critics of the institutional action believe it to be only a transition
measure. They observe that it serves not a private institutional interest, but a
public interest. Civil procedure, however, is designed for settlement of private
disputes. For example, it gives parties complete right to continue or abandon
their lawsuits at will. According to this view, the kind of public interest
litigation that the Injunctions Act permits would be better conducted in an
. . . proceed'mg. 314
admlmstratIve

305. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 11, at 426.
306. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, supra note 54, at 1564, margin no. 14 (stating that
someone who uses the terms contrary to a judgment is subject to the sanction of ZPO § 890).
307. Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 77, margin no. 62.
308. [d.
309. See Hans-W. Micklitz, Rapport sur ['application pratique de la Directive 931131CEE dans
la Republique Federale d'Allemagne, in The Integration of Directive 93/13 into the National Legal
Systems 238, 239, 242 (1999) (noting that from 1976 to 1993, individual actions accounted for one-third
of all actions brought, while group actions accounted for two-thirds, and from 1993 to date, the share of
individual actions increased to 43% (therefore implying that group actions accounted for 57%». On the
other hand, suits by trade associations have proven to be unusual.
310. Judgment of Sept. 27, 2000, VIII ZR 155/99, BGHZ 145 (203).
311. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 13, at 1503,
margin no. 69.
312. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9.
313. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 5, at 422, margin no.
14; Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ., supra note 54, § 15, at 1524, margin no. 31.
314. Schmidt, supra note 300, at 25.
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The E. U. Directive: The Contract Model Meets the Consumer Model

The German Standard Terms Statute by all accounts had a profound
influence on the Unfair Terms Directive. 315 In popular perception the directive
was considered to be narrower, since it applied only to consumer contracts,
while the German statute applied to contracts generally.316 Yet for all the
similarities between the two laws,317 the directive as originally proRosed
turned out to be something of a challenge to the German contract model. 18
Alongside the contract model of German law, there is another approach
that presses for favor in Europe. This approach was fully realized, or nearly
so, in the initial draft of the Unfair Terms Directive, but only partially, if at
all, in the text actually adopted. The alternative approach might be called the
"consumer protection model." The contract model applies tb contracts
generally without limitation as to personal characteristics of the contracting
parties. The content controls it imposes are abstract and generalizing. The
consumer protection model, on the other hand, is limited to consumer
contracts. Its content controls are personalized and particularized. 319 The
contract model protects freedom of contract; the consumer protection model
protects consumers. 320 , The Unfair Terms Directive as finally adopted is a
compromise between the two models. 321
The Commission's first draft of the Unfair Terms Directive anticipated a
comprehensive control of all consumer contracts without regard to whether
the terms appeared in standard forms whether they were individually
negotiated, or whether they concerned the fundamental substance of the
contract. The draft was anathema to German scholars. They contended
nothing less than that the proposal would cause a "considerable dilution of the
p'rinciple of a free market economy, which is safeguarded by the EEC
Treaty.,,322 It would bring about a "drastic restriction" in private autonomy
315, See supra note 10.
316. See, e.g., Huff, supra note 251, at IS. See also supra note 10.
317. While here we focus on differences, the basic similarities are substantial. That the Member
States could agree on a general clause was a triumph in itself See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 525. The
two laws are considered "closely-related," and that is one reason why no separate law was considered
necessary. Remien, supra note 246, at 65. See also Peter Ulmer, Zur Anpassung des AGB-Gesetzes an
die EG-Richtlinie aber. mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucher vertriigen, EuZW [Europliische
Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht] 1993, 337, 337-38 (listing similarities and differences).
318. One long-time expert on standard terms law observed that the very similarity of the
directive and German law "concealed nothing less than a fundamental difference in institutional
conceptions." Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 734. But see Ulmer, supra note 317, at 341 (noting the
differences in purposes of the two laws, but observing that a law's purpose does not always expressly
appear in the statute).
319. Damm, supra note 241, at 172.
320. Within one legal system, both models theoretically could co-exist. According to one view,
however, they might lead to "schizophrenia" if included within one and the same statute. See SchmidtSalzer, supra note 241, at 740.
321. Hans
Schulte-Niilke, panf Jahre AGB-Richtlinie 93/13/EWG
Weitere
Rechtsetzungspliine der Kommission?, NJW 1999, 3176 [report of the 1999 conference of the
Commission on the Directive].
322. Hans Erich Brandner & Peter Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in

Consumer Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission, 28
COMMON MKT. 1. REV. 647,652-53 (1991) [hereinafter Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive
on Unfair Terms]. This is an English version, although not an exact translation, of Hans Erich Brandner
& Peter Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie aber mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverttiigen: Kritische
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and would wholly upset freedom of contract. 323 The German standard terms
law did not threaten private autonomy, they argued, but honored it. The
predicate for invoking the German content control was the absence of
agreement between the parties as to the content of the terms. When standard
terms are presented unilaterally and are not negotiated, the legitimacy of their
claim to be enforced is slight. The principle of freedom of contract counsels
not their free application, but close scrutiny. Where the parties actually
negotiate a term, then the principle of private autonomy demands recognizing
their choice. 324
German scholars criticized the draft directive for its control of individual
contracts. They argued that the directive should not apply to "individually
negotiated terms;" the parties' own negotiations should be recognized to
safeguard freedom of contract. Similarly, they urged that the directive not
apply to the "principal obligations" of the contract; in a free market economy,
the market should determine the price-performance relationship. German
scholars stressed that control of standard terms is different from control of
individually negotiated terms. Above all, control of standard terms can be
"abstract," that is, it does not examine the particular circumstances of the
individual contract. 325 Control of individually negotiated terms, on the other
hand, requires consideration not only of the specific term in question, but of
the entire contract and of all the circumstances of its conclusion. Standard
terms thus are suitable for abstract control procedures involving third parties
such as consumer groups, whereas individually negotiated terms can be
reviewed only in the course of a concrete legal action between the parties. 326
At first the Commission was reluctant to embrace the German scholars'
proposals. But the scholars persisted. Practically on the eve of adoption, in the
Bemerkungen zum Vorschlag der EG-Kommission, BB [Betriebs-Berater] 1991, 701, 703-04
[hereinafter Brandner & Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie]. See also Bunte, supra note 231, at 331 (considering a
July 1989 proposal of the Commission and noting that the E.U. proposal is based on a model of
"contractual justice" (Vertragsgerechtigkeit)); Peter Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter dem Einjlufi
europiiischer Rechtsangleichung, AcP [Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis] 1992, 71, 90-91 (noting that
control of individual contracts encountered sharp opposition because it "buries" private autonomy and
disturbs the ordering function of the free market). The Brandner & Ulmer article is regarded as the most
influential of German contributions and covers all the core questions. Christian Jorges, Die
Europiiisierung des Privatrechts als Rationalisierungsprozefi und als Streit der Disziplinen, ZeuP 1995,
181,193.
Brandner and Ulmer grouped their criticisms into four categories: (I) the fact that the draft
created a special law for consumers; (2) the scope of the directive; (3) the standard of control; and (4)
control procedures. Only their second criticism is addressed here. The first is an issue much broader than
the Unfair Terms Directive itself. See Miklitz, supra note 251, 532 n.74 (noting that the discussion "fills
volumes" and with citations thereto).
323. Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 652-54.
324. Edgar Zoller, Dogmatik, Anwendungsprobleme und die ungewisse Zukunft des Vorrangs
individueller Vertragsvereinbarungen von Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen (§ 4 AGBG), JZ 1991,
850,853, 855.
325. These criticisms were made by, inter alia, Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive
on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 651-54; Brandner & Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie, supra note 322, at 70304; Bunte, Gedanken zur Harmonisierung, supra note 231, at 329,331,333; Hommelhoff, supra note
322, at 90-93 (with further citation).
326. Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 654.
They contended that any control of individually negotiated terms should be permitted only if an "urgent
real necessity" is shown and only if the control is subject to different rules. Brandner & Ulmer, EGRichtlinie, supra note 332, at 704.
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fall of 1992, the Commission largely gave in and changed the text of the
Unfair Terms Directive. 327 As adopted, paragraph 1 of Article 3 excludes from
the directive's application terms that have been "individually negotiated.,,328
Paragraph 2 provides that "pre-formulated standard contracts" are not
individually negotiated. 329 Article 4, paragraph 2, provides that findings of
unfairness shall "relate neither to the definition of the main SUbJect matter of
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration." 30 With these
revisions, German scholars pronounced that the directive preserved the
principle of party autonomy as the "Basic Institution of all European legal
systems. ,,331
Even with the changes, German scholars recognized that differences in
outlook remained. The directive's orientation remains consumer protection;
the German law's orientation is general contract law.332 Germany had no
choice but to implement the directive. The question was how to do it. German
scholars considered two possibilities: amending the old law or adopting a new
one to exist parallel to the old. 333 The legislature looked only at the former
possiblility and considered no draft legislation that would have created a new
law. 334 The close similarity between the Unfair Terms Directive and the
Standard Terms Statute counseled against implementing the directive through
a statute separate from the Standard Terms Statute. 335 Restricting the scope of
the Standard Terms Statute also did not make sense, since the directive itself
set only a minimum standard and explicitly allows Member States to provide
protection that reaches further. In Germany, that additional protection consists
of the incorporation control and the protection of non-consumers.
The German legislature held fast to the German law and took a
minimalist solution that the existing law "should be retained so far as
possible," since, in its view, the German Standard Terms Statute was largely
in compliance even without revision. 336 The legislature passed relatively
minor changes. It modified the conflicts of law rule and added a new section
327. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1817 (discussing the history of the adoption of the directive).
See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 523 (noting how the Gennan side managed to get individual contracts
removed even after the last draft).
328. Council Directive 93/l31EEC, art. 3(1),19930.1. (L 95/29).
329. /d. art. 3(2).
330. Id. art. 4(2).
331. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1817.
332. See Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 733.
333. This choice is presented explicitly by Heinrichs, supra note 211, at 153. See also SchmidtSalzer, supra note 241, at 735; Miklitz, supra note 249, at 532-34 (noting that this directive, more than
any others before it, posed the issue of a separate law for consumers).
334. Cf Heinrich, Die Entwicklung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschajtsbedingungen im
Jahre 1995, NIW 1996, 1381, at 1381; Umsetzung der Richtlinie des Rates vom 5.4.1993 fiber
mif3brauchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertragen: Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur A:nderung des
AGB-Gesetzes, BB 1995, 111.
335. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1818.
336. Gesetz Entwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung des AGBGesetzes [Draft of a Statute to Amend the Standard Tenns Statute], Oct. 20, 1995, Drucksache 13/2713
at points B, available at http://www.bundestag.de. When Gennany delayed past the deadline for
implementing the Unfair Tenns Directive, one leading expert in the Standard Tenns Statute proposed
that almost all required measures could be implemented simply by construing existing law in confonnity
with the Directive. Heinrichs, supra note 211, at 153. Supporting the view of minimal changes, see
Remien, supra note 246, at 65-66; Ulmer in ULMERlBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54,
at 346-47 (warning against using the implementation as an opportunity to narrow the law).
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for consumer contracts. That section, now Civil Code section 310(3), applies
the content control to certain consumer contracts that otherwise exceptionally
would not be covered. 337
Section 310(3) makes yet another change that may seem minor to an
outside observer, but illuminates the differences in concepts at stake. It now
requires that in consumer contracts, "[w]hen deciding whether there has been
unreasonable detriment under sections 307(1) and 307(2) the circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of the contract must also be taken into account."
German scholars vary in how significant they view the change,338 but all
recognize what this provision means. No longer is the standard terms law
exclusively a shield against imposition of improper contract terms, but now it
is also a protection of consumers in their typical position of inferiority.339
The Unfair Terms Directive and the German standard terms law are both
subject to broader European law developments. Further E.D. action in the
consumer area is likely and might result either in changes in the directive
itself or in adopting legislation that would prevail over the directive. The latter
has already occurred in the Guarantees Directive, which obviated any need for
control of consumer warranties under Unfair Terms law by substituting
'1'
man datory 1egIS
atIve terms. 340
Whether the Unfair Terms Directive will be revised to reverse the
compromises of fall 1992 and introduce the consumer protection model is
unclear at the time of this writing. At the July 1999 conference sponsored by
the Commission there was interest in extending the directive to principal
341
While the
obligations as some Member States had already done.
Commission in its April 2000 Report did not formally endorse such a step, it
raised the possibility and observed that no problems in practice had arisen in
those Member States that had taken this step.342 The Economic and Social
Committee was not so restrained. It recommended that the directive be

337. The exceptional situations arise when a fonn contract is used only once or originates with
a third person. The new section also applied section 305c(2) to consumers. That section construes
standard tenns against the user. The new section did not subject these consumer contracts to the
incorporation control. Subsequent to the adoption of the implementing legislation, the European Court
of Justice rejected the argument of the Netherlands that it need not adopt a statutory transparency
requirement to implement Article 5 of the directive, because judicial interpretation of the general clause
reached the same result. Gennany had done the same thing. As part of the obligation refonn law, Section
307(1) was added to meet the decision of the court. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des
Rechtsauschusses: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modemisierung des Schuldrechts, Oct. 8, 2001,
Drucksache 1417052 at 188; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 307 at 121,
margin no. 16.
338. See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 528 (discussing different views); Remien, supra note 246,
at 52-57 (arguing that the Unfair Tenns Directive did not adopt a ''particular-personalized,'' i.e., konkretindividuelIen, approach).
339. LOCHER, supra note 287, at 506, margin no. 3; Bunte, supra note 137, at 1389; Reinhard
Damm,
Privatautonomie und Verbraucherschutz-Legalstruktur und Realstruktur von
Autonomiekonzepten, VersR 1999, 129 n.91.
340. For example, the Guarantees Directive displaces the Unfair Tenns Directive and provides
mandatory law for consumer guarantees. See infra text accompanying notes 357-59.
Weitere
341. Hans Schulte-No Ike, Funf Jahre AGB-Richtlinie 93/13/EWG
Rechtsetzungspliine der Kommission?, NJW 1999,3176.
342. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 14-15,31.
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amended to include individually negotiated tenns and the main subject matter
of the contract. 343

E.

The American License in Germany

American standard tenns are no strangers to Gennany. It used to be that
American businesses operating in Gennany simply translated their U.S. tenns
into Gennan and handed them over to their Gennan customers unchanged.
344
Today that still happens more frequently than one would like to think. But
such foolishness requires a near reckless lack of attention to businesses
located in Gennany. However, with ever more American companies doing
business worldwide on the Internet, it is understandable that licensors located
in the United States and accustomed to doing business at home offer products
and services without thinking about foreign law. 345
Nor are American standard tenns strangers to Gennan controls. Not long
after the Internet became available in Gennany, Gennan consumer groups
challenged the Internet tenns of major U.S. service providers America Online
and CompuServe. The fonner agreed to a cease-and-desist declaration; the
latter suffered a default judgment. In its declaration, America Online agreed to
stop using nineteen tenns in its standard agreement and promised to pay DM
2,000 (now about € 1,000) each time it uses one of the same tenns or a tenn
having comparable content, with a maximum of DM 19,000 (now about €
10,000) per contract. CompuServe, if it uses again any of twenty-three tenns
in its fonner standard agreement, is subject to a civil fine of up to DM
500,000 (now about € 250,000) and its Chief Executive Officer to civil
commitment for contempt of court for up to six months. The same association
of consumer groups also took on Microsoft Corporation's license for its
Windows 2000 operating system. Microsoft also agreed to a binding ceaseand-desist declaration. As a result these three American finns are committed
not to use in Gennany many tenns that are similar to tenns that they continue
to use in the United States. These tenns govern such matters as: liability
343. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124, conclusion 10.3.
The Committee also recommended that the Unfair Terms Directive be extended to professionals, i.e.,
non-consumers. [d. at 124, conclusion 10.2.
344. See Thomas Hoeren & Dirk Schuhmacher, Verwendungsbeschriinkungen im
Softwarevertrag, CR 2000,137. It even happens that German companies copy the terms of U.S. market
leaders.
345. That model-a mass market software license delivered from an American owner over the
Internet directly to the end user-is the only one considered here. Use of shrink-wrap licenses or third
party distributors raises additional questions. In the case of shrink-wrap, is the act of opening the
software a sufficient manifestation of assent? In German law it is, if the attention of the customer is
called to the fact that the software package contains a notice that the license terms are contained within
and the license terms are made available to the customer before opening the package. In the case of third
party distribution there is an issue as to whether there is an agreement between the computer information
producer and the customer or only between the customer and the distributor. The former is now
generally accepted, provided, possibly, that a reference to the relationship with the supplier is noted to
avoid that relationship being regarded as surprising. See Jilrgen Weyers, Die Wirksarnkeit von
Schutzhtillenvertrtlgen bei Standardsoftware in Deutschland und den USA \9-84 (2000) (unpublished
dissertation, Universitat Koln) http;lIwww.ub.uni-koeln.de/ediss/archiv12000/\\v3852.pdf.This
discussion is also limited to software; German law has not yet followed the UClTA model of referring to
"computer information" to include both software and information. The next paragraph in the text,
however, shows that the law applies to online services as well.
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limitations, warranty disclaimers, licensee obligation to indemnify licensor,
unlimited licensee obligation, acceptance of incorporation of other terms,
choice-of-law and forum, retention of unilateral right to change terms
accepted by subsequent use, agreement that additional terms be incorporated,
restriction on right of licensee to terminate, retention of payment on
termination, and legal characterization of relationship. 346
Other American licensors likewise are in for unpleasant surprises if they
fail to pay attention to German law. If a licensee is a consumer, almost
347
certainly the license is subject to German standard terms law. If the licensee
is a businessperson, a more complicaeted conflicts of law analysis is necessary
to determine which controls apply.348 Yet, in the case of a license to a
346. The author did not attempt to determine the extent to which American companies have
already been subjected to standard terms control in Europe. The information in this paragraph comes
from a single inquiry of an association of German consumer groups, the Verbraucherzentral
Bundesverband e.V. ("VzBv"), about proceedings that it was aware of in Germany against American
Internet companies. In a letter to the author dated November 4, 2002; it provided copies of the relevant
papers from its actions against America Online, CompuServe and Microsoft. The documents consist of:
(I) for America Online, Inc., demand letter from VzBv dated May 21, 1997, and a "Cease-and-Desist
Pay .Contract Penalties" (Unterlassungserkliirung mit
Declaration with
Promise to
Vertragsetrafsverspreche) from America Online dated February 18, 1998 (on file with The Yale Journal
of International Law); (2) for CompuServe, Inc., a Default Judgment (Versiiumnisurtei/) dated June 2,
1998, Landgericht Berlin, File No. 26.0.364/97 (same); (3) for Microsoft Corporation, a demand letter
from VzBv dated April 17, 2000, and a Cease-and-Desist Declaration (Unterlassungserkliirung) from
Microsoft dated October 9, 2000 (same).
347. CISG does not apply to transactions in goods bought for personal, family, or household
uses. German conflicts law has special rules for consumers that make it unlikely that an American
licensor could avoid the standard terms law even by a choice of law provision. Notwithstanding choice
oflaw, under Article 29(2) No. I, German standard terms law applies to transactions where a contract
follows "an express offer or advertisement" in Germany and the consumer completes the contract in
Germany. That will be the case in an Internet transaction where the user has in any sense targeted the
German market, e.g., through a presence separate from the Internet or through tailoring its Internet site
for German customers. It might even be the case for Internet sites in the United States that make no
effort to service the German market. Georg Borges, Geschiifte per Internet und deutscher
Zeitschrift
flir
Wirtschaftsrecht
1999,
Issue
14,
http://www.rwsVerbraucherschutz,
verlag.de/volltextlborges.htm, at 2.2.
348. Whether CISG applies to software licenses is disputed and depends upon whether
software should be characterized as "goods." See Boss, supra note 227, at 180-82. German law treats
mass market licenses as sales of goods under domestic law. Judgment of Nov. 4, 1987, VIII ZR 314/86,
CR 1988, 124, 125-26. See infra text accompanying notes 355-56. Accordingly German courts have
treated transactions in software as sales of goods under CISG. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 8, 1995,
HKO
24667/93,
available
at
http://www.jura.uniLandgericht
Miinchen
I,
8
freiburg.de/iprl/cisglurteile/textl203.htm. Whether they would do so for software delivered over the
Internet rather than in a tangible medium is uncertain but considered by some as probable.
Grenzuberschreitende Softwareuberlassung und E-Miingelriige nach dem CISG, at B.l.2. (1999),
RAUSCHHOFER ONLINE, at ht!p:llwww.rechtsanwalt.de/cisg.html. If CISG does apply, its contract
formation rules, Articles 14 et seq., apply. See Judgment of Oct. 31, 2001, VIII ZR 60/01, available at
http://www.bgh-free.de. where the German Supreme Court held that CISG provides the rules regarding
incorporation and implied from CISG formation rules an opportunity to review obligations comparable
to that required by German law. Article 4 of CISG leaves to local law "[t]he validity of the contract or
any of its provisions;" national law provides the rules regarding content control. Schmidt in
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 2 at 276, margin no. 12.
If CISG does not apply, in the absence of an effective choice of a law, a German court would
probably apply American law to contracts with non-consumers. Article 28 of the German conflicts law,
Einflihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB), provides that in the absence of an
agreement, the law of the state having the closest connection to the contract applies. The law with the
closest connection is presumed to be the law of the party who has to provide the "characteristic
performance" of the contract. That means the law of a foreign supplier ordinarily applies. Schmidt in
ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 2, at 269, margin no. 2. One might
argue that even ifCISG applies, this rule directs application of American content law.
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businessperson, an attentive licensor can make an effective choice of
American law, probably even in a standard term license. 349

1.

Incorporation

A "mass-market license" under UCITA 350 ordinarily constitutes standard
terms in the sense of Civil Code section 305(1).351 If the licensee is not a
businessperson, under section 305(2) the license's standard terms become part
of the contract only if the licensee is expressly advised of them and is given
the opportunity to review them. That review must be at or before the
352
If the licensee is a businessperson, then the
conclusion of the license.
stringent requirements of section 305(2) do not apply and the laxer rules of the
Civil Code governing conclusion of contracts generally govern. Under those
rules the reference to the standard terms might be implied by conduct. 353 A
procedure whereby the licensee is given access to the terms before committing
to the license by clicking ("click-wrap") should be sufficient, at least if the
average customer cannot click through without having noticed and decided
whether to take the opportunity to review the terms. 354 "Browse-wrap," i.e., a
notice given by a site that by using it, the user agrees to certain license terms,
is said not to comply with the law's requirements. 355 The individual terms are
subject to the other incorporation controls, Le., individually negotiated terms
take priority (section 305b), surprising terms are invalid (section 305c(1)), and
ambiguous terms are construed against the licensor (section 305c(2)). Use
restrictions are not ordinarily surprising.

2.

Content Control

With the exception of licenses between businesspersons that include an
effective choice of non-German law, UCITA licenses between American
349. Party autonomy is the basic rule of German conflicts law, i.e., the parties are free to
choose the law they wish to apply to their agreement. It is laid down in EGBGB Article 27 and requires
that the choice of law either be express or follow with reasonable certainty from the terms of the contract
or the circumstances of the transaction. That choice of law could be made in a standard form. Under
Articles 27(4) and 31(1) its validity would be determined by the law chosen (e.g., New York law).
German Standard Terms law would not apply. Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ,
supra note 54, app. § 9-11, 1124, at 1227-29. Under Article 31(2), however, a party may challenge
whether there was an agreement on the point. !d. at 1226-28, margin nos. 576-77.
350. UCITA § 102(a)(43) & (44).
351. See Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. §§ 9-11, at
1051-52, margin no. 269. It would not constitute standard terms if it were uniquely used with a party
that is not a consumer.
Wirksamkeit
von
typischen
Klauseln
in
352. Dirk
Schuhmacher,
Softwareiiberlassungsvertragen, CR 2000, 641, 644 (noting that this requirement is "essential" and is
not satisfied if the terms are contained only in a sealed box). Thus the approach sanctioned by UCIT A
Section 209(b) would not work. Cf id. at 643 n.16 (expressing skepticism regarding software producer
practice of providing for licensee to return product). See also Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN,
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 230-31, margin no. 55.
353. Ulmer, supra note 54, § 2, at 246, margin no. 80.
354. See Weyers, supra note 345, at 85-91. The author observed that a leading German
antiquarian book exchange Internet site in summer 2002 altered its procedures to require a "click-wrap"
acceptance of each individual bookseller's standard terms. See Zentrales Verzeichnis Antiquarischer
Bucher, http://www.zvab.com.
355. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 643.
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licensors and German licensees are subject to German content controls.
Application of those controls depends upon the nature of the software license
involved, i.e., how it is classified under German law and whether it is with a
businessperson or not.
Software can fall into anyone of three different classes of contract under
German law. A software license where the license term is unlimited is known
as a Standardlizenz ("standard license") and is treated as a sales contract
(Kaufvertrag). If the license term is for a limited time period (and typically,
although not necessarily, there are recurring payments), then the license is
known as a Dauerlizenz ("duration license") and is treated as a lease
(Mietvertrag). Finally, if the software is developed as part of the agreement,
then the license is treated as part of a service contract (Werkvertrag).356
UCITA mass market licenses are usually standard licenses in the German
sense, and that is the only variety treated here.
Except for separately negotiated terms under section 305b and terms
respecting fundamental performances under section 307(3), licenses with
consumers are subject to testing first under the prohibited list of Section 309,
then under the list of suspect terms under section 308, then finally under the
general clause of section 307. In the case of licenses with businesspersons,
sections 308 and 309 have no formal applicability, but in practice, application
of the general clause of Section 307 usually follows the application of sections
308 and 309. 357
The introductory language to the prohibited list of section 309 makes
explicit that it assumes that a contract term reviewed is one about which the
parties might agree otherwise, at least in negotiated terms. The legislature
added this language when it integrated the Standard Terms Statute into the
Civil Code. It was necessary to take account of the changes in the civil law
made to comply with the E.U. Guarantees Directive, which requires that many
aspects of consumer contracts-among them warranties-be made mandatory
and not subject to modification by agreement.
3.

Warranty Disclaimers and Limitations of Remedy

Pursuant to the E.U. Guarantees Directive, most issues of consumer
warranties and remedies are now mandatory law. Review under standard
terms law is foreclosed. 358 American standard licenses with German
consumers must comply with this mandatory law. 359
356. Bettina Goldmann & Rebecca Redecke, Gewiihrleistung bei SoJtwarelizenzvertriigen nach
dem Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, MMR [Multimedia und Recht] 2002, 3 (noting that the new
legislation had significant changes for Kaufoertrag but not for the Mietvertrag). Schmidt in
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. §§ 9-11 at 1051-52, 1057 margin nos.
269, 272. The idea of treating software licenses as sui generis was rejected. !d. See also Hoeren &
Schuhmacher, supra note 344, at 137-38.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 294-96.
358. See Goldmann & Redecke, supra note 356, at 6. Civil Code Section 475 invalidates
agreements made prior to notification of a defect that limit the consumer's rights under Sections 433-35,
437, and 439-43. Section 475 leaves only a few points open for deviation through standard terms and
thus for review under the content controls. For example, a standard term may reduce the warranty period
from two years to one. This was no great victory for business, since before the new law came into effect
the mandatory warranty period was six months. A standard term might also require that the dissatisfied

168

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28: 109

Warranties and limitations of remedy in licenses with businesspersons
remain subject to testing under standard terms law. Formally, this is only
360
through the general clause of section 307.
Practically, the extensive
provisions in section 309(8)(b) (reprinted in the Appendix) governing
warranties are likely-but not necessarily-to find application. 361 Subdivision
(aa) provides a general rule that a term which excludes warranty claims
362
completely or for relevant parts of defective products is invalid.
Subdivisions (bb) through (dd) govern terms that limit remedies to repair or
replacement: (bb) invalidates such terms unless they expressly reserve the
right, should repair or replacement fail, to cancel the contract or to reduce the
contract price; Subdivision (cc) precludes a user from imposing costs of repair
or replacement on the other party; Subdivision (dd) prevents the user from
setting certain pre-conditions on repair or replacement. Subdivisions (ee) and
(ft) restrict use of terms imposing deadlines on claims limitation: subdivision
(ee) provides that notice requirements for non-obvious defects may not be
shorter than the applicable statute of limitations for claims. Subdivision (ft)
provides that the l~~ally required statute of limitation may not be reduced to
less than one year.

4.

Damage Exclusions and Limitations

The same provision of the Civil Code that makes warranty provisions in
consumer contracts mandatory and withdraws them from disposition by the
parties explicitly excludes from its coverage damage exclusions and
limitations. The provision provides that they shall continue to be reviewed

recipient of a defective product accept damages in lieu of perfonnance. Westphalen, supra note 249, at
24.
359. The mandatory provisions are the following: Section 433 requires the seller to provide the
buyer with the product free of physical or legal defects. Sections 434 and 435 respectively define those
defects. Scction 437 defines thc rights of the buyer in the case of defects. Sections 439-41 govern the
parties' rights respecting repair or replacement, rescission and contract price reduction. Section 442
governs the buyer's knowledge of defects. Section 443 governs express warranties. Restructuring
standard licenses as duration licenses probably would not help the licensor. Not only are duration
licenses generally more demanding, the attempted re-characterization of standard licenses as duration
licenses would run up against the probation on circumvention in the second sentence of Civil Code
Section 475{l).
360. Now that businessperson to consumer contracts are subject to mandatory law, No. 8b has
lost most of its significance. It applies directly only to construction contracts and contracts between
consumers. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 309, at 152, margin no. 53.
Practically the only purpose for keeping it in the law was for its effect on contracts between
businesspersons. Schubel, supra note 277, at 1117.
361. Bjorn Gaul, Standardsoftware: Veriinderung von Gewiihrleistungsanspriichen durch AGB,
CR 2000, 570, 571 (noting the "radiant" effect of the two sections on application of the general clause
and citing a Supreme Court decision for the proposition that even between merchants a standard tenn
would be invalid if it led to loss of warranty claims); Goldmann & Redecke, supra note 356, at 6, 7
(noting uncertainties brought by the modernization law but concluding that the new consumer rules will
act as Leitbild for application of Section 307 to contracts among businesspersons).
362. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § II (1O)(a), at 855,
margin no. 9; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 309, at 152-53, margin nos.
53, 56. The law, as recently amended, explicitly provides that those characteristics may include
representations made in advertising. § 434(1) BGB.
363. Westphalen, supra note 249, at 25. For an extensive discussion of product and inspection
requirements in the context of standard software licenses, see Gaul, supra note 361, at 571-76.
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364
under the standard terms law.
The prohibited list of section 309 governs
two types of damage exclusions and limitations. Section 309(7)(a) invalidates
standard terms that exclude or limit liability for negligent injury to "life,
person or health." Section 309(7)(b) invalidates standard terms that exclude or
limit liability for gross negligence or intentional violation of contractual
obligations. These same restrictions apply to licenses with businesspersons
through application of the general clause. 365 Neither section 309 nor section
308 governs limitations and exclusions of liability for simple negligence. That
does not, however, permit the conclusion that they are always permissible.
Standard terms that exclude or limit liability for simple negligence, or
for other grounds not covered in section 309(7), are subject to review under
the general clause of section 307(2). This principally occurs under section
307(2)(2) which can lead to invalidation of a term that "restricts essential
rights or duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner that
there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved." As the
decision of the German Supreme Court of October 24, 2001 holds, the test is
"whether the exclusion of liability leads to evisceration of those contractual
duties (so-called cardinal duties), which originally made possible the
performance of the contract and on the fulfillment of which the contract
partner trusted and may rely.,,366 It is debated whether an exclusion of liability
for damages for typical computer software problems, such as data loss, or the
367
reduction of disk capacity or processing speed, would fulfill that test.
Rather than try to identify which duties a court may later determine to be
"cardinal," typical disclaimers accept liability for intention, gross negligence,
and negligence affecting cardinal duties, excluding all other liability. 368
Alternatively, or additionally, licenses may limit liability. Limitations on the
amounts of damages for ordinary negligence are generally permissible. In the
case of ordinary negligence affecting cardinal duties, however, the amount of
the limitation provided must correspond to the foreseeable amount of
damages. Limitations on damages may also restrict liability to direct damage
and exclude indirect damage or untypical consequential damages. 369 In either

364. § 475(3) BGB.
365. Gerald Spindler, Haftungsklauseln in Provider-Vertriigen: Probleme der InhaltskontroIIe,
CR 1999, 626, 631 (referring to AGB § 11, the predecessor of Section 309); Goldmann & Redecke,
supra note 356, at 7.
366. Judgment of Oct. 24, 2001, supra note 288.
367. Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 106061, margin no. 66.
368. Spindler, supra note 276, at 631.
369. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54,§ 11(7), at 819-20,
margin no. 27. One model clause is:
Schadenersatzanspriiche konnen Sie gegen uns nur dann geltend machen, wenn der Schaden von
uns, unseren gesetzlichen Vertretern oder Erfilllungsgehilfen vorslitzlich oder grob fahrllissig
verursacht wurde, oder wenn wir einen Schaden dadurch verursacht haben, daB wir eine fur die
Vertragsdurchfuhrung wesentliche Pflicht vorslitzlich oder grob fahrlassig verIetzt haben. [You
can validly assert claims for damages against us only if the damage was caused by us, our legal
representatives or our fulfillment partners intentionally or with gross negligence, or we caused
damages through an intentionally or grossly negligent violation of an obligation material to
fulfilling the contract.].
Marcus Werner, CD-Rom Nutzungsbebedingungen, CR 1998, 391, 392.
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case, such a term is invalid if it includes damages caused by intent or gross
negligence. 37o

5.

Copy, Use, and Transfer Restrictions

The Copyright Statute (Gesetz fiber Urheberrecht und Verwandte
Schurtzrechte), in particular sections 69a to 69g governing software, impose
certain mandatory requirements affecting standard terms limiting copying or
use. Section 69d(2) permits licensees to make back-up copies necessary for
future use. A standard term that required the licensee not to make an archival
copy, but to rely on such a copy held by the licensor, was held invalid as not
recognizing the licensee's interest in having available an archival copy even if
the licensor should go out of business. Section 69d(3) permits licensees to
observe and test the functioning of software. Section 6ge permits licensees to
de-compile software when such de-compiling is "indispensable to obtain the
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs," provided that certain
conditions are met. Section 69g(2) provides that contract terms that contradict
any of these three sections are invalid.
Other copy, use, and transfer restrictions are subject to the general clause
of section 307. The Copyright Statute provides the measure against which
37J
departures from the statutory scheme are judged. Section 69d provides that
unless the parties provide otherwise, copying and translating programs do not
require authorization "where they are necessary for the use of the computer
program by any person entitled to use a copy of the program in accordance
with its intended purpose, including for error correction.,,372 So-called CPU
clauses that restrict use to a single computer constitute an unreasonable
disadvantage, since they prevent licensees from updating their hardware
without having to pay additional charges. 373 Restrictions that limit licensees of
standard licenses from sub-licensing the software are effective. Restrictions
that prohibit such licensees from transferring such software and all their rights
to a third party, however, are not. 374 As a result of the close supervision of
terms, it is said that strict license terms in practice often have only minimal
effectiveness. 375

6.

Enforcement

An American licensor is likely to discover that it has violated German
standard terms law when a consumer association sends it a warning letter
370. Spindler, supra note 276, at 632.
371. Schmidt in ULMERiBRANDNERiHENSEN, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 1062-64, margin no.
278; Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 645-46 (addressing particularly copyright law).
372. Translations from the Copyright Statute are from the translation of the World Intellectual
Property Organization, http://www.iuscomp.org/glaJ. For the scope of permissible restrictions, see
Hoeren & Schuhmacher, supra note 344, at 139 (noting that Section 69(d) can be departed from only
within certain bounds}.
373. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 646-47.
374. Schmidt in ULMERiBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 106264, margin no. 278.
375. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 650.
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demanding that it cease using unlawful terms or face penalties. The American
licensor will then scurry to its American attorney, who hopefully will be wellversed enough to contact a German attorney to confirm that, yes, indeed, a
lawsuit and penalties could follow a failure to comply. The German attorney
will point out that section 6 of the Injunctions Act permits a German plaintiff
to sue a defendant not domiciled in Germany in any district where the
defendant uses the unlawful terms. The cease-and-desist declaration a
defendant must sign not only will subject it to penalties for using these terms
again, but will also prohibit use of similar terms and invalidate all such
existing terms. Thus an American licensor cannot blithely assume that it can
use prohibited terms free of risk. Should that licensor nevertheless use the
terms, it runs the risk that in seeking expansive exclusions of liability, it may
fail to take advantage of those limitations on liability that would have been
available to it.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

National laws that implement the Unfair Terms Directive are a reality
throughout Europe. Americans---especially those doing business on the
Internet-should take account of them. With the impending enlargement of
the European Union, American standard terms will be subject to scrutiny from
Ireland to Poland and from Malta to Finland. Failure to revise American
standard terms accordingly could have serious consequences. There is every
reason to believe that many standard terms that are common in the United
States are unlawful in Europe. 376 While this article has not attempted a
comparative catalogue of such invalid terms, a future work that does so would
be useful.
Functioning systems for control of unfair standard terms exist in Europe.
These systems are more ambitious than the present-day American system. 377
Their very existence challenges complacency with current American law.
Their existence undermines the two principal arguments raised to support
American law: there is no problem, and no system could better balance the
competing interests of certainty of contract and fairness of terms. Obviously,
our European colleagues think that there is a problem, and they have taken
action to deal with it. The apparent success of the German contract model
376. For an example of choice of forum clauses, compare Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a choice of Florida forum for Washington state consumer) with Oceano
Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 2894 (decision of the
European Court of Justice invalidating choice of Spanish forum for Spanish consumer); to see the
diverging standards for warranty exclusions and remedy limitations, compare U.C.C. Sections 2-316 and
2-791 (validating such terms) with German Civil Code Section 309(7), (8), and (11) (controlling such
clauses) and the E.U. Guarantees Directive (mandating minimum warranties); for the differences in
integrated writing and no oral modification requirements, compare U.C.C. Sections 9-202 and 9-209(2)
(validating such terms) with Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERlHENSEN, ABG-GESETZ, supra note 54, app.
§ 9-11, at 1266-1273 (discussing German law's controls on such terms).
377. One attorney with Baker & McKenzie who is admitted to the bar in both California and
Germany reports to German readers that, as a rule, American courts do not undertake content control
similar to that under the German standard terms law or the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive. Lothar
Determann, Electronic Business in den USA, in ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, ANBAHNUNG, GESTALTUNG,
PRAXIS, 9, margin no. 13 (Georgios Gounalakis, ed. 2002).
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suggests that there may not be a necessary trade-off between control of unfair
terms and predictable contracting.
If the American system is less ambitious than its European counte~arts
and is largely limited to striking down terms that "shock the conscience," 78 it
has not been by design. When American legislatures enacted U.C.C. section
2-302, they adopted a provision that its drafters hoped would allow American
courts to develop "machinery,,379 for "policing,,380 contract terms. The
German Supreme Court's development of such machinery from essentially the
same starting point largely confirms the vision of the drafters of the u.e.e. 38 \
In the United States there has been no national debate about whether the
present restrained application ofU.e.e. section 2-302 is preferred. The closest
that the United States has come to such a debate is the ongoing struggle over
reform of the U.C.C. That is a toss-up so far. Business interests blocked the
original revision of U.C.e. Revised Article 2-Sales, while consumer groups
blocked u.e.c. Proposed Article 2B-Licenses and are threatening UCITA.
How did the German legal system-beginning from a very similar
starting point-develop a considerably more ambitious review of standard
terms than did the American legal system? A number of explanations come to
mind. Surely larger social and political factors were at work. As has been
shown, in Germany there was a national consensus to limit oppressive
382
terms.
That consensus was rooted in views about society, the individual,
and the role of government in society. Where an American might see control
of standard terms as government meddling in relations between private parties
and as a limitation on freedom of contract, a German might see the choice not
to intervene as government toleration of exploitation of one private party by
another, and government complicity in that exploitation-by providing
contract law upholding, and a legal system enforcing, form contracts.
But there are other, more strictly legal explanations for how the German
legal system, from a similar starting point, was able to develop an ambitious
program of standard terms control and the American legal system was not. In
the area of standard terms, the German legal system has limited authoritative
sources of the law, has furnished abstract definitions of unlawful terms, and
has provided for proactive enforcement of controls. In contrast, the American
legal system has multiplied the sources of the law, has individualized the
inquiry, and has limited enforcement to retrospective invalidation of
challenged terms.
In both the German and the American legal systems the starting point for
development of control of unfair terms was application of general clauses by
judges. Yet the German legal system had an advantage from the start: it has
one Supreme Court that could and did develop and direct evolution of judge378. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir.
2002).

379. See supra note 74.
380. Supra note 26 (V.C.C. quoting Section 2-302, Official Comment 1).
381. One cannot read the section on boilerplate in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-Llewellyn's
last word on the subject-and reasonably believe that he would have found the anemic application of
Section 2-302 a sufficient response to a problem he found so serious and pervasive. See LLEWELLYN,
supra note 32, at 362.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 213 to 217.
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made law. German standard terms law is federal law. The pronouncements of
its single federal Supreme Court are authoritative. 383 In the American legal
system, on the other hand, although the Uniform Commercial Code provides
one uniform rule in the general clause in section 2-302, fifty different courts
are the sources for interpretation and application of it. It is no wonder that
there is no authoritative statement ofunconscionability.384
Moreover, already more than a quarter of a century ago, while the
United States was struggling with judges applying that single general clause,
the German legislature chose to build a statutory structure on that judge-made
law foundation. That new structure provided additional authoritative points for
application of unfair terms control, while maintaining a general clause to
respond to the need for flexibility. In contrast, American scholars, including
Llewellyn, have mostly assumed that control of unfair terms is necessarily a
task for judge-made law with little room for statute law. 385 Obviously the
apparent success of the German Standard Terms Statute challenges that
assumption. It demonstrates that statute law can facilitate control of unfair
terms.
Another reason that German control of unfair terms has been able to
develop to be more robust than its American counterpart is that it is abstract
rather than personalized. The German system of control was purposely limited
to control of standard terms so that it could provide standard solutions t6
standard problems. Inquiry into all the individual circumstances of particular
parties is not necessary or desired. In this way the work of courts in finding
facts is reduced. But still more important is that abstract application
"concretizes" the general prohibitions into groups of cases and types of terms.
It facilitates a universal application of the resulting control. Accordingly, the
German legal system rejects the less concrete consumer model. The German
legal system avoids control of the main subject of the contract and of
individually negotiated terms for fear of infringing on the parties' freedom of
contract and interfering with their presumptively sound economic decisions.
What the European Commission calls "positive enforcement,,386 explains
how the German legal system has been more successful than its American
counterpart in deterring use of unfair terms. An American court's decision
finding a term unconscionable cannot do more than invalidate the use of the
specific term in a particular contract. It thus has little effect beyond that
individual case. 387 A German court's decision, on the other hand, can not only
383. The Court's constitution helps it provide authoritative decisions to develop and direct law
creation. It has about one hundred judges, but is spared the burden of deciding constitutional cases,
which are the province of the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Its judges decide most
cases in panels of five judges ("Senates") specialized by area of law. As a result the Court is able to
provide numerous and consistent decisions.
384. Accord Dawson, supra note 13, at 1126.
385. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370 ("[I]n our system an approach by statute
seems to me dubious, uncertain, and likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in
scope."); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 174 ("The history of the reforms demonstrates the superiority of
judicial law-making over legislation for contract law."); Woodward, supra note 81, at 1004 ("Any effort
formally to classify the enormous range of commercial contracts subject to article 2 will be labor
intensive, incomplete, temporary, and very contentious.").
386. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
387. Cf Klock, supra note 6, at 332 (quoting HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 233
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invalidate specific terms in a particular contract, it can compel users to cease
using those terms and comparable terms in all similar contracts. Further,
German law simplifies these procedures so that consumer groups can achieve
these results without having to go to court. 388
Even if the German and American legal systems have gone their
separate ways in controlling unfair terms following similar beginnings, there
is still much for American jurists to learn from European experiences as they
contemplate how to make American law the best it can be for American
conditions. This article has discussed two models for control of unfair terms in
Europe: the contract model of German law and the consumer protection model
of the first draft of the Unfair Terms Directive. It has shown the German
contract model in practice as one example of standard terms laws at work in
the European Union. Future studies of the law in the other fourteen Member
States would disclose variations on these models and possibly different
models. Consideration of those models by American jurists could inform the
American debate over unfair terms both with respect to whether a fartherreaching control is desirable and, if desirable, how best to implement it.
Even without change in American law, application of present U.c.c.
section 2-302 would benefit from attention to European experiences and
particularly to the conceptual clarity of the German contract model. The
essential discovery of the German contract model-that when standard terms
are involved there are two transactions, the dickered deal and the
supplementary standard terms-has long been known in America. According
to Llewellyn, "Rooted in sense, history, and simplicity, it is an answer which
could occur to anyone.,,389 The German contract model distinguishes
separately negotiated terms from standard terms. In the former, it defers to the
parties' choice and the principle of party autonomy. In the latter, it finds little
exercise of party autonomy and intervenes to protect freedom of contract. It
also provides a rationale, i.e., preventing abuse of the freedom of contractdrafting, for that contro1. 390
The German contract model disentangles rather than confounds
incorporation and content controls. It recognizes the two as separate issues
and imposes separate expectations of each. In the case of incorporation
control, it insists that users provide other parties with an opportunity to review
the terms. In the case of content control, it rejects the idea, common in the
United States, that an opportunity to review can substitute for deficient terms.
German parties do not have to read the standard terms to be safeguarded from
overreaching.
The German contract model is not content to place confidence in a
single general clause to control content. American attempts to write a suitable
general clause for Revised Article 2-Sales suggest that such a task is
virtually unachievable. Instead, the German contract model guides the content
(1999)). See also supra text accompanying note 68.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 305 and 346.
389. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 371.
390. Cf MUNZ, supra note 33, at 225 ("American law controls the basis for unjust contract
rules, namely disparate bargaining power; German law [controls] the consequences, the unjust contract
rules.").
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control of the general clause with presumptions and supplements it with
"gray" and "black" lists that treat explicitly specific types of terms. Thus it has
successfully concretized control in a way that has eluded American courts.
American law already has concepts similar to those found in German
law. For example, it distinguishes "procedural unconscionability" from
"substantive unconscionability," and negotiated contracts from standard terms
(or adhesion) contracts. The German experience suggests a benefit in courts
using those concepts more consistently. American courts, even without
legislative action, could do that in their application of existing U.C.C. 2-302.
Other important aspects of the German contract model might require
legislation. For example, legislation would probably be necessary to add
"black" and "gray" lists or to a create a more proactive, deterring control
along the lines of the E.U. 's "positive" enforcement. 39l Where legislation is
required, American experiences in revising the U.C.C. caution against
392
underestimating the difficulties of reaching a solution capable of enactment.
Yet the work of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission shows that the
possibility of standard terms legislation is not beyond conception. 393
Reform begins with the conception that things can be otherwise.
Comparative inquiry is one of the best ways there is to broaden the scope of
the possible. Reform of existing law is limited by one's ability to conceive of
alternatives. Through examination of how other legal systems treat similar
problems, one can not only conceive of new alternatives, one can see how
they work. One need not adopt or even adapt foreign models to learn from
them; comparative examination puts one's own law in a critical light.
For more than forty years the United States has denied itself the benefit
of foreign experiences with standard terms. For the last dozen years two of the
most influential organizations in American law and legions of lawyers have
looked at the controversial issue of unfair terms in standard form contracts
with no one systematically studying-indeed, with hardly anyone even
noting-that a trading bloc comparable in size to the United States and a
major trading partner is itself addressing the very same issues and is applying
its laws to Americans. This Article shows that in Europe the scholarly and
legislative discussion of standard terms has always had a comparative
component to it and is better for it. 394 The attempted reforms of the Uniform
Commercial Code undertaken to date could have benefited from the European
experiences had only those reforms paid attention to those experiences.
Today, thanks to global electronic commerce, European and other foreign
standard terms law are on American laptops. And American licenses are on
391. See supra text accompanying note 187.
392. There are opportunities here for research into comparative law reform. Compare Speidel,
supra note 2, and Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83 (discussing the difficulties of finding political
compromise in the uniform laws process) with SCHATZ-BERGFELD, supra note 213 (discussing finding a
political compromise in Germany).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
394. Micklitz, supra note 251, at 534 n.83 (U[T]here is hardly an area of the law, in which such
thorough comparative law inquiries have been produced."). For the general attitude in Europe, see Abbo
Junker, Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach, JZ 1994, 921, 921 (UWhoever today advocates turning
one's view across borders-'to substitute a global for a national horizon'--can be sure of broad approval. He is riding a mighty wave of the Zeitgeist.").
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European laptops. The United States can afford to ignore foreign law no
longer. 395

395. Cj Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why Are u.s. Lawyers Not Learning from
Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LA W 213 (Nedim Vogt et al. eds., 1997); Ernst
C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunity for Learning
from Civilized European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. 1. CaMP. L. 164 (1994); James
R Maxeiner, 1992: High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906
Address ReVisited, IS FORDHAM lNT'LL.J. I (1991).
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ApPENDIX

Standard terms provisions of the German Civil Code effective January 1,
2002, as translated by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann. 396
[Reprinted by Permission]
Section 2: Shaping contractual obligations by means of standard terms
§ 305 Incorporation of standard terms

397

into the contract

(I) Standard terms are all contractual terms pre-established for a multitude of contracts which one party
to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the conclusion of the contract. It is irrelevant
whether the provisions appear as a separate part of a contract or are included in the contractual
document itself, how extensive they are, what script is used for them, or what form the contract takes.
Contractual terms do not constitute standard terms where they have been individually negotiated
between the parties.
(2) Standard terms are incorporated into the contract only if, during the conclusion of the contract, the
user
I. expressly draws the other party's attention to them, or if, on account of the way in which the
contract is concluded, an express reference to them is unreasonably difficult, he draws his
attention to them by means of a clearly visible sign at the place where the contract is concluded
and
2. gives the other party, in a reasonable manner that also appropriately takes account of any
physical handicap of the other party discernible by the user, the possibility of gaining knowledge
of their content, and if the other party agrees that they are to apply.
(3) Subject to observance of the requirements set out in subsection (2) above, the parties may agree in
advance that particular standard terms will apply to a particular type oflegal transaction.

§ 305a Incorporation in special cases
Even if the requirements set out in § 305(2) Nos 1 and 2 are not observed, if the other party agrees to
their application:
I. railway tariffs and regulations adopted with the approval of the competent transport authority
or on the basis of international conventions and terms of transport, authorised in accordance with
the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in scheduled services are
incorporated into the transport contract;
2. standard terms published in the official journal of the regulatory authority for Post and
Telecommunications and kept available in the user's business premises are incorporated
(a) into contracts of carriage concluded away from business premises by the posting of
items in post boxes,
(b) into contracts for telecommunications, information and other services that are
provided directly and in one go by means of remote communication and during the
provision of a telecommunications service, if it is unreasonably difficult to make the
standard terms available to the other party before conclusion of the contract.

396. German Law Archive (2002), at http://www.iuscomp.org/glalstatutesIBGB.htm#b2.
397. The original of the translation into British English translates Allgemeine
Geschiiftsdedingungen as "standard business terms." This article prefers "standard terms" as the more
idiomatic American usage.
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§ 30Sb Precedence of individually negotiated terms
Individually negotiated terms take precedence over standard terms.

§ 30Sc Surprising and ambiguous clauses
(I) Provisions in standard terms which in the circumstances, in particular in view of the outward
appearance of the contract, are so unusual. that the contractual partner of the user could not be expected
to have reckoned with them, do not form part ofthe contract.
(2) In case of doubt, standard terms are interpreted against the user.

§ 306 Legal consequences of non-incorporation and invalidity
(I) If all or some standard terms have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the remainder of the
contract continues to be valid.
(2) Where provisions have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the content of the contract is
determined by the statutory rules.
(3) The contract is invalid if one party would suffer unreasonable hardship if he were bound by the
contract even after the amendment provided for in subsection (2) above.

§ 306a No circumvention
The rules in this section apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements.
398
§ 307 Content Control
(1) Provisions in standard terms are invalid if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they place the
contractual partner of the user at an unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also
result from the fact that the provision is not clear and comprehensible.
(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a provision
1. can not be reconciled with essential basic principles of the statutory rule from which it
deviates, or
2. restricts essential rights or duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner
that there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and §§ 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in standard terms by
means of which provisions derogating from legal rules or provisions supplementing those rules are
agreed. Other provisions may be invalid under subsection (1), sentence 2, above, in conjunction with
subsection (1), sentence 1, above.

§ 308 Clauses whose validity depends on an evaluation 399

In standard terms the following terms, in particular, are invalid:
1. (period for acceptance or performance)
a provision by which the user reserves the right to an unreasonably long or inadequately
specified period for acceptance or rejection of an offer or for performance; this does not include

398. The original of the translation translates Inhaltskontrolle as "Review of subject-matter."
399. The original of the translation translates Wertung as "appraisal."
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reservation of the right to perform only after expiry of the period for revocation or return under
§§ 355(1) and (2) and 356;

2. (additional period for performance)
a provision by which the user, in derogation from legislative provisions, reserves the right to an
unreasonably long or inadequately specified additional period within which to perform;
3. (right oftermination)
the stipulation of a right for the user to free himself, without an objectively justified reason
specified in the contract, of his duty to perform; this does not apply to a contract for the
performance of a recurring obligation;
4. (right of amendment)
the stipulation of the user's right to alter or depart from the promised performance, unless, taking
into account the user's interests, the stipulation to alter or depart from performance is reasonable
for the other party;

5. (fictitious declarations)
a provision whereby a declaration of the user's contractual partner is deemed or not deemed to
have been made by him ifhe does or fails to do a particular act, unless
a) he is allowed a reasonable period within which to make an express declaration and
b) the user undertakes to draw to his attention at the beginning of the period the particular
significance of his conduct; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B
of the contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated;
6. (fictional receipt)
a provision which provides that a declaration by the user of particular importance is deemed to
have been received by the other party;

7. (winding-up of contracts)
a provision by which, in the event that one of the parties to the contract terminates the contract or
gives notice to terminate it, the user can demand
a) unreasonably high remuneration for the utilisation or use of a thing or a right or for
performance made, or
b) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure;
8. (unavailability of the object of performance)
a stipulation permitted under 3. above of the user's right to free himself of his obligation to
perform the contract if the object of the performance is not available, unless the user agrees
a) to inform the other party immediately of the unavailability, and
b) immediately to refund counter-performance by that party.

§ 309 Clauses whose invalidity is not subject to any evaluation
Even where derogation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following are invalid in standard
terms:
1. (price increases at short notice)
a provision which provides for an increase in the remuneration for goods or services that are to
be supplied within four months of the conclusion of the contract; this does not apply to goods or
services supplied in the course of a recurring obligation;
2. (right to refuse to perform)
a provision by which
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a) the right under § 320 of the contractual partner of the user to refuse to perfonn is
excluded or restricted, or
b) a right of retention of the contractual partner of the user, in so far as it arises from the
same contractual relationship, is excluded or restricted, in particular by making it subject
to recognition by the user of the existence of defects;
3. (prohibition of set-off)
a provision by which the contractual partner of the user is deprived of the right to set off a claim
which is undisputed or has been declared final and absolute;
4. (notice, period for perfonnance)
a provision by which the user is relieved of the statutory requirement to give notice to the other
party to perfonn or to fix a period for perfonnance or supplementary perfonnance by him;
5. (lump-sum claims for damages)
stipulation of a lump-sum claim by the user for damages or for compensation for reduction in
value, if
a) the lump sum in the cases in question exceeds the damage expected in the nonnal
course of events or the reduction in value which nonnally occurs, or
b) the other party is not given the express right to prove that damage or reduction in value
has not occurred or is materially lower than the lump sum agreed;
6. (penalty)
a provision by which the user is entitled to receive payment of a penalty in the event of nonacceptance or late acceptance of perfonnance, delay in payment or in the event that the other
party withdraws from the contract;
7. (exclusion of liability for death,400 injury to body and health and for gross fault)
a) (death and injury to body and health)
exclusion or limitation of liability for losses arising out of death, injury to body or health
caused by negligent breach of duty by the user or a deliberate or negligent breach of duty
by his statutory agent or a person employed by him to perfonn the contract;
b) (gross fault)
exclusion or limitation of liability for other losses caused by a grossly negligent breach of
duty by the user or a deliberate or grossly negligent breach of duty by a statutory agent of
the user or by a person employed by him to perfonn the contract;
a) and b) above do not apply to restrictions of liability in the tenns of transport,
authorised in accordance with the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and
motor vehicles in scheduled services, in so far as they do not derogate, to the detriment of
passengers, from the Regulation concerning the tenns of transport by tram and trolley bus
and by motor vehicles in scheduled services of 27 February 1970; b) above does not
apply to restrictions ofliability for State-approved lottery or raffle contracts.
8. (other exclusions ofliability in the event of breach of duty)
a) (exclusion of the right to withdraw from the contract)
a provision which, upon a breach of duty for which the user is responsible and which
does not consist in a defect of the thing sold or the work, excludes or restricts the other
party's right to withdraw from the contract; this does not apply to the tenns of contract
and tariff rules referred to in No.7 on the conditions set out therein;
b) (defects)
a provision by which, in contracts for the supply of new, manufactured things or of work,
aa) (exclusion and reference of claims to third parties)
400 Literally, "injury to life."
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claims against the user on account of a defect as a whole or with regard to
individual elements of it are excluded entirely, restricted to the assignment of
claims against third parties, or which make the pursuit of legal proceedings
against third parties a condition precedent;
bb) (restriction to supplementary performance)
claims against the user are restricted, entirely or with regard to individual
elements, to a right to supplementary performance, unless the other party is given
an express right to claim a price reduction if supplementary performance is
unsuccessful or, except where the defects liability is in respect of building work,
to choose to terminate the contract;
cc) (expenditure incurred in the course of supplementary performance)
the user's obligation to bear the expenditure necessary for supplementary
performance, in particular the costs of carriage, transport, labour and materials, is
excluded or restricted;
dd) (withholding of supplementary performance)
the user makes supplementary performance conditional on the prior payment of
the entire price or, having regard to the defect, an unreasonably high proportion
thereof;
ee) (time-limit for notice of defects)
the user fixes a period within which the other party must give notice of nonobvious defects which is shorter than the period permitted under ff) below;
ff) (facilitation oflimitation)
facilitates the limitation of claims on account of defects in the cases set out in §
438(1), No.2 and § 634a(1), No.2, or, in other cases, results in a limitation period
of less than one year from the date on which the statutory period of limitation
begins; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B of the
contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated;
9. (period of recurring obligations)
in a contractual relationship concerning the periodic delivery of goods or the periodic supply of
services or work by the user,
a) a contract duration which binds the other party for more than two years,
b) a tacit extension of the contractual relationship which binds the other party for a period
of more than one year in each particular case, or
c) to the detriment of the other party, a period of notice to terminate the contract which is
more than three months prior to the expiration of the initial or tacitly extended period of
the contract;
this does not apply to contracts for the supply of things sold as a unit, to insurance
contracts or contracts between the owners of copyrights and of claims and copyright
collecting societies within the meaning of the Protection of Copyrights and Related
Rights Act;
lO. (change of contract partner)
a provision whereby in sales contracts, contracts for the supply of services or contracts for work
a third party assumes or may assume the rights and obligations of the user under the contract,
unless the provision
a) specifies the third party by name, or
b) gives the other party the right to withdraw from the contract;
II. (liability of an agent on conclusion of the contract)
a provision by which the user imposes on an agent who concludes the contract for the other
party,
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a) the agent's own liability or duty to perfonn the contractual obligation without having
made an express and separate declaration in that regard, or
b) where the agent lacks authority, liability which exceeds that under § 179;
12. (burden of proof)
a provision by which the user alters the burden of proof to the detriment of the other party in
particular by
a) imposing the burden in respect of circumstances which fall within the scope of the
user's responsibility, or
b) requiring the other party to acknowledge particular facts;
Subsection b) above does not apply to acknowledgments of receipt which are separately
signed or bear a separate, qualified electronic signature;
13. (fonn of notices and declarations)
a provision by which notices or declarations to be given to the user or third parties are subject to
a stricter requirement than the need for writing or to special requirements with regard to receipt.

§ 310 Scope of application
(1) § 305(2) and (3) and §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to standard tenns which are proffered to a
businessperson, a legal person governed by public law or a special fund governed by public law. In
those cases § 307(1) and (2) nevertheless applies to the extent that this results in the invalidity of the
contractual provisions referred to in §§ 308 and 309; due regard must be had to the customs and
practices applying in business transactions.
(2) §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of electricity, gas, district heating or water supply
undertakings for the supply to special customers of electricity, gas, district heating or water from the
supply grid unless the conditions of supply derogate, to the detriment of the customer, from Regulations
on general conditions for the supply of tariff customers with electricity, gas, district heating or water.
The first sentence applies mutatis mutandis to contracts for the disposal of sewage.
(3) In the case of contracts between a businessperson and a consumer (consumer contracts) the rules in
this section apply subject to the fol1owing provisions:
1. Standard tenns are deemed to have been proffered by the businessperson, unless the consumer
introduced them into the contract;
2. §§ 305c(2) and §§ 306, 307 to 309 of the present Act and Article 29a of the Introductory Act
to the Civil Code apply to pre-established conditions of contract even if they are intended for use
only once and in so far as, because they are pre-established, the consumer could not influence
their content.
3. When deciding whether there has been unreasonable detriment under § 307(1) and (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract must also be taken into account.
(4) This section does not apply to contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and
company law or to collective agreements and private- or public-sector works agreements. When it is
applied to labour contracts, appropriate regard must be had to the special features of labour law; § 305
(2) and (3) is not to be applied. Col1ective agreements and public and private sector works agreements
are equivalent to legal rules within the meaning of § 307(3).

